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16 Chapter 1. Introduction
1.1 Referential overspecification
When people are having a conversation, they use referring expressions
all the time. There is substantial variation across referring expressions
in several respects. They can have concrete referents (‘this book’), but
also very abstract referents (‘the power of love’). They can be utterly
complex in their grammatical form (‘the malicious-looking but in fact
quite peaceful dog lying on the woolen carpet’), but also quite simple
(‘it’). And they can contain a high amount of descriptive content (‘the
woman who was the first female conductor in the Netherlands and moved
to the Unites States after the Second World War’) or a very low amount
(‘that one’).
When speakers use a referring expression, they provide their hearer
with information about their referent. The degree of informativeness of
a referring expression is determined by the context in which it is uttered.
Imagine, for instance, that someone enters a room full of vases in different
colours, two of which are red and only one of them made of porcelain.
If she utters the request in (1), the referring expression (in italics) is ex-
actly informative enough for the hearer to identify the referent. Had she
entered a room where a big and a small red porcelain vase were present,
the same expression would not have been sufficiently informative, even
if the amount of descriptive content has not changed. And if the red
porcelain vase were in fact the only vase in the whole room, the same re-
ferring expression would provide the hearer with more information than
necessary.
(1) Could you hand me the red porcelain vase?
The referring expression in (1) in the last context is an example of what is
known in the literature as referential overspecification. Overspecified refer-
ring expressions are definite descriptions in which at least one property
of the referent is included that is not necessary for the addressee to iden-
tify the referent in a given context. In English, a definite description
minimally consists of the definite article ‘the’ and a noun. It is overspec-
ified when one or more unnecessary modifiers are included, which can
be adjectives (‘peaceful’), prepositional phrases (‘on the table’), and rela-
tive clauses (‘lying on the woolen carpet’). Although at first sight it may
seem odd that a speaker should include an unnecessary modifier, nu-
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merous experimental studies have shown that overspecification is in fact
common (e.g., Mangold and Pobel, 1988; Belke, 2006; Koolen et al., 2013).
In most studies, the majority of the overspecified referring expressions
contain an unnecessary colour modifier (e.g., Pechmann, 1989; Arts et al.,
2011b; Davies and Katsos, 2013). That is, overspecification is often colour
overspecification.
If we want to understand human behaviour, we need to understand
human communication. Since reference is integral to human communi-
cation, it is essential to understand the way humans use referring expres-
sions. And as it is common for speakers to use overspecified referring
expressions, we also need to understand the phenomenon of referential
overspecification. This thesis aims to contribute to a better understanding
of overspecification. First, a survey of the experimental literature on this
topic will be presented, which concludes with possible explanations for
overspecification that have been proposed. I will then present a proposal
for an alternative account, in which insights from different accounts are
combined. Second, I will present a series of experimental studies that
aim to extend our knowledge of the patterns in overspecification. As the
literature shows that colour overspecification is common, the focus of the
experimental studies will be on this phenomenon. Two other attributes
will receive considerable attention too: pattern and size. Furthermore,
the studies focus on salience, which is a key notion in the literature.
Just as important as it is to know what this thesis is about, is it to
know what it is not about. Overspecification is in the first instance an
aspect of language production. The results of comprehension studies will
therefore only be discussed insofar as they are relevant for understanding
the production of overspecification.
Furthermore, although there are many ways in which a referring ex-
pression can be overinformative, some ways have received more attention
in the literature than others. For example, ‘the dog’ in (2a) would be over-
informative if the referent were the only animal in the context, since the
less informative expression ‘the animal’ would do in this context as well.
To the best of our knowledge, this phenomenon has not been discussed
in the literature on overspecification (but see Dale and Reiter’s (1995) dis-
cussion of their FindBestValue function). Moreover, speakers have such a
strong preference for using basic-level terms like ‘dog’, that in a context
with two dogs, one white and one black, ‘the white dog’ is not even con-
sidered an instance of overspecification, although ‘the white one’ would
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be strictly speaking sufficient for the addressee to identify the referent in
this context.
(2) a. Did you see the dog this morning?
b. The dog ate a strawberry in our back garden and left right
away.
If the speaker of (2a) immediately continued by uttering (2b), we would
have another example of a referring expression that can be considered
overinformative: normally, she would continue talking about the dog that
she just introduced by using the personal pronoun ‘it’, as the discourse
context yields it sufficiently salient. There is an extensive literature on
referring expressions that are overinformative in this way (see, e.g., Ariel,
1990; Gundel et al., 1993; Vogels et al., 2013); this thesis, however, focuses
exclusively on referring expressions that are overspecified with respect to
the visual context.
Finally, the thesis will focus almost exclusively on what has been
called ‘one-shot references’ (Brennan and Clark, 1996; Krahmer and van
Deemter, 2012). In a production experiment eliciting one-shot references,
each trial provides a new referent in a new visual context. Hence, the
addressee cannot rely on the preceding discourse when identifying the
referent, but only on the current visual context. There is an extensive
literature, too, on the role of discourse factors in overspecification (e.g.,
Brennan and Clark, 1996; Van Der Wege, 2009; Goudbeek and Krahmer,
2012; Gann and Barr, 2014). In this thesis, that work will not be discussed
in detail, although it will receive some attention in Chapter 2.
In sum, the topic of this thesis is overspecification. Its main focus is
on overspecification in definite expressions which contain a colour (or
pattern or size) modifier that is not necessary for referent identification,
given the context in which it is uttered.
1.2 Overview of the thesis
In the remainder of this chapter, I present a survey of the experimental
literature on the production of overspecification. I start, in Section 1.3,
by discussing the patterns that have been found thus far. Colour over-
specification is discussed most extensively. Since this thesis is limited to
overspecification with respect to the visual context, the focus is on visual
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factors that are involved in overspecification. In Section 1.4, I discuss
the answers that have been given in the literature to the question of why
speakers produce overspecification. As is common in the literature (e.g.,
Arnold, 2008; Arts et al., 2011b; Davies and Katsos, 2013), the accounts are
divided into two families: those explaining overspecification in terms of
production efficiency, and those accounting for overspecification in terms
of communicational benefits.
The present chapter is followed by a theoretical study of overspecifica-
tion (Chapter 2). Following Marr (1982) and Geurts and Rubio-Ferna´ndez
(2015), I show that the two explanations of overspecification that have
been proposed in the literature in fact operate on two different levels of
explanation. I argue that by adopting a Gricean framework, it is possi-
ble to sketch an outline for an account of overspecification in which in-
sights from both families of accounts are integrated. I propose that when
producing referring expressions, speakers make use of general heuris-
tics which result in cooperative behaviour. For example, a heuristic like
‘include the most salient attributes of the referent’ enables speakers to
provide their hearer with useful information. They thus maximise effi-
ciency of both reference production and comprehension: using heuristics
saves effort on the part of the speaker, while including information that
is likely to be helpful in identifying the referent saves effort on the part
of the hearer.
Next, I present a number of experimental studies on overspecification
in Chapters 3–6, again with a focus on colour overspecification. Salience
is a central theme in all those studies, but the focus will narrow down as
we go along. In each chapter, an experiment or a series of experiments is
presented. All are production experiments in which speakers instruct an
imaginary addressee to click on one of several pictures that are displayed
on a computer monitor. Since all displays are organised in such a way
that the intended referent is unique (e.g., if the referent is a dress, there
is no other dress), speakers who include colour, or another attribute, au-
tomatically produce overspecification. This design makes it possible to
compare the rates of overspecification that are produced under various
conditions.
The focus in Chapter 3 is on variation across objects. The starting point
is the proposal made in Chapter 2, according to which the use of heuris-
tics enables speakers to be generally cooperative, maximising efficiency of
both production and comprehension of referring expressions. The central
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question is whether the use of such a general cooperative strategy may
sometimes yield patterns in overspecification which, at first sight, do not
seem to be due to a cooperative strategy. To answer this question, colour
overspecification rates in reference to objects of different categories are
compared. The categories vary in the degree to which colour is salient to
the objects. One factor that is argued to affect colour salience is the degree
to which colour is felt to be important to an object. For example, most
people find colour more important to a dress than to a teapot, but more
important to a teapot than to a stapler. The colour of a teapot is therefore
probably less salient than the colour of a dress, but more salient than the
colour of a stapler. The cooperative strategy to include salient attributes
may thus result in a stronger tendency to produce colour overspecifica-
tion when referring to clothes than when referring to office supplies. The
hearer, however, is unlikely to benefit more from colour overspecification
when the referent is a dress than when it is a stapler. That is, if a corre-
lation were found between the degree to which colour is important (and
hence salient) to objects on the one hand, and the rate of colour over-
specification in reference to those objects on the other hand, the pattern
in overspecification would not seem to reflect any cooperativeness. Still,
the underlying heuristic to include salient attributes would in fact be an
implementation of a general tendency towards cooperativeness.
In Chapter 4, the focus shifts from variation across objects to variation
across attributes. The study investigates how the salience and absolute-
ness of colour contribute to the strong tendency that has been found in
many studies to produce colour overspecification. Absolute attributes
have been proposed to be more likely to be included than relative at-
tributes, because the latter are context-dependent. Size, for example, is a
relative attribute: an object is only big or small in comparison to another
object. That an object is red, in contrast, can normally be determined
without comparing it to other objects, which is why colour is considered
to be an absolute attribute. In a series of four experiments, the rates
of overspecification of three attributes are compared: colour (blue and
green), pattern (striped and spotted), and size (big and small). Pattern is
similar to colour in being salient and absolute, but unlike colour, it has
hardly been explored so far. Size is different from colour and pattern
in being relative and often low in salience, which may explain why size
overspecification is not common in experimental settings. In the present
study, the salience of size is varied, however, by manipulating size con-
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trast. Comparing colour to pattern and size thus provides an opportunity
to assess how salience and absoluteness contribute to the rate of colour
overspecification. Moreover, it makes it possible to assess the alleged
special status of colour in reference production. An additional question
that is addressed in this study is whether the tendency to include one
attribute (e.g., colour) affects the tendency to include another one (e.g.,
pattern), due to speakers’ well-known tendency to be consistent.
As pointed out before, it is often claimed that speakers tend to pro-
duce colour overspecification because colour is highly salient (e.g., Arts
et al., 2011b; Gatt et al., 2013; Koolen et al., 2013). Although this may
often be true, not all colours are as salient as the bright, saturated, and
contrastive colours that have been used for most experimental stimuli:
wine red may not be as salient as fire engine red, for instance. This raises
the question of whether the tendency to produce colour overspecification
depends on the salience of the particular colours. As in the previous
chapter, the data under study in Chapter 5 consist of rates of colour, pat-
tern, and size overspecification. Narrowing down the focus still further,
this study explores the variation in salience within attributes. Overspecifi-
cation rates are compared in reference to objects in salient shades of blue
and green versus less conspicuous pastel tones of those colours, salient
black-and-white patterns versus less contrastive grey-and-white patterns,
and very big versus very small objects versus objects less contrastive in
size. The main hypothesis of the study is that speakers are more likely
to produce overspecification when the referent’s colour, pattern, or size is
highly salient than when it is less salient.
Finally, the focus narrows to an exploration of the factors that con-
tribute to colour salience, and hence the tendency to produce colour over-
specification. The study presented in Chapter 6 aims to assess, and tease
apart, the effects of colour typicality and colour contrast on the produc-
tion of colour overspecification. Colour typicality is the degree to which
speakers of a language feel that a colour is a good example of a colour
category. For instance, the colours of fresh peas and grass are generally
considered to be better examples of the category ‘green’ than mint cream
or olive green. Speakers may be more likely to produce colour overspeci-
fication when referring to objects in highly typical colours. Alternatively,
or additionally, the tendency to produce colour overspecification may be
affected by the amount of contrast between the colours of the referent and
the surrounding objects: the referent’s colour may be more salient when
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it is very different from the colour of an object in the context (e.g., pastel
blue versus army green) than when their colours are more similar to each
other (e.g., pastel blue versus pastel green). The relative effects of colour
typicality and colour contrast on colour overspecification are investigated
in the final experimental study of this thesis.
1.3 Patterns in overspecification
In this section, I present a survey of the patterns in the production of
overspecification that have been found in the experimental literature. The
section is organised as follows. Section 1.3.1 provides a brief histori-
cal overview of the changing ideas about the production of overspec-
ification in psycholinguistics and computational linguistics. In Section
1.3.2, I introduce two important ideas in research on overspecification:
the incremental selection of attributes and the preference that speakers
demonstrate for some attributes over others. I show that the tendency to
produce colour overspecification is so strong that including colour in re-
ferring expressions seems to be a general strategy of speakers. In Section
1.3.3, however, I show that the tendency to include colour is modulated
by several visual factors in a way that suggests that speakers are in fact
concerned with giving information that is relevant for their interlocutor.
In a typical experimental study that investigates the production of
overspecification, a participant is positioned in front of a computer moni-
tor which displays, in each trial, an array with a number of pictures (often
between four and eight). Usually, an arrow or a line indicates which pic-
ture is supposed to be the referent; this picture is called the target. The
other pictures are called competitors or distractors. The participant’s task is
to produce a referring expression in such a way that an addressee would
be able to identify the referent. Often, participants talk to an imaginary
addressee or an avatar, although in some experiments they talk to another
participant or a confederate of the experimenter. Occasionally, the task is
to produce a written utterance. By controlling and manipulating picture
arrays, and hence the visual context in which participants produce their
utterances, researchers are able to explore the patterns in the production
of referring expressions.
The main focus in research on overspecification has been on visual
factors, such as the complexity of the array (e.g., a high versus low num-
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ber of pictures; Sonnenschein, 1985; Koolen et al., 2015), the attributes the
pictures have (e.g., different colours, sizes, and shapes; Pechmann, 1989;
Belke and Meyer, 2002; Arts et al., 2011b), and the way those attributes
are distributed over the pictures in the array (e.g., the target sharing at-
tributes with none, some, or all of the competitors; Mangold and Pobel,
1988; Gatt et al., 2013). In the present section, I will discuss the most im-
portant findings in which visual factors are involved that have been found
thus far. Some studies are concerned with other factors than visual ones,
such as whether speakers are more likely to produce overspecification
when referent identification is crucial than when this is less important
(Arts et al., 2011b). Patterns found in those studies will be discussed in
Sections 1.4 and in Chapter 2.
1.3.1 Acknowledging overspecification
Currently, there is a large body of experimental evidence indicating that
speakers commonly produce overspecification. Before experimental re-
search on the production of referring expressions, however, it was as-
sumed in psycholinguistics and computational linguistics that minimal
specification is the norm in adult speech. In the realm of psycholinguis-
tics, Olson stated, for example, that ‘[speakers] specify the object to the
level required by the listener to differentiate the intended referent from
the alternatives’1 (Olson, 1970, pp. 264–265); this assumption was later
called the ‘minimum redundancy hypothesis’ (Freedle, 1972). The same
assumption was made by Garmiza and Anisfeld, who stipulated that
overspecification is ‘less efficient [than minimal specification] because it
burdens the listener with irrelevant information and may thus cause him
to fail to notice or to utilize the critical attribute’ (Garmiza and Anisfeld,
1976, p. 126).
In line with this assumption, an early computational approach to the
generation of referring expressions implemented the ‘principle of effi-
ciency’ in an algorithm for the production of definite descriptions, which
required that referring expressions must only contain the information
necessary for the task at hand (Dale, 1989). Although admittedly this
1Olson was aware that this is not always so: ‘speakers tend to use a degree of re-
dundancy, perhaps for the benefit of the listener – a subject that wants further study.’
(Olson, 1970, p. 266).
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algorithm was not claimed to model human speakers, the efficiency prin-
ciple was explicitly based on one of the Gricean conversational maxims
(Grice, 1975), which are supposed to regulate production and interpreta-
tion of utterances in conversation.
In the 1970s and 1980s, the results of reference production experi-
ments indicated that overspecified referring expressions are in fact com-
monly produced. Ford and Olson (1975) found that seven-year-old chil-
dren tended to produce overspecification, and more so than four-year-old
children. Maintaining the minimum redundancy hypothesis, they con-
cluded that seven-year-olds are in an intermediate stage of development,
which should eventually result in full context-sensitivity and avoidance
of overspecification in adult speech (Ford and Olson, 1975, p. 381). It
soon turned out, however, that this latter step failed to occur; rather, chil-
dren showed a tendency to produce underspecification that decreased
with age, while the tendency to produce overspecification increased un-
til about the age of nine, where the production of overspecification was
found to be adult-like (Whitehurst, 1976; Deutsch and Pechmann, 1982).
Meanwhile, it had been shown that finding the smallest possible de-
scription is computationally intractable (Garey and Johnson, 1979; Dale
and Reiter, 1995): since an algorithm for the production of minimal de-
scriptions has to check all possible combinations of attributes and values,
its run time becomes excessive as soon as the number of attributes and
values are even slightly realistic. Any feasible algorithm for the produc-
tion of definite descriptions should therefore yield some degree of re-
dundancy. Although Dale and Reiter (1995) cautioned against drawing
conclusions from computational intractability about what human speak-
ers do, they acknowledged that experimental studies with human par-
ticipants showed that overspecification occurs frequently in adult speech
(Mangold and Pobel, 1988; Pechmann, 1989), which strongly suggests that
speakers do not strive for minimal descriptions. Clearly, an algorithm that
aims to model human speakers needs to regularly produce overspecifica-
tion.
1.3.2 Colour preference
Two basic principles in algorithms for reference production have been
particularly influential in research on attribute selection by human speak-
ers. The first is the principle of incremental selection, which was imple-
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mented for the first time in the Greedy Heuristic (Dale, 1989; see also
Johnson, 1974). The Greedy Heuristic selects attributes according to their
discriminatory power (Dale, 1989). The discriminatory power of an at-
tribute is determined by the number of competitors (the objects in the
visual context other than the referent) that share the attribute with the
referent. For example, when the referent is a red chair, the discriminatory
power of colour is higher when it is surrounded by objects in colours
other than red than when some of the surrounding objects are red as
well. To be precise, the discriminatory power of an attribute is computed
by dividing the number of competitors that do not share the referent’s
attribute by the total number of competitors. Thus, the discriminatory
power of colour is 1 when the red chair is the only red object in the con-
text, 0 when all objects in the context are red, and a value between 1
and 0 when some surrounding objects are red while others have differ-
ent colours. According to the Greedy Heuristic, the first attribute to be
selected is the one with the highest discriminatory power, the next is the
one with the next highest discriminatory power, and so on. The selection
process stops as soon as the description distinguishes the referent from
all other objects in the context. This process is incremental because once
selected, an attribute cannot be deselected any more, even if it turns out
to be unnecessary in the end.2
The principle of incremental selection was particularly relevant in the
light of a very similar suggestion made by Pechmann (1989). Eyetracking
data obtained in a reference production experiment with human speak-
ers showed that speakers tend to start articulating referring expressions
before having scanned the whole visual context. That is, they do not
only select attributes incrementally, as the Greedy Heuristic does, but they
also articulate referring expressions incrementally. Importantly, however,
2It may be unexpected that a selection process based on discriminatory power can
yield overspecification. Imagine, however, a situation in which the referent is a big red
striped circle, surrounded by six other circles: two small, blue and striped (1, 2), two big,
blue and spotted (3, 4), one small, red and striped (5), and one big, red and spotted (6).
In this situation, four circles do not share the referent’s colour (1–4), three do not share
its size (1, 2, 5), and three do not share its pattern (3, 4, 6). The Greedy Heuristic will
thus first select colour (ruling out circles 1–4). To yield a fully distinguishing referring
expression, both size and pattern have to be added (size to rule out circle 5, and pattern
to rule out circle 6). However, the resulting expression (‘the red big striped circle’) is an
instance of colour overspecification, since only adding pattern and size (‘the big striped
circle’) would have resulted in a fully distinguishing expression, too.
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Pechmann made an additional observation: in his experiment, colour was
unnecessarily included much more often than any other attribute. Ac-
cording to Pechmann, this might be because the colour of the referent is
perceived immediately and can be included before investigating the vi-
sual context (unlike, e.g., size, which can only be determined relative to
the visual context). It is this observation which inspired Dale and Re-
iter (1995) to implement the second influential principle: preference orders.
Like the Greedy Heuristic, their Incremental Algorithm selects attributes
incrementally. It does not, however, select attributes according to their
discriminatory power, but it considers the attributes in a predefined or-
der, selecting them if they rule out any distractor that has not been ruled
out before, until a distinguishing description is reached. If colour is the
first attribute on the list, the Incremental Algorithm will include it in ev-
ery case where the Greedy Heuristic does. Indeed, it will include colour
in many more situations, as its discriminatory power need not even be rel-
atively high; as long as it is higher than 0, colour will always be selected.
When selecting attributes according to their discriminatory power, like
the Greedy Heuristic does, it is impossible to select an attribute before
having investigated all objects in the context. Dale and Reiter (1995) state
that the Incremental Algorithm is therefore more human-like than the
Greedy Heuristic. This is not to say, of course, that human speakers do
not use discriminatory power at all when selecting attributes: in humans,
several strategies for attribute selection may be combined.
The idea that colour is preferred over other attributes has become
widely accepted (e.g. Koolen et al., 2011; Goudbeek and Krahmer, 2012;
Gatt et al., 2013). This claim does not only cover the fact that colour is
often included unnecessarily, but also the fact that when speakers have to
choose between colour and another attribute in order to distinguish the
referent from the other objects in the context, they normally choose colour
rather than the other attribute (Belke and Meyer, 2002; Viethen et al., 2012;
Gatt et al., 2013). For example, in a situation where the referent is a big
red cup and a second cup is small and yellow, speakers are more likely
to say ‘the red cup’ than ‘the big cup’, even though colour and size are
equally informative. Experimental studies show that colour is included in
definite descriptions more often than several other attributes: size (Belke
and Meyer, 2002; Arts et al., 2011b; Brown-Schmidt and Konopka, 2011),
shape (Mangold and Pobel, 1988), material (Sedivy, 2005), location (Arts
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et al., 2011b), pattern (Gatt et al., 2013)3, and orientation (Gatt et al., 2007).
The preference for colour over other attributes is generally argued
to be due to the ease with which colour is perceived: colour has been
claimed to be ‘easily cognizable’ (Pechmann, 1989, p. 103), ‘easily percep-
tible’ (Dale and Reiter, 1995, p. 250), ‘absolute’ (Belke and Meyer, 2002, p.
240), and ‘perceptually salient’ (Koolen et al., 2011, p. 3234). This will be
discussed in more detail in Chapter 4. Additionally, Viethen et al. (2012)
have shown that ‘linguistic codability’ plays a role: in a reference task,
speakers preferred colour over size to a greater extent when they could
use a basic colour term (e.g., ‘blue’) than when a basic colour term did not
distinguish the referent from the other objects in the context (e.g., when
the referent was dark blue and the other objects were light blue).
The idea of a preference order determining attribute selection was at
the heart of the Incremental Algorithm, which was designed as an alter-
native to algorithms which select attributes according to discriminatory
power, like the Greedy Heuristic. Indeed, several studies suggest that the
impact of discriminatory power on attribute selection is relatively weak
(van Deemter et al., 2012; Gatt et al., 2013; Viethen et al., 2014). How-
ever, experimental evidence suggests that the Incremental Algorithm does
not model human speakers in a satisfactory way (e.g. Viethen and Dale,
2006; Gatt et al., 2007; Dale and Viethen, 2010). A particularly relevant
example here is the following. Even the Incremental Algorithm takes
into account discriminatory power to some degree; it will never select
an attribute which has a discriminatory power of 0; for example, it will
not select colour when all objects, including the referent, have the same
colour. However, it has been found in several studies that even in such
monochrome contexts, colour overspecification is sometimes produced
(Mangold and Pobel, 1988; Belke and Meyer, 2002; Koolen et al., 2013).
This is not only at odds with the Incremental Algorithm, but also, and
more importantly, surprising when taking into account the possibility
that unnecessary attributes may sometimes be included because they are
nevertheless helpful in referent identification (a suggestion that will re-
ceive more attention in Section 1.4.2 and in Chapter 2). After all, given a
monochrome context, a colour term cannot be beneficial in referent iden-
tification in any way, hence being truly redundant.
The finding that colour overspecification is sometimes produced in
3See Chapter 4 for a discussion of the way pattern was manipulated in that study.
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monochrome contexts may give the impression that colour is included in
object reference by default; a suggestion that has indeed been made (Se-
divy, 2003, p. 14). Further evidence that speakers tend to include colour
as a general strategy will be presented in Chapter 3. However, there are
several other factors that have been found to affect the tendency to pro-
duce colour overspecification, which is not in line with the suggestion
that colour is included by default. In the remainder of this chapter, I
will discuss experimental findings suggesting what kind of factors play
a role in the production of colour overspecification, and overspecification
in general.
1.3.3 Including colour and contextual factors
Although it has been shown that discriminatory power has relatively little
impact on the selection of attributes, it is not the case that it has no effect
at all. In a series of reference production experiments with items differing
in colour, shape, and size, Mangold and Pobel (1988) found that speak-
ers always included colour when its discriminatory power was 1 (that is,
when the colour of the referent was unique in the array) and the discrim-
inatory power of the other two attributes was lower than 1. Speakers in-
cluded colour less often when its discriminatory power was lower than 1
but higher than 0 while either size or shape had a discriminatory power of
1, and they included colour still less often when its discriminatory power
was 0. A similar trend was shown for size and shape overspecification
(although speakers barely produced any of it when the discriminatory
power of colour was 1). Indeed, a discriminatory power of 1 makes an
attribute both highly salient and useful in referent identification, while a
discriminatory power of 0 makes it low in salience and entirely useless in
referent identification. Apparently, even the inclusion of colour, being a
highly preferred attribute, is affected by such considerations.
It is not only the visual context that affects the tendency to produce
colour overspecification. When Sedivy (2003) suggested that colour is in-
cluded in the default descriptions of most objects, her main point was
that this is actually not the case for entities that are strongly associated
with a certain colour, such as bananas, grasshoppers, and fire engines.
In a reference production study, she found that speakers rarely produced
colour overspecification when referring to such colour-diagnostic objects.
That is, speakers are less likely to mention the colour of an object when
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it is predictable from the type of object than when it is not. If colour
is predictable, including it is truly redundant, because it is unlikely to
be helpful for referent identification in any way. These results have re-
cently been confirmed by Rubio-Ferna´ndez (2016). Interestingly, Wester-
beek et al. (2015) and Rubio-Ferna´ndez (2016) have shown that the reverse
is also true: when a colour-diagnostic entity is presented in an atypical
colour, such as a banana that is red, speakers are more likely to produce
colour overspecification than when they are referring to an object that
is not associated with a specific colour. Indeed, unexpected colours are
highly salient, and presumably very useful for referent identification.
The finding that the tendency to produce colour overspecification is
affected by the degree to which colour is predictable from the referent’s
object category suggests that speakers are concerned with what infor-
mation is relevant for their interlocutor. A very different finding points
into the same direction. In a recent experiment, Koolen et al. (2014) pro-
vided speakers with photographs of visual scenes with three coloured ob-
jects. The scenes were always such that size needed to be included, while
including colour resulted in overspecification. For example, two green
bowls of different sizes, the smaller one being the target, were standing
closely next to each other, and then there was a more distant, yellow
object which could be a plate or another big bowl. It was found that
colour overspecification was produced more when all objects were of the
same type than when the third object was of a different type. If an object
which shares its type with the referent is more likely to be considered as
a relevant competitor than an object of a different type, this finding can
be explained in terms of relevance: speakers are more likely to include
colour when it distinguishes between the referent and any relevant object,
which is only the case in the first situation. This interpretation is sup-
ported by a second finding in the same experiment. Apart from the third
object’s type, its position in the scene was manipulated, too: it could be
on the same table as the other two objects, or on a sideboard. Importantly,
the distance between the referent and the third object in the photograph
was kept constant; the question was whether participants would be more
likely to group the third object together with the other objects if it was on
the same table than when it was on the sideboard, and hence to consider
it as a more relevant competitor in the first case, resulting in more colour
overspecification. This prediction was corroborated by the data, provid-
ing additional evidence that speakers take into account what information
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is relevant when selecting colour.
Complexity of the context has also been shown to trigger colour over-
specification, and overspecification in general. Koolen et al. (2015) found
that speakers are more likely to produce colour overspecification in a
‘cluttered’ scene, where ‘clutter’ was defined as ‘a collection of objects
that are thematically related to a particular target object’ (Koolen et al.,
2015, p. 7). The amount of clutter is hence positively correlated to the
number of (thematically related) objects in a scene. A positive effect of
the number of objects in the visual context on overspecification was also
found by Sonnenschein (1985). In this study, ten-year-old children (but
not six-year-olds) produced more overspecification (both colour overspec-
ification and unnecessary inclusion of other attributes) in contexts with
24 objects than in contexts with 12 objects. These findings are in line with
Pechmann’s (1989) suggestion that overspecification can be due to speak-
ers including attributes before scanning the entire visual context: as it
takes longer to examine all objects in the visual context when the number
of objects is high than when it is low, it is more likely that salient at-
tributes, and especially unnecessary colour adjectives, are included while
they are not necessary for referent identification. In the light of the find-
ings above, which suggest that speakers take into account the relevance of
the information they include when selecting attributes, it is not surprising
that speakers produce more overspecification when the visual context is
complex: there are more candidates that may be relevant, and it probably
takes more effort to find out whether they are. Moreover, comprehension
studies suggest that hearers benefit from overspecification more when
the visual context is complex than when it is simple (see Section 1.4.2).
A plausible alternative explanation for the effect of contextual complex-
ity on overspecification may therefore be that speakers take into account
what is convenient for their hearer.
1.3.4 Summary
In contrast to initial assumptions in psycholinguistics and computational
linguistics, adult speakers commonly produce overspecification. In gen-
eral, speakers have a preference for including colour over other attributes.
They often do so even if colour turns out to be unnecessary, which is
roughly in line with the predictions made by the Incremental Algorithm.
It has been argued that colour is preferred because it is easily perceived,
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and also because it is easy to encode linguistically. The preference for
including colour is so strong that, against the predictions made by the In-
cremental Algorithm, colour is sometimes included even in monochrome
contexts. The production of colour overspecification in situations where
including colour is clearly non-functional suggests the use of a general
strategy to include colour into referring expressions.
On the other hand, it has become clear that there are various factors
modulating this preference: effects have been found of discriminatory
power of colour, the apparent relevance of competitors and the colour
of particular referents, and complexity of the context. Effects like these
provide some insight into the question of why speakers produce over-
specification. In the next section, explanations proposed in the literature
will be discussed further.
1.4 Explanations for overspecification
In the previous section, I presented several experimental findings that
throw light on the patterns in the production of colour overspecification.
I showed that although including colour in referring expressions may
be a general strategy of speakers, there are several factors modulating
this strategy. While discussing these factors, I already touched upon the
question of why speakers do what they do. In the present section, I go
into this question in more detail, reviewing the explanations that have
been proposed in the literature.
I divide the proposed explanations into two families. The accounts
that explain the production of overspecification in terms of production ef-
ficiency are discussed in Section 1.4.1. Central to those explanations is the
idea that overspecification may reduce the effort speakers have to make
when producing referring expressions. In Section 1.4.2, explanations in
terms of communicative benefits are discussed. Those explanations focus
on the role of unnecessary attributes in referent identification. Although
the two types of accounts are not mutually exclusive, it is sometimes sug-
gested that they are. This point is addressed in Chapter 2.
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1.4.1 Production efficiency
Incrementality
As was already mentioned in Section 1.3.2, an influential account of the
occurrence of overspecification is Pechmann’s (1989) account in terms of
incrementality. As speech is produced incrementally, speakers may of-
ten start uttering a referring expression before they have investigated the
whole scene. If attributes are selected in this way, discriminatory power
cannot be the selection criterion, simply because discriminatory power
can only be determined when taking into account all objects in the vi-
sual context. Alternatively, speakers may first articulate attributes which
are easily perceivable and hence early available. As we have seen in the
previous section, colour is generally thought to be such an attribute. The
first attributes selected need not be required for referent identification,
however. In the end, they may turn out to be unnecessary.
Pechmann’s incrementality account has been supported by eyetrack-
ing data. Brown-Schmidt and Konopka (2011) found that speakers only
included size adjectives after fixating on an item in the context which
was of the same type as the referent but different in size (e.g., a large but-
terfly, when the referent was a small butterfly), indicating that speakers
tend to check whether size is necessary before they decide to include it
in a definite description. Colour adjectives, on the other hand, were often
produced without going through this checking procedure. This confirms
the idea, proposed by Belke and Meyer (2002), among others, that the
asymmetry between colour and size might be due to the fact that colour
is an absolute attribute while size is relative.
The incrementality account is not entirely satisfactory, however. Since
it claims that colour overspecification arises because speakers start ar-
ticulating the colour adjective while they are scanning the whole visual
context to determine which additional attributes need to be included, it
predicts that in a referring expression with an unnecessary colour adjec-
tive and a necessary size adjective, the colour adjective should precede
the size adjective. Although in West-Germanic languages, the reverse or-
der (e.g., ‘the big red car’) is the canonical one (Sproat and Shih, 1991;
Cinque, 1994), some of the Dutch speakers in Pechmann’s production
experiment indeed produced definite descriptions in which colour pre-
ceded size, supporting the incrementality account. However, in a refer-
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ence production experiment conducted by Belke (2006), German speak-
ers included colour in almost all trials where no colour modifiers were
required, but none of the unnecessary colour adjectives preceded the size
adjective. Hence, the production of colour overspecification in this exper-
iment cannot be explained by Pechmann’s incrementality account.
Although colour overspecification might not always be due to incre-
mental articulation, Belke’s experiment is consistent with the idea that
attributed are selected incrementally. In her experiment, participants were
presented with items varying in colour and size. Eyetracking data showed
that speakers started investigating the visual context by grouping to-
gether items that had the same colour as the referent. Only then, size
differences in the array, and usually only within this group of items, were
investigated. Colour overspecification occurred in 87% of the trials where
colour modification was unnecessary, whereas size overspecification oc-
curred in only 26.7% of the trials where size modification was unneces-
sary. Together, the data suggest that as soon as a colour contrast in the vi-
sual context is detected, colour is selected in most cases without checking
whether it is necessary. Only after that, the items that are not excluded by
the colour adjective are investigated to select attributes that are necessary
for correct referent identification. That colour is selected does not mean,
however, that a colour adjective is immediately articulated: the speech
production system is, to a certain extent, capable of ‘looking ahead’, and
hence of postponing the articulation of a word or phrase in order to yield
a phrase that is grammatically correct (Levelt, 1989, pp. 24–26). There-
fore, including both colour and size need not result in a non-canonical
word order.
Whether overspecification is due to incremental articulation or selec-
tion of attributes, both accounts provide an explanation for the occurrence
of overspecification in terms of production efficiency. The fact that an al-
gorithm for generation of minimal descriptions in natural situations is
computationally intractable, as was pointed out in Section 1.3.2, suggests
that even if speakers were able to compute the discriminatory power of
all available attributes, it would be an immensely costly way to produce
referring expressions. Selecting attributes without determining each at-
tribute’s discriminatory power is far more efficient, since the speaker need
not check the relevance of each attribute selected. Pechmann’s account is,
then, a specification of how speakers produce definite descriptions in a
relatively efficient way.
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Pechmann’s proposal was never meant to be a complete account of the
production of definite descriptions; it is an account of overspecification.
By contrast, in the computational literature, the aim is to algorithmically
model human reference production. In this literature, alternative and
more precise specifications have been proposed in terms of heuristics.
Heuristics
It has been suggested that human decision making is largely guided by
heuristics, that is, by simple principles ‘that reduce the complex tasks of
assessing probabilities and predicting values to simpler judgmental oper-
ations’ (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974, p. 1124). Relying on heuristics is
thought to be efficient, because it saves the effort of making precise com-
putations. Although the resulting solutions may not be perfect, they are
supposed to be good enough in general. Recently, it has been suggested
that when producing definite descriptions, speakers might rely on heuris-
tics as well (Dale and Viethen, 2010; Koolen et al., 2015). The Incremental
Algorithm, which was designed in the light of Pechmann’s incremental-
ity account, is in fact a heuristic for finding a definite description that
enables a hearer to identify the referent (Gatt et al., 2013).
The Incremental Algorithm requires a check of the scene after each
attribute selected, in order to determine whether the selection process
should continue. Viethen and Dale (2006) have argued that this aspect of
the algorithm is psychologically implausible. In their experiment, partic-
ipants sometimes added unnecessary attributes to referring expressions
that already disambiguated between the referent and the competitors.
Participants had to refer to coloured drawers in a cabinet, where one of
the drawers in the bottom row was orange. One participant referred to
this drawer as ‘the orange drawer in the bottom second from the right’.
This expression would never be generated by the Incremental Algorithm,
as a check after adding ‘in the bottom’ would reveal that the expres-
sion was already fully distinguishing. To get round this problem, Dale
and Viethen (2010) propose a set of possible heuristics, based on human-
produced data, such as ‘include colour’ or ‘if the distractor is of the same
type as the referent, include size’. In line with the finding that human
speakers show considerable variation in the way they refer (Viethen and
Dale, 2010), the authors suggest that each individual speaker relies on a
subset of all possible heuristics. More recent work suggests that heuristic-
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based models of definite description production can be rather successful
at predicting human behaviour (Viethen et al., 2014).
Current accounts of the production of definite descriptions are much
more precise than Pechmann’s original proposal. On a more general level,
however, they provide a similar account of overspecification, the core of
which is that (a) attributes are not selected by checking their relevance,
but are based on an alternative rationale, and (b) attributes that are se-
lected cannot be deselected in a later stage. The underlying assumption is
that this is an efficient way to produce definite descriptions. This assump-
tion is supported by results of the production experiment conducted by
Belke (2006) that was discussed earlier. Participants in this study were
divided into two groups, receiving different instructions. The first group
was instructed to avoid overspecification, whereas the second group was
simply instructed to produce referring expressions. The first group of
speakers did not manage to entirely avoid overspecification, in spite of
longer viewing times and delayed speech onsets in comparison to the
second group. Belke’s findings suggest, then, that producing overspec-
ification, where speakers might rely on heuristics, takes less effort than
producing minimal specification, and is thus, in general, more efficient.
In sum, one possible explanation for the production of overspecifica-
tion is that it is more efficient for speakers to do so. Although research on
how speakers exactly select attributes is still in progress, the general view
is that speakers save effort by including at least some attributes without
checking their relevance, and without backtracking if attributes turn out
to be unnecessary in the end. This explanation of overspecification is
speaker-oriented: it is concerned with the advantages that overspecifica-
tion might have for reference production. In the next section, we will turn
to hearer-oriented accounts of overspecification.
1.4.2 Communicative benefits
Communicative success
When presenting the incrementality account, Pechmann (1989) briefly dis-
cussed an alternative account for overspecification, according to which
speakers include unnecessary information to compensate for potential in-
formation loss. That is, speakers may produce overspecification to make
sure that their hearer can identify the referent even in case some of the
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information might be missed or misunderstood. Although this can in-
deed be an effect of including unnecessary attributes, Pechmann pointed
out that speakers in his experiment often included unnecessary informa-
tion which did not distinguish the referent from all objects in the visual
context. Since nondistinguishing attributes cannot compensate for infor-
mation loss, he rejected the alternative account.
However, there are also experimental findings that do support such
an account. Arts et al. (2011b) conducted a reference production experi-
ment in which two groups of participants received the same stimuli but
different instructions. While both groups of participants were instructed
to write a description of the target object in each trial, only one group
of writers was told additionally that by describing the objects, they pro-
duced instructions in long-distance medical surgery. It was found that
substantially more overspecification was produced in this group than in
the other group. As in Pechmann’s experiment, however, the unneces-
sary information did not always distinguish the referent from all other
objects in the context. These findings suggest that there is a tendency to
provide the addressee with extra information about the referent if cor-
rect identification of the referent is felt to be important. The inclusion of
nondistinguishing information suggests that this may be a general strat-
egy, and that speakers do not carefully figure out which particular piece
of information can compensate for potential loss.
A similar experiment conducted by Rubio-Ferna´ndez (2016) shows,
however, that speakers do not include extra, unnecessary information
randomly. In this study, too, participants were divided into two groups,
receiving different instructions: whereas one group had to produce refer-
ring expressions that enabled a potential addressee to identify the refer-
ent, the other group was explicitly warned against the risk of communica-
tive failure. As in Arts et al.’s experiment, the second group produced
more overspecification than the first. Crucially, however, this was only
the case when they referred to objects in atypical colours. If the colour
could be predicted from the referent’s object class (e.g., a yellow banana),
colour overspecification was not produced by speakers of either group.
This shows that a feeling of urgency does not result in speakers simply
adding extra information, but rather in speakers adding potentially useful
information.
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Efficient identification
A related but different explanation for the production of overspecifica-
tion is that speakers include unnecessary attributes to enable the hearer
to identify the referent more efficiently. This explanation was put forward
by Mangold and Pobel (1988), who found in a comprehension study that
certain overspecified referring expressions enabled participants to iden-
tify the referent more quickly than minimal descriptions. This account
was rejected by the same authors, because they had found that unneces-
sary attributes can also hinder referent identification, resulting in longer
reaction times.
There are other studies showing that unnecessary information can be
cumbersome for hearers and readers in comparison to minimal speci-
fication: it can lead to slower reading (Altmann and Steedman, 1988),
slower referent identification (Engelhardt et al., 2006, 2011; Luccioni et al.,
2015), N400 effects, which are effects in the brain associated with seman-
tic anomalies (Engelhardt et al., 2011; but see Luccioni et al., 2015), and
lower felicity ratings (Davies and Katsos, 2013). To the contrary, how-
ever, there are also studies showing that overspecification is beneficial
for addressees, leading to faster referent identification (Sonnenschein and
Whitehurst, 1982; Paraboni et al., 2007; Arts et al., 2011a; Tourtouri et al.,
2015).
That the results are mixed might be due to the fact that unnecessary
information is not homogeneous: its usefulness is dependent on the con-
text. In a very simple visual context, e.g., an array with two simple ge-
ometrical figures (as in Engelhardt et al., 2011), a hearer is less likely to
benefit from unnecessary information than in a context that is highly com-
plex due to a high number of objects and attributes (as in Sonnenschein
and Whitehurst, 1982). Whether unnecessary information is useful for
identifying a referent is also dependent on the information itself. For ex-
ample, colour has been shown to be a highly efficient cue in visual search
(Christ, 1975), and therefore colour will be helpful in many circumstances.
In this light, it is not surprising that colour is included more often than
other attributes.
Evidence that speakers and writers tend to include useful informa-
tion in their referring expressions was found by Arts et al. (2011b). As
described above, the participants in their production experiment were di-
vided into a group receiving a neutral instruction and a high urgency
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group, instructed to produce referring expressions for medical surgery.
The production of referring expressions was compared with referent iden-
tification times in a reading experiment conducted by the same authors,
in which the same displays were used as stimuli (Arts et al., 2011a). It
turned out that writers in the high urgency group tended to produce ex-
actly those (overspecified) referring expressions that had been found to
facilitate referent identification in the reading study. This indicates that,
as in the study conducted by Rubio-Ferna´ndez (2016) described earlier,
writers did not include unnecessary information randomly; instead, they
tended to include information that was useful for the reader.
In sum, there is evidence that overspecification is produced, at least
in some situations, to make sure that the hearer can correctly and effi-
ciently identify the referent. In contrast to the explanations discussed in
the previous section, the explanations in the present section are hearer-
oriented: they account for the production of overspecification in terms of
considerations of efficient comprehension.
1.4.3 Summary
In the foregoing, I discussed two families of explanations for the produc-
tion of overspecification. First, overspecification has been explained as
the result of efficient attribute selection. Rather than calculating the dis-
criminatory power of attributes in order to include only attributes that are
relevant, speakers use heuristics to select attributes, without deselecting
attributes that turn out to be irrelevant in the end. Using such shortcuts
instead of making extensive calculations saves the speaker effort, thus
making the production process more efficient.
A different stance is taken by researchers who point out that overspec-
ification is produced because it is communicatively beneficial. Including
certain attributes may not be necessary, but it can be useful when some
information is lost, or when it saves the addressee effort in identifying
the referent. It has been shown that speakers and writers are indeed
more likely to produce overspecification when referent identification is
especially urgent, and that they tend to include information that is par-
ticularly helpful.
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1.5 Conclusions
In this chapter, I have given an overview of the literature on the produc-
tion of overspecification. In Section 1.3, I discussed patterns that have
been found in overspecification. Despite assumptions of minimality in
the production of definite descriptions in psycholinguistics and compu-
tational linguistics, experimental findings show that overspecification is
frequently produced. Especially colour overspecification has been found
to be common. The occasional production of colour overspecification in
monochrome contexts suggests that including colour in referring expres-
sions is a general speakers’ strategy, although several factors, such as
considerations of relevance, have been suggested to modulate this strat-
egy. Factors that are currently known to play a role in overspecification
are summarised in Table 1.1.
Several explanations for the production of overspecification have been
proposed in the literature. They were discussed in Section 1.4. Some ac-
counts explain overspecification in terms of production efficiency, point-
ing out that production overspecification may save the speaker the ef-
fort of carefully evaluating the relevance of attributes. Others focus on
the communicative benefits of overspecification, as several experimental
studies have shown that overspecification may result in faster identifica-
tion of the referent than minimal specification, at least in certain situa-
tions. Moreover, overspecification may compensate for the potential loss
of information, ensuring correct identification of the referent.
In the next chapter, the aim of explaining overspecification is put into
a broader perspective. Adopting a Gricean framework, I propose an ac-
count of overspecification in terms of cooperativeness, acknowledging the
cognitive restrictions on the processes underpinning general cooperative
strategies that may result sometimes in the production of suboptimal re-
ferring expressions.
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Attribute preferences (Sections 1.3.2, 1.3.3, 1.4.1, 1.4.1)
Speakers tend to include attributes they prefer (most notably colour),
without extensively checking their relevance in the context; salience, ab-
soluteness and codability may be factors in attribute preferences (e.g.,
Pechmann, 1989; Belke and Meyer, 2002; Belke, 2006; Brown-Schmidt
and Konopka, 2011; Viethen et al., 2012; Gatt et al., 2013).
Discriminatory power (Sections 1.3.2 and 1.3.3)
The discriminatory power of an attribute positively affects the tendency
to include it (Mangold and Pobel, 1988).
Speakers sometimes include colour when its discriminatory power is 0,
albeit less often than when its discriminatory power is higher than 0
(Mangold and Pobel, 1988; Belke and Meyer, 2002; Koolen et al., 2013).
The role of discriminatory power in attribute selection tends to be over-
ruled by other factors (Gatt et al., 2013; Viethen et al., 2014).
Predictability of the referent’s colour (Section 1.3.3)
Colour overspecification is more likely when the referent’s colour is
atypical for the type of object, but less likely if it can be predicted
from the type of object (Sedivy, 2003; Westerbeek et al., 2015; Rubio-
Ferna´ndez, 2016).
Complexity of the context (Section 1.3.3)
Speakers tend to produce (colour) overspecification in complex contexts
(Sonnenschein, 1985; Koolen et al., 2011, 2014).
Relevance of competitors (Section 1.3.3)
Speakers are more likely to include colour when it distinguishes the
referent from a relevant competitor (Koolen et al., 2014).
Urgency of communicative success (Section 1.4.2)
Overspecification is more likely to occur when the speaker feels that
correct identification of the referent is urgent (Arts et al., 2011b; Rubio-
Ferna´ndez, 2016).
Table 1.1: Summary of factors that are currently known to play a role in overspecifica-
tion.
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2.1 Introduction
In Section 1.4 of the previous chapter, two families of explanations for
overspecification were discussed. First, overspecification has been ac-
counted for in terms of efficient attribute selection: speakers have been
argued to select attributes by using heuristics (Dale and Viethen, 2010;
Viethen et al., 2014; Koolen et al., 2015) rather than calculating the dis-
criminatory power of attributes and selecting them accordingly, which
is probably highly effortful. This approach is speaker-oriented, as it is
concerned with the benefits of overspecification for speakers. There is
some experimental evidence for this line of thinking; Belke (2006) found
that it is hard for speakers to avoid overspecification, which suggests that
at least in some situations, producing overspecification takes less effort
than producing minimal specification. Overspecification has also been
explained, in contrast, in a hearer-oriented way: it can compensate for a
potential loss of information and it can increase the efficiency with which
the referent is identified (see, e.g., Arts et al., 2011b, and Davies and Kat-
sos, 2013, for suggestions along these lines). This view, too, has been
supported by experimental studies; data obtained by Arts et al. (2011a)
and Rubio-Ferna´ndez (2016) suggest that speakers and writers tend to
include information that is useful for addressees.
In the literature, the two families have been presented sometimes as
competing accounts. Special caution has been shown in regard to the
second one, as speakers may sometimes do something that is helpful to
the addressee in a merely accidental way. For example, although Man-
gold and Pobel (1988) found that in a production experiment, participants
typically produced overspecified referring expressions that led to efficient
referent identification in a comprehension experiment, they point out that
this symmetry ‘may be a consequence of the operation of the same per-
ceptual mechanisms on both the speaker’s and the listener’s side’ (Man-
gold and Pobel, 1988, p. 190). What they mean is, probably, that an
attribute is useful for referent identification due to the same perceptual
mechanisms that make it salient to a speaker. The found pattern may
thus be due to the speakers’ tendency to include useful attributes be-
cause they are salient, and therefore easy to include, while the positive
effect on referent identification is just a lucky side effect. Sometimes, it
is even assumed that overspecification is always due to what has been
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called ‘egocentric production processes’ (Engelhardt and Ferreira, 2014,
p. 2).
In the present chapter, I take a different stance. I start in Section 2.2
by discussing Gricean pragmatics, going into the tension between the
frequent production of overspecification and Grice’s often-cited maxim
of Quantity in Section 2.3. An alternative explanation, in terms of ego-
centrism, is discussed and rejected in Section 2.4. Taking Marr’s (1982)
three-way distinction between levels of analysis (which will be described
in Section 2.2) as a starting point, I propose a general account in which
both types of explanations are combined in Section 2.5.
2.2 Gricean pragmatics as a W-level theory
In this thesis, I adopt the framework of Gricean pragmatics in order to
account for the production of overspecification. This might seem sur-
prising. After all, Grice (1975) is well-known for his second maxim of
Quantity, which says: ‘Do not make your contribution more informative
than is required.’ At first sight, a speaker producing an overspecified re-
ferring expression seems to violate this maxim. In the following sections,
however, I will argue that the production of overspecification is not neces-
sarily at odds with Grice’s theory. To make this point clear, I first discuss
what in my view is central to the Gricean approach.
Grice considers human conversation as a special case of collaborative
behaviour, where rational interlocutors have shared goals and strive for
the achievement of those goals when engaged in conversation. Grice pro-
poses that all interlocutors expect one another, and know they too are
expected, to adhere to the Cooperative Principle, which says:
Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at
the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direc-
tion of the talk exchange in which you are engaged. (Grice,
1975, p. 45)
This overarching principle is then specified by four categories of maxims,
‘the following of which will, in general, yield results in accordance with
the Cooperative Principle’ (Grice, 1975, p. 45). Specifically, the proposed
maxims urge interlocutors to provide their addressee with information
that is true, sufficient and relevant, and to do this in an orderly manner.
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Gricean pragmatics is a theory of language use: it is aimed at explain-
ing why speakers produce certain utterances to convey certain meanings,
or, taking the complementary perspective, why hearers interpret utter-
ances the way they do. On the assumption that all interlocutors are co-
operative and know that they are all expected to be, communicative con-
tent can be conveyed and derived that goes beyond the semantic, ‘literal’
meaning of the utterance. The best-known example of this is probably
the derivation of quantity or scalar implicatures, as hearers will normally
do when interpreting (1a).
(1) a. Robin stole some of the cookies.
b. Robin stole all of the cookies.
Normally, an addressee hearing the utterance of (1a) will understand that
the speaker believes Robin to have stolen some but not all of the cook-
ies. According to the Gricean account, this does not imply that ‘but not
all’ is part of the semantic meaning of ‘some’. Rather, the interpreta-
tion results from reasoning that had Robin stolen all of the cookies, the
speaker would have uttered (1b) rather than (1a). After all, this alterna-
tive sentence is more informative, and therefore, uttering it would have
been more cooperative in that situation. As the speaker is assumed to
be cooperative, the uttering of (1a) instead of (1b) is taken to implicate
that the speaker does not believe (1b) to be true. In other words, the
addressee concludes that (1a) is the most informative claim the speaker
could have truthfully made. The inference that Robin stole some cookies
but left some others is known in the literature as a quantity implicature, be-
cause the central maxim in the derivation is in the category of Quantity,
constraining the quantity of information provided (see Geurts, 2010, pp.
27–32, for a precise account of the derivation of quantity implicatures).
As pointed out by Geurts and Rubio-Ferna´ndez (2015), it is important
to realise that the Gricean approach does not presuppose any conscious
inferencing when deriving implicatures, as is sometimes assumed (e.g.
Wilson, 2000; Origgi and Sperber, 2000). In order to make this point clear,
they refer to Marr (1982), who proposed a three-way distinction in levels
of analysis when dealing with complex systems (including human be-
ings). On the highest, most abstract level, the central questions are what
the system does and why. When we aim at understanding human be-
ings, we thus need to determine what kind of behaviour is exhibited and
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what the goals of this behaviour are. On a lower level, the central ques-
tion is how the system does what it is supposed to do. This question is
to be answered independently of the physical details of a system; when
attempting to explain human behaviour on this level, we abstract from
particular properties of the brain, for example. The physical implemen-
tation of the processes described at the second level is described, finally,
on the lowest level. The two things about Marr’s framework that are im-
portant here are, first, that research questions need to be answered on
the appropriate level of analysis, and second, that it is the highest level
that is ‘critically important’ (Marr, 1982, p. 25), since only when we have
figured out what is done and why, can we start seeking the answer to the
question of how this is done.
Geurts and Rubio-Ferna´ndez argue that Gricean pragmatics should
be viewed as a theory of communication on the highest level (the ‘W-
level’ in their terminology): it is concerned with what interlocutors do
and why they do it. Patterns in human communication are explained in
terms of propositional attitudes, such as beliefs and desires. The theory
does not make any claims about the way those inferences are internally
represented (e.g., as conscious mental states). Such claims belong to the
intermediate level (the ‘H-level’), since they are answers to the question
of how things are done. Criticising Gricean pragmatics for its allegedly
unlikely claims about processing is, they argue, the result of mixing up
two different levels of analysis.
Of course, this is not to say that processing is not of interest to theo-
rists in the Gricean tradition. Although theorising on the W-level ideally
precedes theorising on the two lower levels, explanations on each level
are needed for a good understanding of human communication. And al-
though W-level and H-level theories need not mirror each other, Geurts
and Rubio-Ferna´ndez show that there is ample evidence that attitude
representations indeed play a role in processing. In Section 2.4, I will
elaborate on this further.
2.3 Gricean pragmatics and overspecification
Grice’s theory of communication is often mentioned in the literature on
overspecification, because the finding that speakers often unnecessarily
include attributes in their referring expressions seems to be in conflict
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with the second maxim in the category of Quantity (see, e.g., Brennan
and Clark, 1996; Engelhardt et al., 2006; Brown-Schmidt and Konopka,
2011; Tourtouri et al., 2015; but see also Arts et al., 2011a; Koolen et al.,
2011). The category of Quantity subsumes the following two maxims:
1. Make your contribution as informative as is required (for
the current purposes of the exchange).
2. Do not make your contribution more informative than is
required. (Grice, 1975, p. 45)
Geurts and Rubio-Ferna´ndez (2015) point out that although the formula-
tion of the Gricean maxims suggests that they are limited to declarative
speech acts, Gricean pragmatics in fact extends to both the use of other
illocutionary acts and the use of smaller linguistic acts, such as words
and, presumably, referring expressions. Clearly, then, there is a tension
between the production of overspecified referring expressions and the
second maxim of Quantity.
Grice himself had his doubts about the second maxim of Quantity, and
suggested that it might be usurped by the maxim of Relation, namely ‘Be
relevant’ (Grice, 1975, p. 46). As was stated in the previous section, the
maxims form a set of (somewhat loosely formulated) specifications of the
general, overarching Cooperative Principle. It is important to emphasise
this point, because the central notion in Grice’s theory is cooperativeness,
not informativeness. It is for this reason that ‘for the current purposes
of the exchange’ is added to the first maxim of Quantity, which is to be
extended, presumably, to the second maxim. One of those purposes is,
according to Grice, ‘a maximally effective exchange of information’. As
was discussed in Section 1.4.2, there is evidence that at least some un-
necessary information is useful in the identification of objects, resulting
in addressees benefiting from overspecification in comparison to minimal
specification at least under certain circumstances. Moreover, it has been
found that speakers are more likely to produce overspecification when the
importance of referent identification increases (Arts et al., 2011a). Find-
ings like these suggest that communicative benefits might be the reason
that speakers produce overspecification, at least partly (see Arts et al.,
2011a and Koolen et al., 2011, for a discussion along the same lines).
My provisional conclusion is, then, that overspecification need not be
a violation of the Cooperative Principle, or even of the second maxim
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of Quantity. As we have seen in Section 1.4.1 of the previous chapter,
however, there is evidence that overspecification does not necessarily con-
tribute to the efficacy of communication. The most obvious finding show-
ing that speakers sometimes include attributes that are both unnecessary
and useless may be the (atypical but not exactly sporadic) production of
colour overspecification in monochrome contexts, where it is clear that
the addressee is unable to benefit from the unnecessary colour adjective
in any way. Experimental results like this indicate that at least in some
cases, it is not an act of cooperativeness to produce overspecification. Do
experimental results like these not indicate that the Gricean approach is
mistaken? In the next sections, I delve into this question.
2.4 Egocentrism and overspecification
It has been suggested that even including unnecessary attributes that are
functional in terms of communicative benefits can be, and often is, due to
processes that are called ‘speaker-driven’, ‘speaker-internal’, or ‘speaker-
oriented’ (Mangold and Pobel, 1988; Pechmann, 1989; Koolen et al., 2011;
Engelhardt and Ferreira, 2014; Gatt et al., 2014). A related but stronger
claim is that interlocutors do not by default reason about each other’s
propositional attitudes at all. Rather, communication is driven by auto-
matic processes like priming (Pickering and Garrod, 2004), interlocutors
being essentially egocentric (Keysar et al., 2003). Although they are, to
some degree, capable of reasoning about each other’s propositional at-
titudes, constantly doing this would be inefficient because it is not only
unnecessary but also costly in terms of cognitive resources. Therefore,
interlocutors only start doing this when the automatic processes fail.
There is scant evidence for this two-stage model of communication,
however. Although interlocutors have been shown to be less than perfect
at reasoning about each other’s propositional attitudes (e.g. Horton and
Keysar, 1996; Wardlow Lane et al., 2006), there is ample evidence that
they normally do so nevertheless, and that they do it from the earliest
stages of utterance planning and interpretation (see for production, e.g.,
Nadig and Sedivy, 2002; Vanlangendonck et al., 2013; Yoon and Brown-
Schmidt, 2014; and for comprehension, e.g., Metzing and Brennan, 2003;
Heller et al., 2008; Brown-Schmidt, 2009; for a recent overview, see Brown-
Schmidt et al., 2015).
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One finding is particularly relevant here. It is well-known that the pro-
duction of referring expressions is not only affected by the visual context,
but also by the discourse context. Brennan and Clark (1996) show that
speakers tend to reuse referring expressions used earlier in the discourse,
even if the current visual context would trigger a different referring ex-
pression in isolation. For example, if all objects in a context are shoes, ‘the
shoe’ is underspecified in this context when the speaker wishes to refer to
one of them, and she would normally use a more specific term, like ‘the
loafer’. Brennan and Clark found that when speakers had to refer to the
loafer again later in the discourse, but now in a context where it was the
only shoe, they were more likely to say ‘the loafer’ instead of ‘the shoe’
than when they had not referred to this object as ‘the loafer’ before. Van
Der Wege (2009) found that the same holds for the use of modifiers which
were necessary in the initial visual context but unnecessary in a later one.
Another study suggests that overspecification can even be triggered by
the interlocutor’s use of overspecified referring expressions (Goudbeek
and Krahmer, 2012). In this experiment, human participants interacted
with computers, alternating between identifying referents based on pre-
recorded referring expressions on the one hand, and acting as speakers,
producing referring expressions themselves, on the other hand. Speakers
were found to produce more overspecification when the computer did so
too than when it did not. The interesting thing about these findings in the
light of the debate on reasoning about propositional attitudes is that there
is evidence that effects like these are partner-specific. That is, speakers
are more likely to reuse referring expressions when talking to the same
addressee than when talking to someone else (Brennan and Clark, 1996;
Lockridge and Brennan, 2002), and hearers expect speakers to reuse re-
ferring expressions, but they expect less that two different speakers use
the same referring expressions for the same referents independently of
each other (Metzing and Brennan, 2003). This indicates that interlocu-
tors take into account each other’s propositional attitudes. Moreover, the
fact that interlocutors expect each other to maintain the established ‘con-
ceptual pacts’ (Brennan and Clark, 1996) indicates, again, that producing
overspecification is sometimes more cooperative than producing minimal
specification.
An even more severe problem with the two-stage account of commu-
nication is that it is inherently inconsistent. As was pointed out before by
Bezuidenhout (2013), and recently also by Geurts and Rubio-Ferna´ndez
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(2015), failure of automatic processes can, in many cases, only be detected
by taking into account the interlocutor’s propositional attitudes. How-
ever, since reasoning about propositional attitudes is supposed to be trig-
gered only after a failure is detected, the two-stage account predicts that
in those cases, this will never happen. An example, taken from Geurts
and Rubio-Ferna´ndez (2015, p. 15), illustrates this point. Compare the
following two ways in which someone you have never met before could
start a chat with you on the tram:
(2) a. Isn’t it a shame that our prime minister still isn’t married?
b. Isn’t it a shame that your brother still isn’t married?
While you may be surprised by the opening sentences in any case, you
are likely to be very surprised in the second scenario, wondering how a
complete stranger could know that you have a brother who is unmarried.
The reason why the second scenario would normally be more surprising
than the first is that, in contrast to the knowledge that there is a prime
minister who is unmarried, the knowledge that you have a brother who is
unmarried is unlikely to be knowledge that is mutually shared between
two random people on the tram. That is, realising that the uttering of
sentence (2b) by a complete stranger is odd is only possible after taking
into account what is in the common ground and what is not. Accord-
ing to the two-stage account, however, common ground considerations
only arise if triggered by communicative failure. Therefore, this account
cannot explain why the second scenario is more surprising than the first.
Summarising, the claim that interlocutors only incidentally take into
account each other’s propositional attitudes is not supported by experi-
mental evidence. On the other hand, there is substantial evidence that
interlocutors engage in reasoning about what the other person might be-
lieve and expect, and that this can result in overspecification. Still, this
does not imply that automatic processes do not play a role in an explana-
tion of communication, or of the production of overspecification specifi-
cally, on the H-level. In the next section, I will sketch the outline of how
we might understand the production of overspecification.
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2.5 Combining W-level and H-level insights
As we have seen in Chapter 1, there is evidence that when producing
referring expressions, speakers make use of heuristics, although it is as
yet unclear what exactly these heuristics look like. Put differently, the
evidence suggests that at least some of the processes underlying the pro-
duction of overspecification are simple, automatic processes. The impor-
tant point is that this is not at all in conflict with Gricean pragmatics.
When we are attempting to describe the processes underlying communi-
cation, we are trying to find an answer to the question how we do what
we do: we are on the H-level. That we use heuristics is a (very general)
answer to this question. Recall that Gricean pragmatics, in contrast, is a
W-level theory, providing answers to the question what we do and why.
As was pointed out before, theories on the two levels may but need not
mirror each other. Gricean pragmatics does not presuppose that repre-
sentations of propositional attitudes are used in all processes underlying
cooperative behaviour, and neither does an H-level account of language
processing in terms of automatic processes exclude the possibility that
interlocutors tend to be cooperative in conversation.
The Gricean theory predicts that speakers normally produce referring
expressions that enable their addressee to identify the referent reasonably
efficiently. Ideally, they would produce exactly those referring expres-
sions that are optimal from the addressee’s point of view. We have seen
that experimental results show that speakers indeed tend to do this (Arts
et al., 2011b). On the other hand, they also produce suboptimal refer-
ring expressions sometimes, for instance, adding attributes that are truly
redundant (e.g., Koolen et al., 2013). It is important to realise, however,
that the Gricean theory does not presuppose that speakers are perfect at
what they are supposed to do – or, more to the point: ‘an adequate un-
derstanding of what is done and why does not entail that it is done well’
(Geurts and Rubio-Ferna´ndez, 2015, p. 8). Humans do not have the un-
limited amount of cognitive resources that would enable them to always
produce those referring expressions that are optimal for comprehension.
This need not be an obstacle in having a conversation, however. Given
the assumption that not only speakers but also hearers are cooperative,
hearers are predicted to be willing to spend some of the effort required
for a reasonably smooth conversation. Indeed, this principle of mutual
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responsibility is central to the joint effort model proposed by Clark and
Wilkes-Gibbs (1986). If the production of referring expressions can be
fairly efficient when underpinned by relatively simple heuristics that re-
sult in a fairly efficient comprehension of those referring expressions at
the same time, there seems to be no reason why more complex, costly
processes would evolve. That simpler processes sometimes fail to filter
out truly redundant attributes is only to be expected.
To illustrate, it is a reasonable strategy of a cooperative speaker to
include salient attributes in their referring expressions. Attributes that
are salient to the speaker are likely to be salient to the addressee, too.
They are also likely to distinguish between the referent and the other
objects, since by definition salient attributes become salient due to their
standing out in their context. As we have seen, salient attributes may not
always be necessary for referent identification, but since they are often
useful in comprehension, they will normally not bother hearers too much.
However, this general strategy, which is cooperative in origin, can lead to
patterns that are not functional, or that are even bothersome from the
addressee’s point of view. The production of colour overspecification,
which was discussed in Chapter 1 (Section 1.3.2) is a case in point, and
we will see a similar example in Chapter 3.
In sum, I have sketched an outline for a combined account of the
production of overspecification on the W-level and the H-level. I have
argued that the production of overspecification is in line with a Gricean
account of conversation: the unnecessary attributes that speakers add are,
in general, beneficial for addressees, as would be expected of cooperative
speakers. On the W-level, then, my general answer to the question of why
speakers produce overspecification is that they want to be understood by
their addressee, which is a precondition for achieving their shared con-
versational goals. The production processes underlying frequently used
constructions need to be efficient, and therefore speakers may rely on
heuristics, which are simple and possibly automatic processes. On the H-
level, I thus explain, at least in part, the production of overspecification in
terms of speaker efficiency, although the processes in fact underpin coop-
erative behaviour. The resulting referring expressions are sometimes sub-
optimal from the addressee’s point of view; normally, however, including
unnecessary attributes will be beneficial rather than cumbersome.
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2.6 Conclusions
In this chapter, I have presented a proposal for an account of overspeci-
fication in which insights from speaker-oriented and hearer-oriented ap-
proaches are combined, by making use of the distinction between the
W-level and the H-level. First, I have discussed the proposal to view
Gricean pragmatics as a W-level theory, since it is concerned with the
question of what interlocutors do when they are involved in conversation
and the question of why they do it. The central claim of the theory is that
interlocutors are cooperative. I have argued that the frequent produc-
tion of overspecification is in line with this claim, as speakers tend to in-
clude attributes that are beneficial in referent identification. At first sight,
the occasional production of non-functional attributes, such as colour in
monochrome contexts, seems to be at odds with the claim that interlocu-
tors are generally cooperative and take into account what is in their com-
mon ground. Rather, it seems to be in line with an alternative account of
conversation, explaining the existing patterns in terms of egocentrism. I
have shown, however, that this account is both empirically and theoreti-
cally problematic. In the last section, I introduced an alternative account
of the production of overspecification. I explained the general patterns in
overspecification in terms of cooperativeness, pointing out that the pro-
cesses underlying the aim to be cooperative have their cognitive limita-
tions, sometimes resulting in suboptimal referring expressions.
Chapter 3
Variation across object categories
This chapter has been published before, in a slightly different form, as:
Tarenskeen, S., Broersma, M., and Geurts, B. (2015). “Hand me the yellow stapler” or
“Hand me the yellow dress”: Colour overspecification depends on object category. Proceedings
of the 19th Workshop on the Semantics and Pragmatics of Dialogue (SemDial; goDIAL),
Gothenburg, Sweden.
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Abstract
Two production experiments were conducted to investigate how colour overspecification
varies with the object category the referent falls into. We found a positive correlation
between how important colour is for objects and how likely speakers are to produce
colour overspecification when referring to those objects. We also found that speakers
tend to produce colour overspecification when referring to geometrical figures, even
though colour is considered of low importance for this category. Following Arts et al.
(2011a) and Koolen et al. (2011), we assume that speakers tend to include colour because
it is often a highly salient attribute of objects. We argue that on the one hand, colour
importance increases colour salience, accounting for the correlation between colour im-
portance and colour overspecification, and on the other hand, the paucity of other at-
tributes of simple figures increases colour salience, accounting for the high proportions
of colour overspecification for this category. We claim that variation in colour overspec-
ification across object categories is due to the general cooperative strategy of including
salient attributes, which are helpful in referent identification.
3.1 Introduction
When speakers use definite descriptions to refer to objects and individu-
als, they have to select information about the referent. How speakers do
this is currently a major question in research on reference (van Deemter
et al., 2012). We present a series of studies that provide insight into this
question. We investigate how characteristics of object categories increase
the degree to which colour is salient for objects in those categories, and
hence the likelihood that speakers select colour when referring to them.
For example, are speakers more likely to select colour when referring to a
dress, the colour of which is important and therefore presumably salient,
than when referring to a stapler? And do they select colour more often
when referring to simple figures such as circles and squares, which have
no other attributes than colour and shape to attract the attention, than
to more complex, real life objects? We focus on colour overspecification,
which occurs when colour is included even though a unique description
of the referent does not require mention of colour in the particular vi-
sual context, e.g., ‘the red dress’ in a context where the referent is the
only dress. Although reference has many functions in dialogue, we limit
ourselves to the function of referent identification.
Early theories assumed that speakers tend to select those attributes
with highest discriminatory power, that is, attributes which distinguish
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between the referent and most of the other objects in the context, thereby
avoiding attributes that are not necessary for the addressee to identify the
referent (Ford and Olson, 1975). Experiments, in contrast, have shown re-
peatedly that speakers do not tend to produce such minimal descriptions
of their referents, but often include unnecessary attributes, resulting in
overspecification. Moreover, the discriminatory power of attributes does
not seem to be a significant factor in the selection process (Gatt et al., 2013;
Viethen et al., 2014); instead, speakers have preferences for certain at-
tributes. In particular, speakers seem to prefer mentioning colour, some-
times selecting it even when it has no discriminatory power at all, that is,
when all objects in the context share the referent’s colour (Koolen et al.,
2013). Colour is included more often without need than other attributes,
like size (Belke, 2006), material (Sedivy, 2005), and location (Arts et al.,
2011b). That is, overspecification is most often colour overspecification.
Why is colour preferred so strongly? The common view is that colour
is a salient property of objects (Arts et al., 2011a; Koolen et al., 2011).
We can think of several reasons why this might be so. Colour is used
to identify objects and to distinguish between objects: it is a basic cue in
interpreting our visual image (Treisman and Gelade, 1980). It is also an
absolute attribute (Pechmann, 1989; Belke and Meyer, 2002): to determine
the colour of an object, it need not be compared to other objects, in con-
trast to determining whether it is big or small. Eyetracking data suggest
that speakers often start to articulate colour adjectives even before looking
at other objects, whereas they only include size after detecting a size dif-
ference between the referent and another object of the same type (Brown-
Schmidt and Konopka, 2011). We suggest, then, that colour is visually
highly accessible. It is also linguistically accessible: many languages have
a fine-grained colour lexicon, which enables speakers to easily label vir-
tually all colours they can perceive and to use unique labels for a wide
variety of colours (Berlin and Kay, 1969). Colour is probably special in
being both visually and linguistically more accessible than most if not all
other attributes.
It is sometimes argued (Engelhardt et al., 2006) that overspecification
is in conflict with Grice’s theory of pragmatics (Grice, 1975). After all,
the second maxim of quantity should prevent us from producing an ut-
terance that is more informative than is required. This line of argument
does not seem to do justice to the Gricean framework. Grice’s point is
not that we obey to a set of (stipulative) rules; it is that communication is
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a form of cooperative behaviour. If including information into a referring
expression is not necessary but nevertheless helpful in the identification
of the referent, it is an act of cooperativeness to do so (Arts et al., 2011a).
It is a good idea for a cooperative speaker to mention an attribute that is
salient to her: such an attribute is likely to be salient to the addressee too,
and therefore helpful in referent identification. Salient attributes are not
necessarily required for the ultimate purposes of the discourse, but in-
cluding them does improve the efficiency of the comprehension process.
Indeed, it has been found that overspecification can result in shorter ref-
erent identification times than minimal descriptions (Mangold and Pobel,
1988; Arts et al., 2011a).
This is not to say that speakers always produce the referring expres-
sions that are optimal for comprehension. Language production is con-
strained by the way our cognitive system is organised, and producing an
expression that is optimal for the addressee can therefore be inefficient
for the speaker. The smoothness of the exchange may thus improve if
an expression is produced that is more efficient from the speaker’s point
of view and suboptimal but nevertheless understandable from the ad-
dressee’s point of view. There is evidence that unnecessary information
can hinder the comprehension process (Altmann and Steedman, 1988; En-
gelhardt et al., 2011; Davies and Katsos, 2013) and it is an interesting em-
pirical question in what situations hearers detect overspecification, and
what happens when they do. It seems a reasonable assumption, however,
that colour is such a helpful cue in referent identification that, in general,
addressees do not tend to detect the redundancy of colour overspecifica-
tion and are usually not hindered by it.
In this paper, we focus on characteristics of objects that contribute to
the colour salience of those objects. Of course, characteristics of the visual
context contribute to colour salience of objects, too. The colour of a blue
object, for instance, is less salient if all other objects in the context are blue.
Hence, we would expect speakers to be less likely to produce colour over-
specification in such contexts than when the referent is surrounded by ob-
jects in different colours, which is indeed what has been found (Koolen
et al., 2013). This finding is readily explained in the Gricean framework:
it is likely that an addressee detects the redundancy of a colour adjective
and is hindered by it when all objects surrounding a blue referent are
also blue. Another way in which colour salience is affected by the visual
context is when the colour of an object is atypical for this type of object:
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the colour of a purple crocodile is arguably more salient than the colour
of a green crocodile, and we would expect the probability that colour
overspecification is produced to increase correspondingly. This too has
been confirmed by experimental data (Westerbeek et al., 2015). Again,
an explanation in the Gricean framework is easily provided: a hearer
who is not told about the colour of a purple crocodile will initially look
for a green individual to no avail, and when he has identified the refer-
ent, the question why the speaker did not mention such a salient feature
may confuse him even further. Producing colour overspecification is then
more cooperative than avoiding it.
If it is true that speakers have a general tendency to include salient
attributes – which is generally compatible with cooperative behaviour –
patterns in attribute selection may occur that are not readily explained
in terms of cooperativeness. As has been suggested before, for exam-
ple, colour is intuitively not equally important for all object categories
(Rubio-Ferna´ndez, 2011): most people will presumably consider colour
more important for fashion items than for construction tools. If higher
colour importance increases colour salience, we would expect that speak-
ers are more likely to produce colour adjectives and colour overspecifica-
tion when referring to a fashionable bag than to an electric drill, all else
being equal. Yet, ‘red’ is probably not more helpful in identifying the
referent when it is a bag than when it is a drill. Selecting colour when
referring to a bag but not when referring to a drill would thus not be
communicatively functional, although the underlying strategy of includ-
ing salient properties is a manifestation of cooperative behaviour.
The present studies were conducted to explore patterns in colour over-
specification that are strictly non-functional, but due to the more general,
cooperative strategy to include salient attributes. We do not test the effect
of colour salience directly, but we investigate how colour overspecifica-
tion of objects in various categories is affected by factors which, presum-
ably, contribute to colour salience of those objects. Experiment 1 is a
production experiment conducted to assess whether the tendency to pro-
duce colour overspecification is affected by the degree to which colour is
important (and hence probably salient) for the referent. We compare ref-
erences to different types of referents: clothes (high colour importance),
dinner ware (medium colour importance), and office supplies (low colour
importance). A pretest was conducted to establish subjective ratings of
colour importance. We hypothesise that the likelihood of colour over-
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specification increases with colour importance of the referent.
In Experiment 2, we investigate colour overspecification in reference
to a special category of referents: geometrical figures. It is fairly com-
mon to investigate referential behaviour experimentally by making par-
ticipants refer to geometrical figures (Mangold and Pobel, 1988; Arts et al.,
2011b). Geometrical figures are easy to manipulate, but they are abstrac-
tions rather than real objects. As they have no other attributes than shape
and colour to attract the attention, their colour might be more salient than
the colour of real life objects whose colour is equally important. We hy-
pothesise that this paucity of attributes that may attract the attention is
a second factor in colour salience and hence in the production of colour
overspecification. In Experiment 2, we investigate colour overspecifica-
tion in reference to figures, comparing this category with a category of
objects whose colour is equally important.
3.2 Pretest
In order to be able to select the items for Experiments 1 and 2, we con-
ducted a pretest to assess to what extent speakers of Dutch judged colour
to be important for objects in various categories. To this end, we pre-
sented participants with pictures of objects and asked them to judge, on
a 7-point scale, how important they felt colour was for the object in ques-
tion. This procedure enabled us to select four objects in four categories:
one with high, one with medium, and two with low colour importance.
3.2.1 Method
Participants
We tested 21 native speakers of Dutch (18 females, 3 males, mean age
22:1 years, range 18-27) at Radboud University, the Netherlands. All were
volunteers. They received a small fee for their participation.
Materials
We used 60 black-and-white photographs of objects as stimulus mate-
rials, divided into ten categories (objects to draw, write, or paint with,
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clothes, vehicles, toys, dinner ware, furniture, kitchen utensils, office sup-
plies, cleaning utensils, and geometrical figures; for example pictures see
Figure 3.1) of six objects each. All real life objects were familiar items
which are commonly available in a variety of colours and which are eas-
ily recognised and named. Additionally, three filler items were included,
which did not belong to any of the ten categories.
Figure 3.1: Photographs (one from each of the ten object categories) used in the pretest.
Each photograph represented one object against a white background.
The selection criteria were that the object should be easy to recognise and
that the photograph should be as simple as possible. The original pho-
tographs were freely available on the internet. Some were manipulated
in Photoshop. Only photos of painted objects were selected, in order to
avoid an association with the typical colour of certain materials (such as
unpainted wood, which is typically brown). This experiment and all the
following experiments were programmed with Presentation software.
Design
All participants judged the colour importance of each of the 60 items. The
order of the items was pseudorandomised, with the restriction that items
were always followed by at least two items from a different category. Each
participant saw the items in a different order.
Procedure
Participants were tested one at a time in a quiet booth. In each trial,
participants saw a picture of an object and a 7-point scale below it on
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a computer screen. Participants were instructed to indicate, by clicking
on a point on the scale, how important they felt colour was for the object,
where 1 represented ‘not at all important’, and 7 ‘highly important’. They
were encouraged to follow their intuitions and react quickly. There was
no time-out for responding. It took participants about five minutes to
complete the task.
3.2.2 Results and selection procedure
We excluded one of the ten categories1 from further consideration. For the
remaining nine categories, the median judgements of colour importance
of the items are represented in Figure 3.22. We selected those items which
we expected to be easy to recognise and name for speakers of Dutch, and
that were not visually or conceptually similar to another item in the same
category (such as a circle and an ellipse). We selected categories with four
items that were as homogeneous as possible in their median judgement.
For Experiment 1, we selected a High Importance category (Mdn =
6), a Medium Importance category (Mdn = 4), and a Low Importance
category (Mdn = 2). We selected clothes as High Importance category
(trousers, coat, dress, all Mdn = 6, and hat, Mdn = 5), dinner ware as
Medium Importance category (plate, mug, bowl, all Mdn = 4, and teapot,
Mdn = 3), and office supplies as Low Importance category (stapler, pencil
sharpener, scissors, all Mdn = 2, and ring binder3, Mdn = 3). For Ex-
periment 2, we selected four geometrical figures (circle, square, triangle,
diamond, all Mdn = 2).
1The category of objects to draw, write, or paint with was excluded because expres-
sions such as ‘the green pen’ are ambiguous between a pen filled with green ink and a
pen painted green.
2It may be surprising that one of the geometrical figures received a median judgement
of 5. This was the heart, which is associated with romantic love, and hence, probably,
with red or pink.
3Although there was a fourth object with a median of 2, namely the paperclip, we
selected the ring binder instead because it was impossible to sufficiently increase the
coloured area of the paperclip picture (see section 3.3.1 below).
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Figure 3.2: Median judgements of colour importance for the items in each category.
The integer in brackets behind the category labels represents the median judgement for
that category.
3.3 Experiment 1: Colour importance
In Experiment 1, we tested the hypothesis that there is a positive correla-
tion between judgements of colour importance and the amount of colour
overspecification, by conducting a production experiment in which par-
ticipants referred to objects of the three categories of real life objects se-
lected in the pretest.
3.3.1 Method
Participants
We tested 38 participants similar to those in the pretest (33 females, 5
males, mean age 22:10 years, range 18-29). None of the participants in
Experiment 1 had taken part in the pretest. All of them reported not to
be colourblind.
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Materials
Twelve critical pictures represented the objects selected in the pretest.
They were found on the internet and then manipulated in Photoshop to
create four colour variants of each picture: bright red, green, yellow, and
blue.4 This procedure thus yielded 48 different pictures altogether. We
constructed the pictures so that the size of the coloured area was approx-
imately similar across categories5 (mean number of coloured pixels per
picture: 28505 for clothes, 29821 for dinner ware, and 29703 for office
supplies).
Filler pictures were taken from the Tarrlab Stimulus Repository6. There
were three types of filler pictures: sixteen common objects such as bikes
and envelopes (Rossion and Pourtois, 2004), sixteen Greebles (Gauthier
and Tarr, 1997), and sixteen human faces. Greebles are artificially con-
structed objects which are complex and highly similar to each other, and
therefore difficult to describe uniquely. Paying attention to colour was
prevented by changing salient colours into desaturated, inconspicuous
ones (common objects) or into tones of grey (Greebles), and by selecting
pictures of dark-haired Caucasian people only (human faces).
Design
Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: High Im-
portance, Medium Importance, and Low Importance. Colour importance
was manipulated between participants: each participant saw objects from
only one of the three categories. Each of the four objects in a category
acted as target four times (in four different colours), so that each partici-
pant performed sixteen critical trials. They also performed sixteen trials
of each of the three types of fillers, yielding a total of 64 trials. The order
of the trials was pseudorandomised, with the restriction that each trial
was always followed by at least two trials in which the target was of a
4The pictures in the experiment and the pretest were as similar as possible. We did
not use the pictures from the pretest because most of them were not suitable for making
good colour variants.
5The results of a pilot study made us suspect a positive correlation between the size
of the coloured area of a picture and the probability of colour overspecification.
6Stimulus images courtesy of Michael J. Tarr, Center for the Neural Basis of Cognition
and Department of Psychology, Carnegie Mellon University, http://www.tarrlab.org/.
For some of the pictures we adjusted the colours or we flipped them into a mirror image.
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different type of object. For example, when the target was a dress, the
target in the two subsequent trials was never a dress. We did this in or-
der to prevent participants from producing an adjective for the sake of
contrast between the referent and the previous referent, which speakers
have been shown to do in reference production experiments (see Pech-
mann, 1989, and Levelt, 1989, p. 132 for discussion of this type of factors
in reference production). Each participant received the trials in their own
unique order.
Target pictures were presented in an array with other objects of the
same category. The number of items in an array varied among two,
three, four, and six. The objects in the context were never of the same
type as the target object. Including colour therefore always resulted in
colour overspecification, except for the rare cases where participants did
not use a basic-level term (e.g., ‘the yellow object’ instead of ‘the yellow
stapler’), which were not included in the analysis. Colours were pseu-
dorandomly distributed over the objects in the array, with the restriction
that monochrome displays did not occur. The target could be, but was
not necessarily unique in its colour. Examples of arrays in each of the
three conditions are shown in Figure 3.3.7
Fillers were added to prevent participants from sticking to one syntac-
tic and semantic structure throughout the whole experiment, and from
finding out about the aim of the experiment. There were three types of
filler trials. Fillers of type A were displays with four pictures of common
objects. They were included to elicit referring expressions in which no
modifier, such as an adjective or a prepositional phrase, was added to
the head noun. Modification was not expected because basic-level terms
were always sufficient and none of the pictures had any striking features.
Fillers of type B were displays with four pictures of Greebles. They were
included to make participants aware that simply naming objects was not
always sufficient. Fillers of type C were displays with two human faces,
which were either of the same gender or of different genders. They were
included to elicit variation in the presence of modifiers within a category:
modification was necessary when the two people were of the same gen-
der, but unnecessary when they differed in gender. Examples of the three
types of filler arrays are shown in Figure 3.4.
7Note that the representation of the stimuli’s colours can only be an approximation
of their representation in the experiment.
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Figure 3.3: Arrays in the High Importance (left), Medium Importance (middle), and
Low Importance (right) conditions.
Figure 3.4: Filler arrays of type A (left), type B (middle), and type C (right).
Procedure
Participants had to instruct an imaginary addressee to click on one of
the pictures displayed in each trial, by finishing the Dutch equivalent of
the sentence ‘Click on . . . ’. A cross preceding the presentation of the
array indicated the position of the target on the screen. Participants were
instructed to avoid referring to the object’s location on the screen. It took
them about fifteen minutes to complete the task. Otherwise the procedure
was similar to that of the pretest.
3.3.2 Results
Each of the 38 participants performed sixteen critical trials, yielding 608
responses. Twenty responses (3.3%) were removed, because the referent
was not the target item, because the speaker corrected herself during
the articulation of the utterance, or because colour was included without
this resulting in overspecification. The remaining 588 expressions were
annotated as colour overspecified when a colour adjective was included.
We expected that the proportion of colour overspecification would in-
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crease with the degree to which colour is considered important for the
object. That is, we expected a positive correlation between the colour im-
portance judgements collected in the pretest, and the mean proportions
of colour overspecification produced in reference to those items in the
present experiment. Indeed, as Figure 3.5 shows, the proportion of colour
overspecification increased with colour importance. The mean proportion
of colour overspecification was highest in the High Importance condition
(M = .79, SD = .41), intermediate in the Medium Importance condition
(M = .63, SD = .48), and lowest in the Low Importance condition (M =
.37, SD = .48). The correlation between the median judgements of colour
importance and the proportions of colour overspecification of the items
was significant, τ = .762, 95% CI [.335, .929], p = .001.
3.3.3 Discussion
We predicted that the salience of an object’s colour would increase with
the degree to which colour is considered important for that object, re-
sulting in a higher proportion of colour overspecification in reference to
the object. Our prediction was borne out by the results: there was a sig-
nificant positive correlation between colour importance judgements and
the mean proportion of colour overspecification in reference to the same
items.
Since the pretest indicates that colour importance is considered to be
equally low for geometrical figures as for office supplies, speakers are
not expected to often produce colour overspecification when referring
to figures. However, as pointed out in the Introduction, colour salience
is probably not only determined by colour importance, but also by the
number of other attributes that matter: if only a low number of attributes
may attract the attention, those attributes will increase in salience. The
colour of simple geometrical figures might be highly salient because the
only attributes of geometrical figures that matter are colour and shape.
This possibility was investigated in Experiment 2.
3.4 Experiment 2: Geometrical figures
Experiment 2 was conducted to test the hypothesis that speakers produce
more colour overspecification when referring to geometrical figures than
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Figure 3.5: The relation between colour importance and colour overspecification. The
median colour importance ratings are plotted on the x-axis, and the mean proportions
of colour overspecification are plotted on the y-axis
.
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to objects of equal colour importance. We elicited references to figures
and compared the amount of colour overspecification to the amount pro-
duced in Experiment 1 in reference to office supplies, as the Pretest had
indicated that colour is considered to be equally important for the two
categories.
3.4.1 Method
Participants
We tested 13 participants similar to the ones in Experiment 1 (all females,
mean age 21:3, range 19-26).8 None of the participants in Experiment 2
had participated in either of the previous studies.
Materials, design, and procedure
Critical pictures represented the geometrical figures selected in the pretest.
They were created in LATEX, using the Tikz package, sometimes in com-
bination with Photoshop. Otherwise, materials, design, and procedure
were as in Experiment 1.
3.4.2 Results
Each of the 13 participants performed 16 critical trials, yielding 208 re-
sponses, 23 (11%) of which were removed as in Experiment 1. The re-
maining 185 expressions were annotated as in Experiment 1.
The experiment was conducted to test the hypothesis that speakers
produce more colour overspecification when referring to geometrical fig-
ures than to office supplies. To this end, we compared the proportion of
colour overspecification produced in Experiment 2 to that produced in
the Low Importance condition (office supplies) in Experiment 1.
Figure 3.6 represents the mean proportions of colour overspecifica-
tion in reference to geometrical figures and office supplies. For reasons of
comparison, the mean proportions for dinner ware (Medium Importance)
and clothes (High Importance) from Experiment 1 are also represented.
8Two additional participants participated in the experiment but their data were not
analysed, because colour was included without resulting in overspecification in more
than half of the trials (n = 1) or because they did not understand the task (n = 1).
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As hypothesised, the proportion of colour overspecification was higher in
reference to geometrical figures (M = .84, SD = .37) than in reference to
office supplies (M = .37, SD = .48). The individual participants’ propor-
tions of colour overspecification varied a lot within conditions, as the high
standard deviations suggest. A Shapiro-Wilk test indicated that the data
were not normally distributed (p was below .05 in both conditions). We
therefore ranked the data (we report mean ranks, denoted by MR) and
used non-parametric statistics. A Mann-Whitney test indicated that the
difference between geometrical figures (MR = 16.58) and office supplies
(MR = 9.12) was significant and that the effect size was large, U = 31.50, z
= -2.59, p = .01, r = -.52.
As can be seen in Figure 3.6, the proportions of colour overspecifica-
tion produced in reference to geometrical figures and clothes (the High
Importance condition in Experiment 1) were very close. A Mann-Whitney
test indicated that the difference between figures (MR = 12.27) and clothes
(MR = 13.79) was not significant, U = 87.50, z = .60, p = .61, r = .12.
3.4.3 Discussion
Experiment 2 was conducted to test the hypothesis that speakers are more
likely to produce colour overspecification in reference to geometrical fig-
ures than to office supplies, even though colour is of equally low impor-
tance for the two categories. This prediction was borne out by the data. In
fact, the proportion of colour overspecification produced in Experiment
2 was so high, that it was statistically indistinguishable from the propor-
tion produced in reference to clothes, the High Importance condition in
Experiment 1. The results suggest that the colour of geometrical figures
is substantially more salient than the colour of office supplies, which we
have argued to be due to the fact that geometrical figures are very simple
objects whose only attributes which may attract the attention are colour
and shape.
3.5 General discussion
We presented a series of experimental studies that investigate the produc-
tion of colour overspecification in reference to objects in different object
categories. In Experiment 1, we tested the hypothesis that salience of
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Figure 3.6: Mean proportions of colour overspecification for geometrical figures from
Experiment 2, and office supplies (Low), dinner ware (Medium), and clothes (High),
from Experiment 1. The error bars represent standard errors.
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the colour of objects, and hence the probability that speakers produce
colour overspecification when referring to those objects, increases with
the degree to which colour is considered important for objects. In this
experiment, participants referred to objects that we know from a pretest
to vary in colour importance: clothes (High Importance), dinner ware
(Medium Importance), and office supplies (Low Importance). We found
a significant positive correlation between the median ratings of colour im-
portance and the mean proportions of colour overspecification, which is
evidence for our hypothesis.
The pretest indicated that colour is considered about equally impor-
tant for geometrical figures as for office supplies. In Experiment 2, we
investigated whether objects in the two categories nevertheless diverge in
how likely speakers are to produce colour overspecification when refer-
ring to them. We predicted that the colour of simple geometrical figures
is more salient than the colour of office supplies because figures have a
low number of attributes that may attract the attention, and that speakers
are hence more likely to produce colour overspecification when referring
to figures than to office supplies. This prediction was corroborated by
the data, which is in line with previous studies in which high rates of
colour overspecification were found in reference to geometrical figures
(Arts et al., 2011b). Besides, speakers referring to figures produced a very
similar amount of colour overspecification to speakers who referred to
clothes, to which colour is highly important.
We conclude from Experiments 1 and 2 that the likelihood of colour
overspecification increases when colour is important to the referent, and
when the referent has a low number of attributes that may attract the at-
tention. We have argued that colour importance and paucity of attributes
both increase colour salience, which triggers selection of colour, even if
the resulting colour adjective is redundant.
It might be questioned whether colour importance really increases the
salience of an object’s colour, as this hypothesis was tested only indi-
rectly. An alternative explanation is that the colour of office supplies is
equally salient to the colour of clothes, but that some speakers do not se-
lect colour when they are referring to office supplies because the lack of
colour importance makes them realise that colour is redundant. We think
this unlikely, because out of the seven participants in the Low Important
condition in Experiment 1 who produced colour overspecification at least
once, six had not produced it in the first trial, and four kept producing
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it consistently after the first time they did include colour. That is, if they
had realised that colour was redundant in their first trial, why then would
they start to include it later in the experiment? We therefore maintain that
it is salience of an object’s colour that largely determines whether colour
will be included in a referring expression. This is not to say that a high
degree of salience of an attribute automatically leads to including it. It is
perfectly possible, and indeed likely, that speakers evaluate to some de-
gree whether a selected attribute is sufficiently important. However, the
fact that colour overspecification is sometimes produced in monochrome
contexts suggests that such an evaluation mechanism is not infallible.
The question remains, however, why colour importance would in-
crease colour salience. A possible answer to this question is that when
colour is important to an object, speakers will often include the colour of
such an object when talking about it even in situations where the inten-
tion is not to enable the addressee to identify a referent, but rather to feed
his imagination such that he can shape an accurate image of the object in
his mind (cf. Dale and Reiter, 1995, on additional communicative goals
beyond identification only). For example, Bill may tell Ann-Marie about
his beautiful new pink shirt, without intending to enable her to pick out
the right object as a referent, but just to give her an idea of what his pre-
cious purchase looks like. If colour is important to an object, people may
therefore be inclined to pay attention to it. Moreover, as the label of an
object is often accompanied by a colour term, an association may emerge
between the colour term and this label.
As was argued in the Introduction, we claim that the effect of object
categories on how likely speakers are to produce colour overspecifica-
tion is due to a general cooperative strategy: selecting salient attributes
generally leads to efficient identification of the referent. We think it un-
likely that speakers tend to produce colour overspecification in reference
to clothes but not to office supplies because they reckon their addressee
will benefit from colour in identifying clothes but not in searching for of-
fice supplies. Only empirical evidence can tell us whether colour is more
beneficial in identifying clothes than office supplies. As was pointed out
in the Introduction, overspecification has been found to be beneficial in
some studies but cumbersome in others, and why experimental results
diverge at this point is as yet unclear. Addressees may be more likely to
notice that colour is redundant when the referent is a stapler than when
it is a dress, and hence are hindered by colour overspecification in the
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former case but not in the latter. Our point is that whether or not this is
the case, it is not the reason why speakers select colour more often when
referring to dresses than to staplers.
To conclude, a series of production experiments showed that speak-
ers are more likely to produce colour overspecification when referring to
some objects than to others, apparently regardless of how helpful colour
is for identifying the objects. Colour overspecification increased with
colour importance in reference to real life objects. It was also high in ref-
erence to geometrical figures, even though colour importance is low for
this category. We argue that colour overspecification increases with colour
salience, and that colour importance of real life objects and a paucity of
attributes that may attract attention both contribute to colour salience. We
claim that this is due to a general cooperative strategy, because in general,
salient attributes are likely to be helpful in the identification process.
Chapter 4
Variation across attributes
This chapter has been published before, in a slightly different form, as:
Tarenskeen, S., Broersma, M., and Geurts, B. (2015). Overspecification of color, pat-
tern, and size: Salience, absoluteness, and consistency. Frontiers in Psychology, 6 (1703).
doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2015.01703.
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Abstract
The rates of overspecification of colour, pattern, and size are compared, to investigate
how salience and absoluteness contribute to the production of overspecification. Colour
and pattern are absolute and salient attributes, whereas size is relative and less salient.
Additionally, a tendency towards consistent responses is assessed. Using a within-
participants design, we find similar rates of colour and pattern overspecification, which
are both higher than the rate of size overspecification. Using a between-participants
design, however, we find similar rates of pattern and size overspecification, which are
both lower than the rate of colour overspecification. This indicates that although many
speakers are more likely to include colour than pattern (probably because colour is more
salient), they may also treat pattern like colour due to a tendency towards consistency.
We find no increase in size overspecification when the salience of size is increased, sug-
gesting that speakers are more likely to include absolute than relative attributes. How-
ever, we do find an increase in size overspecification when mentioning the attributes is
triggered, which again shows that speakers tend to refer in a consistent manner, and that
there are circumstances in which even size overspecification is frequently produced.
4.1 Introduction
When speakers refer to objects, they do not always limit themselves to
giving information that is strictly necessary for the addressee to identify
the referent. In other words, they sometimes produce overspecification
instead of minimal specification (e.g. Pechmann, 1989; Engelhardt et al.,
2006; Arts et al., 2011b). Imagine, for example, a speaker requesting her
addressee to pass her a yellow cup, which happens to be surrounded by
blue plates and bowls. Although the speaker need not include a colour
adjective to enable her addressee to identify the referent, because there
is only one cup present, experimental work suggests that she would be
more likely to utter (1b) than (1a) in this situation, and hence, to produce
colour overspecification.
(1) a. Please pass me the cup.
b. Please pass me the yellow cup.
Experimental findings suggest that there is something special about colour
in reference: including colour is preferred over including various other at-
tributes, most notably size. When it is necessary to include either colour
or size to get a unique description of the referent, colour is more often
included than size (Belke and Meyer, 2002). Colour is also more likely
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to be included redundantly than size: for example, when referring to a
small yellow cup surrounded by big cups in yellow, red, and green, many
speakers will not only select size, which is both necessary and sufficient
for identification of the referent, but also colour, which is neither neces-
sary nor sufficient (Pechmann, 1989). When referring to an object that
is unique in its type, as in the situation above, speakers often include
colour as well (Koolen et al., 2013), even though no modification (e.g. an
adjective) is needed at all in that case. Most extremely, even when all ob-
jects in the visual context have the same colour as the referent, colour is
sometimes mentioned (Mangold and Pobel, 1988; Belke and Meyer, 2002;
Koolen et al., 2015).
In this paper, we investigate the seemingly special status of colour
in reference production, and in overspecification in particular. We do
this by comparing colour with two other attributes: pattern and size.
Whereas colour and size overspecification have been investigated before,
the study of reference to pattern is virtually unexplored. Pattern is an
interesting attribute because it is like colour – but unlike size – in being
both salient and absolute. As these two factors have been suggested to
explain why speakers produce colour overspecification, comparing the
three attributes will enable us to systematically tease apart, for the first
time, the effect of the two factors on the tendencies to include different
attributes redundantly.
We present a series of four language production experiments. In our
first experiment, we compare the rates of colour overspecification with the
corresponding rates of pattern and size overspecification. In one follow-
up experiment, we then assess the effect of salience and absoluteness.
In two other follow-up experiments, we assess the effect of consistency,
that is, the tendency to reuse previous expressions and constructions, by
varying colour, pattern, and size both within and between participants,
and by triggering selection of the three attributes.
4.2 Salience, absoluteness, and consistency
In this section, we discuss the literature on referential overspecification.
In Section 4.2.1, we introduce the notion of salience as an important factor
in attribute selection. The role of salience and absoluteness in the pref-
erence that speakers appear to have for including colour is elaborated
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on in Section 4.2.2. In Section 4.2.3, we discuss experimental work on the
speakers’ tendency to behave consistently. Finally, we introduce the series
of experiments that we conducted in more detail in Section 4.2.4.
4.2.1 Salience and overspecification
A question in the research of referring expressions production that has
received much attention lately is how speakers select attributes when pro-
ducing definite descriptions (for a recent overview, see van Deemter et al.,
2012). A factor that is currently thought to be central to attribute selection
is salience (e.g. Arts et al., 2011a; Koolen et al., 2011; Gatt, 2007). An ob-
ject’s attribute can be salient for various reasons, and is then more likely
to be selected by a speaker who intends to refer to this object. This may
result in overspecification, as salient attributes are not always necessary
to enable the addressee to identify the referent.
The basic idea of selecting salient attributes is intuitive: speakers tend
to select the attributes according to the degree to which their attention
is attracted by them. In the literature on salience and visual perception,
visual or perceptual salience is considered to be a property of objects,
which may be defined in terms of surprise (Itti and Baldi, 2009). Surprise
can occur on a low level, for example, when an object is unique on one
or more dimensions (Treisman and Gelade, 1980), such as a blue round
candy among red cubic candies. It can also occur on a higher level, in-
duced by world knowledge (Franke, 2012): a blue banana will in general
be more salient than a yellow banana.
In the literature on reference production, it is assumed (often implic-
itly) that not only objects, but also attributes of objects vary in salience
(e.g. Davies and Katsos, 2013). Attributes that are unique in a given con-
text, like colour and shape in the candies example above, may be salient,
and attributes that are surprising due to world knowledge, such as the
colour of a blue banana, may be salient as well, analogously to factors that
determine the salience of objects. Indeed, speakers tend not to include
redundant colour adjectives when referring to objects strongly associated
with a specific colour, for instance, the colour of a yellow banana (Sedivy,
2003), which is entirely as expected and therefore not particularly salient.
If a referent has an unexpected colour, however, colour overspecification
is much more likely to occur (Westerbeek et al., 2014). Davies and Katsos
(2013) show that speakers are more likely to produce overspecification
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when objects have salient attributes than when they do not.
It seems a good idea to select attributes that are salient, not only be-
cause it is easy for the speaker, as has often been suggested (Mangold
and Pobel, 1988; Davies and Katsos, 2013; Koolen et al., 2013), but also,
and perhaps more importantly, from a communicative point of view (cf.
Arts et al., 2011b; Koolen et al., 2011; Davies and Katsos, 2013). If an at-
tribute attracts the speaker’s attention, it is likely that it will attract the
attention of her addressee as well, which probably increases the likeli-
hood that it is useful in the process of identifying the referent. Not all
salient attributes are necessary for referent identification, however, and
selecting them may therefore result in overspecification. Although the
word ‘overspecification’ may have a negative flavour, suggesting that the
expression is too specific, overspecification need not be cumbersome and
may even be beneficial, as the benefits of a strictly redundant but salient
attribute in the comprehension process may often outweigh the risk that
the addressee is hindered by its redundancy. Indeed, there is evidence
that overspecification can speed up the process of referent identification
(Sonnenschein and Whitehurst, 1982; Mangold and Pobel, 1988; Paraboni
et al., 2007; Arts et al., 2011b; but see Engelhardt et al., 2006 and Engel-
hardt et al., 2011). An eyetracking study on the processing of size and
colour adjectives suggests that redundant size adjectives may be confus-
ing for addressees, whereas redundant colour adjectives are not (Sedivy
et al., 1999). Another study on the comprehension of overspecified ex-
pressions suggests, moreover, that non-salient redundant attributes are
more likely to hinder the addressee than salient redundant attributes
(Davies and Katsos, 2013).
In sum, there seems to be a tendency to select salient attributes, even if
this results in overspecification. Redundancy can hinder the comprehen-
sion process, but as salient attributes are likely to be helpful in referent
identification, including a redundant but salient attribute may often be
beneficial.
4.2.2 The colour preference
The literature suggests that speakers tend to include colour more often
than other attributes, and that colour overspecification is more common
than overspecification of other attributes. Two features of colour have
been argued to contribute to this preference: salience and absoluteness.
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We will discuss both features in this section. An overview of salience and
absoluteness of colour, pattern, and size is presented in Table 4.1.
Salience
In line with the view that speakers tend to select salient attributes, it
has been argued that colour is preferred because it is intrinsically salient
(Arts et al., 2011a; Gatt et al., 2013; Koolen et al., 2013). The common
view is that intrinsically salient attributes are noticed immediately, and
before other attributes: they are ‘perceived earlier’ (Gatt, 2007, p. 40) and
‘immediately grab [the speakers’] attention’ (Koolen et al., 2013, p. 408).
It has also been suggested that colour is more likely to ‘pop out’ than
other attributes (Westerbeek et al., 2014, p. 1772): intuitively, one green
candy in a jar surrounded by red ones is more likely to be noticed than
one small candy surrounded by big ones, or one cubic candy surrounded
by round ones.
Indeed, colour is one of the features computed in the earliest stages of
human visual processing (Livingstone and Hubel, 1988), and can be con-
sidered a primary cue in visual perception. It has been found that objects
in a colour that is contextually unique can grab the attention in visual
search, even if colour is irrelevant to the task (Theeuwes, 1992; Turatto
and Galfano, 2001). Colour also tends to be more helpful in visual search
than other attributes, such as size and shape (Williams, 1966; Christ, 1975).
Colour contrast between items thus seems to be an extremely powerful
cue in visual perception. In this respect, colour may be different from
other visual attributes, and also from non-visual attributes, like material,
some of which have been found to be included redundantly less often
than colour (see Mangold and Pobel, 1988, for shape, Arts et al., 2011b,
for size, and Sedivy, 2005, for size and material).
When examining experimental stimuli from previous experiments,
however, we observed that colours in experimental stimuli tend to be
bright and/or highly contrastive, while differences in size are usually
rather modest (e.g. Koolen et al., 2011; Arts et al., 2011b). We argue, then,
that previous findings do not necessarily show that colour is preferred
over size due to a difference in salience. Rather, the specific colours and
colour contrasts used in those experiments may have been more salient
than the size contrasts used, resulting in higher rates of colour overspec-
ification. Recently, the preference for colour over size was found to dis-
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appear when the size contrast between the referent and other objects was
increased (van Gompel et al., 2014). Along the same lines, speakers may
be less inclined to produce colour overspecification when the colour con-
trast is low or when colours are not particularly vivid than when colours
are bright and contrastive (Tarenskeen et al., submitted, Chapter 5 of this
thesis). In sum, it is not evident that, for example, a pale blue candy
surrounded by mint green ones is more likely to get the attention than a
huge candy surrounded by tiny ones.
In the study conducted by van Gompel et al. (2014), competition be-
tween colour and size was investigated. In the condition relevant for our
study, the referent was different from the other objects in the array in
colour and size but not in type. For example, the referent was a small
red candle and the other objects were a big blue and a big black can-
dle. When the size contrast was low, participants included colour but not
size in 79% of the cases, and size but not colour in only 2% of the cases.
When the contrast was high, however, colour but not size was included
in only 27% of the cases, while the rate of referring expressions including
size but not colour increased to 23%. Importantly, it was always neces-
sary to include either colour or size. Hence, overspecification occurred
only when both colour and size were included. This set-up is suitable
for studying attribute preferences, but not for comparing attributes with
respect to how likely they are to be added redundantly, which is the aim
of the present study. To be able to compare the rates of colour, pattern,
and size overspecification, we present participants with arrays in which
the referent is unique in its type (for example, if the referent is a dress,
none of the other objects in the array is a dress). Thus, adding an extra
attribute always results in overspecification. As van Gompel et al. (2014),
we manipulate the size contrast between the referent and surrounding
objects. While they investigate the effect of size contrast on the choice for
including size versus colour, we assess the effect of size contrast on the
production of size overspecification.
While we vary the salience of size, we keep the two other attributes
constant in being high in salience. Unlike colour and size, pattern is
virtually unexplored in the literature on reference production. In the
only study investigating pattern in reference production, Gatt et al. (2013)
found that speakers prefer colour over both pattern and size. As in van
Gompel et al.’s study, however, they investigated competition between
attributes, using arrays in which the referent was not unique in its type.
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Moreover, they used a single superimposed shape (a circle, a diamond,
or a square) on a brightly coloured picture as patterns, e.g. a green bot-
tle with a circle-shaped patch on it. Such patterns are probably not very
salient, and pictures with one little figure would not normally be called
‘patterned’. The use of striking colours may have decreased the salience
of pattern even more. This thus leaves the crucial question open whether
speakers are also more likely to produce colour than pattern overspeci-
fication in a situation where pictures have salient patterns but no other
salient attributes. The present study aims to address this question by de-
picting patterned objects which are completely striped or spotted and do
not have any other striking attributes. If colour overspecification is pro-
duced frequently because of its intrinsic salience, a high rate of pattern
overspecification is expected too, as pattern may be highly salient as well.
On the other hand, a high rate of size overspecification is only expected
if size is made salient. In Section 4.2.4, we elaborate on this further.
Absoluteness
According to Pechmann (1989) and Belke and Meyer (2002), speakers
tend to select colour before size because colour is an absolute attribute,
whereas size is relative1. That is, a speaker need not take into account
objects surrounding the referent in order to determine its colour2, while
she normally has to do this to determine whether the referent is big or
small. Pechmann points out that as speech is produced incrementally,
the speaker can start to articulate the referent’s colour while examining
the context in order to find out which additional attributes are required
for a unique description, which may result in colour overspecification.
Pechmann’s argument is in line with eyetracking results which indicate
that speakers often start producing colour adjectives before fixating on an
item of the same type but a different colour in the array (e.g. a blue cup
when the referent is a yellow cup), while they rarely start producing size
1Size is usually considered to be a relative attribute because in experimental studies
of reference, speakers refer to size by using gradable adjectives like ‘big’ and ‘small’,
and not absolute measures such as centimeters.
2This is not strictly speaking true, as colour perception is in fact highly sensitive to
various features of the visual context. However, colours used for experimental stim-
uli are almost always bright, saturated colours that are highly typical for the colour
categories they fall into, being minimally sensitive to the context, rendering colour prac-
tically an absolute attribute.
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adjectives before fixating on a size-contrastive item (Brown-Schmidt and
Konopka, 2011).
Two findings indicate that absoluteness alone does not explain the
colour preference. First, not all absolute attributes tend to be redun-
dantly included in referring expressions. Although shape is an abso-
lute attribute, shape overspecification has been found to occur less fre-
quently than colour overspecification (Mangold and Pobel, 1988; Arts
et al., 2011b). In another study, material, which is also an absolute at-
tribute, was included redundantly as infrequently as size, even though
size is a relative attribute (Sedivy, 2005).
The second indication that absoluteness alone does not explain the
colour preference is that size adjectives usually precede both redundant
and non-redundant colour modifiers (e.g. ‘the big red car’, Sproat and
Shih, 1991; Cinque, 1994), while according to Pechmann’s account, re-
dundant colour modifiers should in general precede size modifiers (‘the
red big car’). After all, colour overspecification is due to speakers start-
ing their referring expression after selecting colour but before selecting
size. In Pechmann’s production study, speakers of Dutch indeed pro-
duced colour before size adjectives sometimes, even though they would
normally prefer the reverse order (Sproat and Shih, 1991, p. 580). How-
ever, in two studies with speakers of German and English, who have
the same adjective order preference as speakers of Dutch (Cinque, 1994),
colour overspecification was produced frequently, but colour hardly ever
preceded size (Belke, 2006). This indicates that colour overspecification
is often not due to articulating colour adjectives before selecting size, as
Pechmann proposes. It is possible, however, that colour is normally se-
lected before size, without necessarily being articulated before selecting
size (see also Belke and Meyer, 2002).
Although the distinction between absolute and relative attributes thus
cannot entirely explain the asymmetry between colour and size, the fact
that colour is absolute while size is relative is likely to play a role in the
preference for colour over size in reference. In the present study, we take
into account the role of absoluteness by comparing colour both to size,
which is relative, and to pattern, which is absolute.
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4.2.3 Consistency
Our main interest in this paper is in the overspecification of three dif-
ferent attributes that vary in salience and in being absolute or relative:
colour, pattern, and size. Additionally, we investigate the way in which
the rates of overspecification of the three attributes may affect one an-
other. Experimental studies show that speakers have a preference for
sticking to previously used expressions and constructions (e.g. Brennan
and Clark, 1996; Pickering and Garrod, 2004; Goudbeek and Krahmer,
2012). In this paper, we investigate the relation between this preference
and tendencies to include one attribute but not another one. For example,
if speakers have a preference for including colour but not including size,
a preference for consistency may result in a decrease in the rate of colour
overspecification, or an increase in the rate of size overspecification.
Recently, the attention of some researchers has been attracted by the
high amount of variation across speakers when producing referring ex-
pressions in experimental settings. It was found that machine learning
models predict human-produced referring expressions better when they
take into account both speaker identity and characteristics of the visual
context than when they only use visual characteristics (Viethen and Dale,
2010; see also Mitchell et al., 2011, and Ferreira and Paraboni, 2014). Since
machine learning models that used speaker identity based their predic-
tions on previously produced referring expressions, this finding suggests
not only that speakers strongly differ in their referring behaviour, but
also that individual speakers tend to be consistent in the way they re-
fer. Indeed, a basic assumption in psychological research is that variation
between participants is higher than variation within participants, which
is why participants are often modelled as random variables in statistic
analyses (e.g. Baayen et al., 2008).
The finding that speakers tend to refer in a consistent way is reminis-
cent of the well-established tendency to reuse referring expressions that
have been used earlier in the conversation by one of the interlocutors. For
example, Brennan and Clark (1996) showed that speakers who use a spe-
cific term instead of a basic-level term in order to avoid ambiguity, such
as ‘the loafer’ in a context with several kinds of shoes, tend to stick to
this term even in contexts where the basic-level term would not lead to
ambiguity any longer, such as ‘the loafer’ in a context where the loafer is
the only shoe. Analogously, speakers were found to reuse constructions
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for the same referents by including modifiers that were redundant in the
current context but necessary in preceding contexts (Van Der Wege, 2009).
More generally, speakers can be primed to include attributes that
would normally be dispreferred, such as the orientation of the referent
where its colour would have been sufficient, too (Goudbeek and Krah-
mer, 2012). Another study suggests that attribute selection is affected
by the linguistic context more than by some visual factors that are of-
ten expected to be influential, such as the degree to which the referent’s
attributes are unique in the visual context, called discriminatory power3
(Viethen et al., 2014). They found that learning models of reference pro-
duction that take into account features of previously produced referring
expressions predicted human-produced expressions better than models
selecting attributes based on discriminatory power, which is also in line
with Gatt et al. (2013). The tendency to reuse words in experimental
settings has been found outside the realm of reference as well (see e.g.
Alferink and Gullberg, 2014).
In our study, we investigate whether due to a tendency towards con-
sistency, the tendencies to include one attribute but not another can af-
fect one another. We also assess whether, in line with Goudbeek and
Krahmer (2012), mentioning the three attributes can trigger even size
overspecification, which is normally produced infrequently. Our study
is not intended, however, to assess the mechanisms that underpin con-
sistency in reference production. Currently, a debate is going on about
those mechanisms. One position is that in dialogue, interlocutors es-
tablish conceptual pacts (Brennan and Clark, 1996): they reuse referring
expressions when talking to the same partner and expect their partner
to do the same. This view presupposes that interlocutors keep track of
their common ground, that is, the information that is mutually shared
between them. According to the alternative account, interlocutors au-
tomatically align their representations on all linguistic levels (Pickering
and Garrod, 2004). The central claim is that interlocutors do not need to
keep track of their common ground, memory processes like priming nor-
mally being sufficient for proper alignment. That is, interlocutors reuse
referring expressions because those expressions are salient due to their
3To be precise, the discriminatory power of a referent’s attribute is computed by
dividing the number of competitors (the objects in the visual context other than the
referent) that do not share the attribute with the referent by the total number of com-
petitors.
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being primed by their previous usages. It is uncontroversial that priming
is a mechanism present in both language production and comprehen-
sion: there is substantial evidence for semantic priming (e.g. Meyer and
Schvaneveldt, 1971; Neely, 1976), phonological priming (e.g. Bock, 1986a;
Grainger and Ferrand, 1996), and syntactic priming (e.g. Bock, 1986b;
Potter and Lombardi, 1998). What researchers in the present debate es-
sentially disagree about, however, is whether interlocutors routinely take
into account their common ground when producing and comprehend-
ing utterances in a way that goes beyond automatic priming mechanisms
(see, amongst many others, Brown and Dell, 1978; Lockridge and Bren-
nan, 2002; Pickering and Garrod, 2004; Yoon and Brown-Schmidt, 2014).
In sum, speakers often reuse words and constructions that were used
earlier in the discourse, having a preference for consistency. They tend to
do this even if there is in fact a good reason to switch to a different con-
struction, like the changed context in Brennan and Clark’s (1996) exper-
iment, or the general preference for other attributes than orientation, as
in Goudbeek and Krahmer’s (2012) experiment. Consistency in reference
production may be due to considerations of the interlocutors’ common
ground or to simple priming mechanisms. However, we are neutral as
to what mechanisms may result in the effects we find, although we will
discuss some possibilities in Section 4.7.
4.2.4 The present study
The present study investigates, in the first place, tendencies to include
various attributes in referring expressions, even if this results in over-
specification, and the way in which salience and absoluteness contribute
to these tendencies. In order to do this, we conduct four language pro-
duction experiments in which speakers use referring expressions to refer
to pictures of objects that vary in colour, pattern, and size. We compare
the proportions of overspecification of the three attributes. Our study
is the first to compare attributes such that salience and absoluteness are
systematically teased apart. We do this by varying the salience of size
between experiments. Throughout the experimental series, we also ex-
plore the tendency towards consistent behaviour, examining to what ex-
tent speakers alternate between including and not including an attribute,
and investigating the effect of including necessary attributes on the pro-
duction of size overspecification in particular.
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Salience Absolute
Colour High Yes
Pattern High Yes
Size Experiments 1 and 2: Low No
Experiments 3 and 4: High
Table 4.1: Salience and absoluteness of the three attributes.
Experiment 1 is a baseline study in which we investigate the rates
of colour, pattern, and size overspecification. As discussed in the previ-
ous section, colour, which has been argued to be ‘special’ with respect to
overspecification, is similar to pattern in being salient and absolute (see
Table 4.1). Size, on the other hand, differs from colour and pattern in
being relative instead of absolute. Further, in Experiment 1, the contrast
between big and small items is low and size is hence low in salience.
As such, size is different from both colour and pattern, in being relative
and less salient. If speakers tend to include colour because it is salient
and absolute, they are expected to include other attributes that are salient
and absolute as well. We therefore hypothesise that in comparison to
size overspecification, speakers will not only produce more colour over-
specification, which would be in line with what has been found before
(Pechmann, 1989; Belke and Meyer, 2002; Gatt et al., 2013), but also more
pattern overspecification.
In Experiment 2, we explore the possibility that in Experiment 1,
where a within-participants design is used, the expected tendency to-
wards consistency may lead to an effect of the tendency to include or
not include one attribute on the rate of overspecification of another at-
tribute. For example, pattern might be treated like colour because the
two attributes share characteristics with each other but not with size. An-
other possibility is that not including size in their utterances will lead
some speakers to stop producing colour and pattern overspecification as
well. In Experiment 2, we investigate the occurrence of such effects in
Experiment 1, by varying the three attributes between instead of within
participants. If the rates of overspecification tend to affect one another,
the pattern of results is expected to change compared to the pattern found
in Experiment 1.
In Experiment 3, we delve into the question of how salience and ab-
soluteness contribute to the tendency to include attributes, teasing these
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two features apart. We make size more salient by increasing the con-
trast between big and small items. We hypothesise that the rate of size
overspecification increases correspondingly, which would indicate that
salience is a factor in selecting attributes and producing overspecifica-
tion. Furthermore, we expect absoluteness to have an effect, too, leading
to higher rates of overspecification of the two absolute attributes (colour
and pattern) than the relative attribute (size).
Experiment 4, finally, investigates whether overspecification of the
three attributes is triggered by including non-critical trials which, unlike
the critical trials, require colour, pattern, or size to be included. The ex-
periment is thus conducted to assess whether the production of overspec-
ification of colour, pattern, and even size, can increase due to a tendency
towards consistency.
4.3 Experiment 1
In Experiment 1, we vary colour, pattern, and size in a within-participants
design and compare the rates of overspecification for the three attributes.
As colour and pattern are salient and absolute while size is less salient
and relative, we hypothesise that the rates of colour and pattern over-
specification will be higher than the rate of size overspecification. We
also explore the tendency towards consistency by examining the individ-
ual proportions of alternations between overspecification and minimal
specification in each condition.
4.3.1 Method
Participants
We tested 18 native speakers of Dutch (14 females, 4 males, mean age 23
years, range 18-27 years) at Radboud University, Nijmegen, the Nether-
lands. All were volunteers and they received a small fee for their partici-
pation. All of them reported not to be colourblind.
Materials
We used six line drawings of clothes as stimulus materials, which were
collected on Google Image. All garments would normally be named by a
4.3. Experiment 1 87
one-syllabic noun in Dutch. The six pictures were manipulated in order
to create variation on the three attributes. Relative size is expressed in
Dutch by equivalents of ‘big’ and ‘small’, which makes it basically a bi-
nary attribute. We therefore selected two values of each of the two other
attributes, too. The pattern values were striped and spotted, the colour
values were blue and green, and the size values were big and small, as
shown in Figure 4.1. We thus created six variants of each picture. The
patterns were clear grey stripes or spots against a white background and
the colours were bright, saturated colours. The ratio between the heights
of the big and small pictures was 3:2. We also had filler pictures, which
were as in Chapter 3 (Figure 3.4). The experiment was programmed with
Presentation software.
Design
In critical trials, an array was presented with pictures of six different gar-
ments. They were arranged in a 2 (row) × 3 (column) grid. We had three
conditions: Colour, Pattern, and Size. The objects within an array always
varied on exactly one attribute: colour, pattern, or size, respectively. In
each array, half of the objects had one value (e.g. striped) and the other
half had the other value (e.g. spotted). The target object thus shared its
value with two other objects. Including a colour, pattern or size modi-
fier always resulted in overspecification. Examples of arrays are shown in
Figures 4.1.4
Figure 4.1: Arrays in the Colour (left), Pattern (middle), and Size (right) conditions in
Experiment 1.
Attribute was manipulated within participants: each participant re-
ceived trials from all three conditions. Each of the six objects once acted
4Note that the representation of the stimuli’s colours can only be an approximation
of their representation in the experiment.
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as target in each of the six possible values, yielding 36 critical trials. All
participants saw all critical trials. They also saw 36 trials of each of the
three filler types, yielding a total of 144 trials. Eight additional trials were
included for practice.
Fillers were included for two reasons: first, to prevent participants
from sticking to one syntactic and semantic structure throughout the
whole experiment, and second, to hide the purpose of the experiment.
There were three types of filler trials. Fillers of the first type consisted
of arrays with four pictures of common objects, which were included to
elicit unmodified referring expressions, that is, expressions without any
adjectives or prepositional phrases. We did not expect modification to oc-
cur because basic-level terms were always sufficient and pictures did not
have striking or unexpected features. Fillers of the second type were ar-
rays with four pictures of Greebles, which were included to make partici-
pants aware that simply naming objects was not always sufficient. Fillers
of the third type were arrays with two human faces, which were either
of the same gender or of different genders. They were included to elicit
variation in the presence of modifiers within a category: modification was
necessary when the two people were of the same gender, but unnecessary
when they differed in gender.
The order of the trials was pseudorandomised, with the restriction
that a trial was always followed by at least two trials in which the target
was of a different type of garment (see Section 3.3.1 for a motivation of
this procedure). Each participant saw the trials in a unique order.
Procedure
Participants were tested individually in a quiet booth. Their task was
to instruct an imaginary addressee to click on one of the pictures, by
completing the Dutch equivalent of the sentence ‘Click on . . . ’. A cross
preceding the array indicated the position of the target on the screen. Par-
ticipants were asked to formulate their instruction in such a way that an
addressee would be able to click on the right picture, even if the pictures
would be arranged differently on the screen for the addressee than for the
participant. This particular instruction was given to prevent them from
referring to the location of the pictures on the screen. It took participants
about twenty minutes to complete the task.
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4.3.2 Results
Each participant performed 36 critical trials. In two trials, no response
was given. The critical trials thus elicited 646 responses. Seventeen re-
sponses (2.6%) were removed, because the referent was not the target
item, or because the speaker corrected themselves during the articulation
of the utterance. The remaining 629 expressions were annotated as over-
specified when a colour modifier was included in the Colour condition,
when a pattern modifier was included in the Pattern condition, and when
a size modifier was included in the Size condition.5
Experiment 1 was conducted to answer the question how likely speak-
ers are to produce overspecification of colour, pattern, and size, respec-
tively. We expected that overspecification would be produced more often
in the Colour and the Pattern conditions than in the Size condition. In-
deed, Figure 4.2 shows that overspecification was produced often in the
Colour condition (proportion of overspecification: M = .55, SD = .50) and
in the Pattern condition (M = .42, SD = .49), but almost never in the Size
condition (M = .01, SD = .10).
In this experiment and all the following, Shapiro-Wilk tests indicated
that the data were not normally distibuted (p < .001 in all conditions in
all experiments). Hence, we ranked the data and used non-parametric
statistics for the analyses. We report mean ranks, denoted by MR.
A Friedman’s ANOVA indicated a highly significant main effect of
Attribute on overspecification, χ2(2) = 24.24, p < .001. In line with our
hypothesis, stepwise stepdown comparisons indicated a significant dif-
ference between the Pattern (MR = 2.17) and Size (MR = 1.19) conditions,
p = .005, while the difference between the Pattern and the Colour (MR =
2.64) conditions was not significant, p > .1.
To explore the tendency towards consistent behaviour, we counted
the number of times that participants included an attribute in a trial but
did not include it in the next trial of the same condition, or vice versa.
For each participant, we divided this number by the number of trials of
5This means we did not take into account all occurrences of overspecification. Colour
was sometimes included in the Pattern condition (n = 9) or in the Size condition (n
= 2), but we did not count these cases as colour overspecification. Doing so would
not have yielded a fair comparison between the attributes because only pictures in the
Pattern condition had patterns, while all pictures had a colour. Moreover, patterns in
line drawings are only there by the grace of colour contrast.
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Figure 4.2: Experiment 1: Proportions of overspecified referring expressions. The
error bars represent standard errors.
the condition minus 1 (the number of opportunities to alternate). Figure
4.3 shows the degree of consistency in each condition, indicating that
participants tended to behave highly consistently, the majority alternating
in less than 10% of the trials within each condition.
4.3.3 Discussion
Experiment 1 indicates that, in line with our expectations, speakers pro-
duced substantial rates of colour and pattern overspecification, but hardly
any size overspecification. Although the rate of colour overspecification
was numerically higher than the rate of pattern overspecification, this
difference was not significant. It seems, then, that colour and pattern
overspecification are both likely to occur, both attributes being salient
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Figure 4.3: Experiment 1: The proportion of participants (y-axis) in each range of
proportions of alternations in each condition (x-axis).
and absolute. In line with the literature, we found that speakers were
highly consistent within conditions, most of them either producing or
not producing overspecification in the majority of the trials.
As was pointed out before, the tendencies to include or not include
one attribute may have affected the rate of overspecification of another at-
tribute, due to a tendency towards consistency. It is possible, for example,
that a tendency to include colour may have triggered the production pat-
tern overspecification, since the two attributes share characteristics with
each other but not with size. Another possibility is that the tendency not
to include size has resulted in a decrease in overspecification overall.
In Experiment 2, we vary the three attributes between participants,
thereby excluding the possibility that the rate of overspecification in one
condition affects the rate in another. A change in the pattern of results
would therefore indicate that such between-attributes effects took place
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in Experiment 1, probably due to the tendency towards consistency. A
stable pattern, in contrast, would show that the rates of overspecification
of the three attributes did not affect one another.
4.4 Experiment 2
In Experiment 2, we vary colour, pattern, and size in a between-participants
design, in order to find out whether the rates of overspecification in Ex-
periment 1 affected one another, due to a tendency towards consistent
behaviour. A change in the pattern of results would indicate that such
effects occurred, whereas a similar pattern would show that they were
absent. Again, we expect a high degree of consistency within speakers.
4.4.1 Method
Participants
We tested 54 participants (43 females, 11 males, mean age 22 years, range
18-31 years) similar to those in Experiment 1.6 None had participated in
the previous experiment.
Materials, design, and procedure
Materials were the same as in Experiment 1. Attribute was now manipu-
lated between participants. Participants were randomly assigned to either
of the three conditions: Colour, Pattern, or Size, with 18 participants per
group. In each condition, there were twelve different critical pictures in
each condition (6 pictures × 2 values of the attribute in that condition).
Each picture was presented twice in each experimental session, yielding
24 critical trials in each condition. Participants also received 24 trials of
each of the three filler types, yielding a total of 96 trials. Four additional
trials were included for practice. Otherwise design and procedure were
the same as in Experiment 1.
6Data from eight additional participants were collected but not analysed because they
were instructed incorrectly (n = 4), because they received the wrong practice trials (n =
1), or because they failed to produce definite descriptions (n = 3).
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4.4.2 Results
All participants performed 24 critical trials. Once, no response was given.
The critical trials thus elicited 1295 responses. We excluded 28 responses
(2.2%) from the analysis as in Experiment 1. The remaining 1267 expres-
sions were annotated as in Experiment 1.7
A comparison of Figures 4.2 and 4.4 suggests that the patterns of re-
sults found in Experiments 1 and 2 were different, indicating that varying
the three attributes within participants affected the proportions of over-
specification in Experiment 1. A Kruskall-Wallis test indicated a main
effect of Attribute in Experiment 2, H(2) = 35.98, p < .001. Stepwise step-
down comparisons revealed that the proportion of overspecification was
significantly higher in the Colour condition (M = .79, SD = .41, MR =
42.94) than in the Pattern condition (M = .13, SD = .34, MR = 22.06), p
< .001. Although overspecification in the Size condition was at floor, it
was still significantly lower (MR = 17.50) than in the Pattern condition, p
= .037.
A Mann-Whitney test showed that the rate of pattern overspecification
was significantly lower in Experiment 2 (MR = 14.33) than in Experiment
1 (MR = 22.67), U = 87.00, z = 2.61, p = .017, which indicates that the rate of
pattern overspecification in Experiment 1 was affected by the tendencies
to include or not include the other attributes. The rate of colour over-
specification was numerically higher in Experiment 2 (MR = 21.72) than
in Experiment 1 (MR = 15.28), but this difference was only marginally
significant, U = 220.00, z = 1.91, p = .07.
As in Experiment 1, most participants alternated between producing
and not producing overspecification within conditions in less than 10% of
the trials, as indicated in Figure 4.5. That is, consistency was high again,
which is in line with our expectation.
4.4.3 Discussion
The patterns of results found in Experiment 1 and 2 were clearly differ-
ent, indicating that the rates of overspecification in Experiment 1 affected
one another. In contrast to what was found in Experiment 1, where the
7Participants never mentioned colour in the Pattern or Size conditions, as happened
sometimes in Experiment 1.
94 Chapter 4. Variation across attributes
Figure 4.4: Experiment 2: Proportions of overspecified referring expressions. The
error bars represent standard errors.
rates of colour and pattern overspecification were statistically indistin-
guishable, there was a large and highly significant difference between the
Pattern and the Colour conditions in Experiment 2. Although the rate of
overspecification was significantly higher in the Pattern than in the Size
condition in both experiments, the rate of pattern overspecification was
closer to the rate of colour than to the rate of size overspecification in
Experiment 1, while it was the other way around in Experiment 2. A
significant difference between the two Pattern conditions in Experiments
1 and 2 suggests that the production of colour overspecification in Exper-
iment 1 triggered the production of pattern overspecification. We found
no evidence, on the other hand, that colour overspecification decreased due
to a tendency to not produce size overspecification: although the rate of
colour overspecification was numerically higher in Experiment 2 than in
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Figure 4.5: Experiment 2: The proportion of participants (y-axis) in each range of
proportions of alternations in each condition (x-axis).
Experiment 1, this difference did not reach significance.
Experiment 2 indicates that the tendency to include colour is stronger
than the tendency to include pattern. Since both attributes are absolute,
a possible explanation is that pattern is less salient than colour. On the
other hand, while the tendency to produce colour overspecification may
have triggered some participants to produce pattern overspecification, it
did not trigger them to produce size overspecification. This may be be-
cause size is still less salient than pattern, but it may also be due to the fact
that size is a relative attribute while both colour and pattern are absolute.
In Experiment 3, we vary the three attributes within participants again,
and we increase the contrast between big and small items, making size
more salient. This enables us to investigate the respective effects of salience
and absoluteness on the tendency to include attributes. In line with
van Gompel et al. (2014), we might expect the rate of size overspecifi-
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Figure 4.6: An array in the Size condition in Experiment 3.
cation to increase, indicating that salience is a factor in the tendency to
include attributes and to produce overspecification. Furthermore, we ex-
pect an effect of absoluteness, resulting in a difference between colour and
pattern on the one hand, and size on the other hand, as in Experiment 1.
4.5 Experiment 3
In Experiment 3, we assess how salience and absoluteness contribute to
the tendency to select attributes in referring expressions. As in Experi-
ment 1, we vary colour, pattern, and size within participants, but now
increasing the salience of size, in order to find out whether this results
in an increase in size overspecification compared to Experiment 1, which
would indicate an effect of salience on overspecification. We also expect
that there will remain a difference between the two absolute attributes
(colour and pattern) and size. Finally, we expect the degree of consis-
tency within speakers again to be high.
4.5.1 Method
Participants
We tested 18 participants (13 females, 5 males, mean age 21 years, range
18-29 years) similar to those in the previous experiments. None had par-
ticipated in either of the previous experiments.
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Materials and design
In the Size condition, the ratio between big and small pictures was 3:1
instead of 3:2. An example of an array in the Size condition is shown
in Figure 4.6. Otherwise, materials, design, and procedure were as in
Experiment 1.
4.5.2 Results
All participants performed 36 critical trials each. Once, no response was
given. The critical trials thus elicited 647 responses. Seven responses
(1.1%) were removed from the analysis as in Experiment 1. The remaining
640 responses were annotated as in the previous experiments.
We conducted Experiment 3 to assess how salience and absoluteness
contribute to the tendency to select attributes. Our first hypothesis was
that an increase in salience of size would result in an increase in the rate
of size overspecification from Experiment 1 to Experiment 3, indicating
that salience contributes to this tendency. We also expected absoluteness
to contribute, our second hypothesis being that there would still be a
difference between colour and pattern on the one hand, and size on the
other hand (like in Experiments 1 and 2).
The proportions of overspecified referring expressions in each con-
dition in Experiment 3 are shown in Figure 4.7. A Mann-Whitney test
indicated that although the proportion of size overspecification was nu-
merically higher in Experiment 3 (M = .11, SD = .31, MR = 20.17) than
in Experiment 1 (M = .01, SD = .10, MR = 16.83), this difference was not
significant, U = 129.00, z = 1.38, p > .1. Thus, our first hypothesis was not
confirmed by the data.
In line with our second hypothesis, Figure 4.7 suggests that the pat-
terns of Experiments 1 and 3 were globally similar, with overspecifica-
tion being produced more often in the Colour and the Pattern conditions
than in the Size condition. Two additional Mann-Whitney tests confirmed
that there was no significant difference between Experiments 1 and 3 for
Colour (MR = 20.72 versus MR = 16.28, U = 122.00, z = -1.28, p > .1), and
for Pattern (MR = 20.08 versus MR = 16.92, U = 133.50, z = -.94, p > .1).
A Friedman’s ANOVA indicated that there was a significant main ef-
fect of Attribute, χ2(2) = 19.58, p < .001. Stepwise stepdown comparisons
showed that the difference between the Colour (M = .37, SD = .48, MR
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= 2.56) and Pattern (M = .29, SD = .45, MR = 2.03) conditions was not
significant, p > .10, as in Experiment 1, and that the difference between
Pattern and Size (MR = 1.42) was marginally significant, p = .059.
Figure 4.7: Experiment 3: Proportions of overspecified referring expressions. The
error bars represent standard errors.
Earlier, we found a significant difference between the two Pattern con-
ditions in Experiments 1 and 2, while the difference between the two
Colour conditions was only marginally significant (see Section 4.4.2). We
thus found evidence that in Experiment 1, the rate of pattern overspec-
ification was affected by tendencies to include or not include other at-
tributes, but no evidence for analogous effects on the rate of colour over-
specification. However, a Mann-Whitney test indicates that the propor-
tion of colour overspecification was significantly lower in Experiment 3
(M = .37, MR = 13.86) than in Experiment 2 (M = .79, MR = 23.14), U =
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Figure 4.8: Experiment 3: The proportion of participants (y-axis) in each range of
proportions of alternations in each condition (x-axis).
78.50, z = -2.71, p = .007, indicating that the rate of colour overspecifica-
tion, too, is affected by the way other attributes are treated.
As in the previous studies, most participants alternated between pro-
ducing and avoiding overspecification within conditions in less than 10%
of the trials, as indicated in Figure 4.8. That is, consistency was high
again, which is in line with our expectation.
4.5.3 Discussion
Experiment 3 was conducted to assess how salience and absoluteness
contribute to the tendency to produce overspecification of colour, pat-
tern, and size. We hypothesised that due to an increase in salience, the
rate of size overspecification might increase, but that due to a difference
in absoluteness, the rates of colour and pattern overspecification would
100 Chapter 4. Variation across attributes
remain higher than the rate of size overspecification.
Our first expectation was not confirmed: there was no significant dif-
ference between the rates of size overspecification in Experiments 1 and
3. At first sight, this result does not seem to be in line with the findings
of van Gompel et al. (2014), who did find a positive effect of increas-
ing salience of size on size overspecification. However, as discussed in
Section 4.2.2, there is a crucial difference between their experiments and
ours: in their study, all items were of the same type but different sizes
and colours, requiring either size or colour for disambiguation between
the target and the other objects, while in our study, all items were of dif-
ferent types and therefore it was never necessary to add a modifier to
the noun. Thus, including size resulted in overspecification in our study,
while in theirs, only including both colour and size did. Even if both
colour and size were included in their study, however, size might still
not be experienced as irrelevant by an addressee, because it did distin-
guish between objects of the same type. An eyetracking study conducted
by Sedivy et al. (1999), which was touched upon briefly in Section 4.2.1,
indicated that addressees expect speakers to use size adjectives only if
the referent has a bigger or smaller counterpart in the context, whereas
they do not have analogous expectations about the use of colour adjec-
tives. In this study, participants were shown arrays with, for example, a
big and a small glass, a big pitcher, and a small key. Eye gaze patterns
suggested that upon hearing ‘big’, participants inferred that the referent
was the big glass rather than the big pitcher, whereas in a situation with
a pink and a yellow comb, a yellow bowl, and a knife, they did not infer
from hearing ‘yellow’ that the referent was the yellow comb rather than
the yellow bowl. These findings suggest that size adjectives are expected
only if there is a relevant size contrast in the context, that is, if the referent
is bigger or smaller than another object of the same type. There was such
a relevant size contrast in the experiment conducted by van Gompel et
al., where all objects in the array were of the same type, but not in our
experiments, where all objects were of different types. Size overspecifi-
cation would therefore violate an addressee’s expectation, and possibly
even lead to confusion, when produced in the visual contexts we used in
our experiment, but not in the contexts used in van Gompel et al.’s study.
This may urge speakers to avoid size overspecification when there is no
relevant size contrast in the context, probably due to the fact that size is
a relative attribute.
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Alternatively, it is possible that the difference between van Gompel
et al.’s findings and ours is due to the fact that the size contrast in their
study was 5:1 whereas it was 3:1 in our study. As Figure 4.6 shows,
however, the size contrast in our study was quite striking, which led one
of the participants in a pilot study to ask for ‘the very small dress’ (‘de hele
kleine jurk’) the first time when she came across a trial in which a small
object was the target. We therefore think it unlikely that participants in
our study did not include size because it was not sufficiently salient.
The absence of a significant effect of salience on size overspecification
and the difference between our results and those found by van Gompel
et al. suggest that absoluteness is an important factor in attribute selec-
tion: even if size is made salient, size overspecification is produced in-
frequently. This suggestion is in line with our expectation that due to
the difference in the absoluteness dimension, the rate of size overspec-
ification would remain lower than the rates of colour and pattern over-
specification. Although the difference between pattern and size was only
marginally significant, we did find that the pattern of results in Experi-
ment 3 was globally similar to the one in Experiment 1, where this differ-
ence was highly significant. None of the three conditions in Experiment
3 was significantly different from the corresponding conditions in Exper-
iment 1. Besides, in both experiments, proportions of overspecification
in the Colour and Pattern conditions were statistically indistinguishable,
and they were numerically closer to each other than either of them was
to the Size condition. All in all, this suggests that absoluteness indeed
contributes to the tendency to include certain attributes but not others.
If the low frequency of size overspecification in Experiment 3 is indeed
due to the fact that the contrast on this relative attribute was irrelevant,
this may also explain why the rate of colour overspecification in Exper-
iment 3 was so much lower than in Experiment 2. We know from the
previous experiments that speakers strongly tend to behave consistently,
treating similar attributes in a similar way. In Experiment 1, this resulted
in the majority of participants including both colour and pattern but not
size, which was different from the other two in being relative and low in
salience. The high salience of size in Experiment 3, however, may have led
participants to treat all three attributes similarly, since all of them were
salient, either including them all or including none of them. Since includ-
ing them all would lead to the unnecessary and irrelevant mention of a
relative attribute, the majority of the participants may have been triggered
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to produce no overspecification at all.
It might be noted that, as in the previous experiments, our manipula-
tion of the size of the pictures was independent of the proportions among
the objects that the pictures represent: for example, a dress is normally
much larger than a sock. Because people are so experienced in interpret-
ing pictures and their sizes, which are not always proportional to real
life sizes, we assume that our participants will have had no problem in-
terpreting the size of the pictures in the arrays. Letting go of real life
proportions was inevitable in the light of our purpose, namely, to com-
pare the rates of overspecification of size with the other two attributes. In
many other studies (such as van Gompel et al.’s), size differences are in-
dicated by representing several objects of the same type in different sizes
(for instance, a small candle and several larger candles). As discussed
in Section 4.2.2, this is suitable when the competition between size and
other attributes is investigated: how likely are speakers to include size
when including either size or colour is sufficient? In that situation, over-
specification only arises when both size and colour are included. In the
present study, however, we are interested in a comparison between over-
specification of different attributes, including size. To investigate this, it
is necessary that the target object is unique in a display and that it differs
in size from different objects. As it is hard, if not impossible, to indicate
in a realistic way that a sock is small for a sock by exploiting the pro-
portion between the sock and a dress, especially if the ratio between big
and small pictures is fixed, we decided to abstract from the natural sizes
of the objects represented. The fact that size overspecification was often
produced in Experiment 4 (see Section 4.6.2), in which the same displays
were used, indicates that it is unlikely that participants were confused by
the ‘unnatural’ size differences between the pictures.
Experiment 3 shows that size overspecification is produced infrequently
if there is no relevant size contrast in the visual context, even if size is
made highly salient. In Experiment 4, we investigate whether there are
nevertheless circumstances that do trigger size overspecification, even if
there is no relevant size contrast. As speakers show a tendency towards
consistency, triggering the mention of the three attributes is likely to result
in an increase in the rates of overspecification of all attributes, including
size.
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4.6 Experiment 4
In Experiment 4, we investigate circumstances that may trigger size over-
specification, by introducing non-critical trials which require speakers
to include colour, pattern, or size in order to yield a unique descrip-
tion. Since participants in previous studies were found to show a strong
tendency towards consistency, we expect the non-critical trials to trigger
mentioning the three attributes, yielding an increase in colour and pat-
tern in comparison with Experiment 3, and also, for the first time, the
occurrence of size overspecification, even though there is no relevant size
contrast present in the visual context.
4.6.1 Method
Participants
We tested 20 participants (16 females, 4 males, mean age 22 years and 10
months, range 18-28 years) similar to those in Experiment 1.8 None had
participated in any of the previous experiments.
Materials, design, and procedure
The critical pictures used in Experiment 3 were now used both as crit-
ical and non-critical pictures. The pictures that were used as fillers in
the previous experiments were not used here. Otherwise, materials and
procedure were as in the previous experiments.
As in Experiment 3, attribute was manipulated within participants.
Non-critical trials were now included to trigger the use of modifiers. They
were identical to critical trials, except that one of the garments shared the
target’s type (but not its value). For example, when the target was a big
sock, then there was also a small sock in the array. In this context, omit-
ting a size modifier (‘Click on the sock’) would result in underspecifica-
tion, which we know from a variety of studies to be rarely produced (e.g.
Engelhardt et al., 2006; Arts et al., 2011b; Koolen et al., 2011; Davies and
Katsos, 2013). Additionally, in half of the trials discriminatory power was
8Data from two additional participants were collected but not analysed because they
did not follow the instructions (n = 1) or because their age exceeded the upper age
bound of 35 (n = 1).
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increased to make the target value more salient and hence increasing the
probability that speakers would include size modifiers even in the critical
trials. In half of the trials, as in the previous experiments (LowDist), the
target shared its value with two of its distractors (see Figure 4.1), whereas
in the other half (HighDist), it did not share its value with any of them,
increasing this value’s salience. For example, if the target in the HighDist
condition was blue, the five other pictures were green.
All 36 variants of each picture acted as the target of a critical trial
twice: they acted as target once in the LowDist condition and once in the
HighDist condition. They also acted as the target of a non-critical trial
twice, yielding a total of 144 trials. Six additional trials were included for
practice.
4.6.2 Results
All participants performed 72 critical trials each. The critical trials elicited
1440 responses, 45 of which (3.1%) were excluded from the analysis as in
Experiment 1. The remaining 1395 were annotated as in Experiment 1.
Experiment 4 was conducted to answer the question whether even
size overspecification is triggered by mentioning colour, pattern, and size.
Additionally, in half of the critical trials (HighDist condition), we in-
creased the salience of the target’s value by making it unique in the array.
The proportions of overspecified referring expressions in each condition
are shown in Figure 4.9. In all conditions, including the Size condition,
the proportion of overspecified referring expressions was now strikingly
high, namely between .7 and .8. A comparison with the results of Experi-
ment 3, presented in Figure 4.7, indicates an increase in the rate of colour
and pattern overspecification, and, crucially, also of size overspecification.
A Wilcoxon Signed Rank test was conducted first, to find out whether
discriminatory power had an effect on overspecification. This turned out
not to be the case, z = 1.28, p = .20, r = .29. Hence, the HighDist and the
LowDist conditions were collapsed in all subsequent analyses.
Indeed, a Mann-Whitney test confirmed that the difference between
Experiment 3 and Experiment 4 was highly significant for the Size condi-
tions (MR = 11.11 versus MR = 27.05, U = 331.00, z = 4.54, p < .001), and
also for the Colour (MR = 13.50 versus MR = 24.90, U = 288.00, z = 3.26,
p = .001) and the Pattern conditions (MR = 14.14 versus MR = 24.32, U =
276.50, z = 2.97, p = .004).
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Figure 4.9: Experiment 4: Proportions of overspecified referring expressions. The
error bars represent standard errors.
Finally, a Friedman’s ANOVA indicated that there was a significant
main effect of Attribute in Experiment 4, χ2(2) = 11.81, p = .003. Pairwise
comparisons indicated that the differences between Colour (MR = 2.40)
and Pattern (MR = 2.08) and between Pattern and Size (MR = 1.52) were
not significant, p> .08 for both comparisons, while the difference between
Colour and Size was significant, p = .006.
As indicated in Figure 4.10, consistency was high, as in all previous
experiments. In line with our expectation, the majority of the participants
produced or avoided overspecification most of the time in all conditions.
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Figure 4.10: Experiment 4: The proportion of participants (y-axis) in each range of
proportions of alternations in each condition (x-axis).
4.6.3 Discussion
Experiment 4 shows that the strong tendency not to produce size over-
specification that we found in our previous experiments can disappear
almost entirely when mentioning colour, pattern, and size is triggered.
Although even in this experiment, more overspecification was produced
in the Colour than in the Size condition, the proportion of size overspec-
ification strongly increased due to the non-critical trials, which required
size modifiers, and it was very close to the proportions of overspecifica-
tion in the Colour and Pattern conditions, which were also significantly
higher than the proportions of their counterpart conditions in Experiment
3.
To conclude, Experiment 4 provides evidence that overspecification,
even of size, can be triggered under certain circumstances, due to a gen-
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eral tendency to behave consistently. Speakers thus do not necessarily
avoid overspecification of a relative attribute, even if there is no relevant
contrast on this attribute in the visual context.
4.7 General discussion
In this paper, we investigated the tendencies to produce colour, pattern,
and size overspecification. We compared rates of overspecification of the
three attributes, focusing on the role of salience, absoluteness, and con-
sistency. Since colour and pattern are salient and absolute whereas size
is relative and often less salient, we hypothesised that speakers would
produce more colour and pattern overspecification than size overspecifi-
cation. Experiment 1, which had a within-participants design, confirmed
this expectation: speakers produced substantial rates of colour and pat-
tern overspecification, which were very similar to each other, but almost
no size overspecification.
Experiment 2 indicated, however, that in Experiment 1, pattern was
treated similarly to colour because the rates of overspecification affected
one another: when varying the attributes between participants, the pro-
portion of pattern overspecification was low, while the proportion of
colour overspecification was high. The tendency to select pattern is thus
less strong than the tendency to select colour. As both are absolute at-
tributes, a possible explanation for this finding is that pattern is less
salient than colour. We concluded that in Experiment 1, the tendency
to produce colour overspecification probably stimulated the production
of pattern overspecification, which is likely to be due to the fact that the
two attributes are absolute and more salient than size. A comparison
between Experiments 2 and 3, in which the three attributes were manip-
ulated within participants again, indicated that the rates of overspecifica-
tion of the three attributes can also affect one another in a different way:
the rate of colour overspecification was significantly lower in Experiment
3 than in Experiment 2. A plausible explanation is that the tendency not
to include size triggered some participants to not include colour either. In
sum, Experiment 2 shows that the rates of overspecification of different
attributes can affect one another due to a tendency towards consistency.
Experiment 3 was conducted to assess how salience and absoluteness
contribute to the tendencies to select attributes. As in Experiment 1,
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attribute was manipulated within participants, but size was now made
more salient by increasing size contrast. This manipulation did not re-
sult in a significant increase in size overspecification, however, and the
patterns found in Experiments 1 and 3 were globally similar. In contrast
to our findings, van Gompel et al. (2014) found that an increase in size
contrast made speakers stop preferring colour over size. Importantly, the
size contrast in their study was relevant: when the referent was a small
candle, there were also large candles in the array. In our study, in con-
trast, the referent was always unique, and the size contrast was therefore
not relevant. Thus, an increase in salience can trigger selection of size, as
van Gompel et al. show, but our study shows that salience is not enough
to trigger size selection. The fact that a relevant contrast in the context
seems to be crucial for including size suggests that size overspecification
is infrequent because size is a relative attribute, indicating that absolute-
ness is a factor in attribute selection. This was supported by the fact that
the pattern of results found in Experiment 3 was globally similar to the
one in Experiment 1, where colour and pattern were treated similarly, and
differently from size, even though the difference between pattern and size
was only marginally significant in Experiment 3.
In Experiment 4, finally, we found that even size overspecification can
be triggered by mentioning colour, pattern, and size, even though there
was no relevant size contrast present in the critical trials. This finding is in
line with Goudbeek and Krahmer (2012), who found that the selection of
dispreferred attributes can be primed. It shows that the strong tendency
towards consistency that was also found in the other three experiments
can even lead to overspecification of attributes which otherwise do not
tend to be included redundantly.
In many earlier studies investigating consistency in reference produc-
tion, speakers appeared to have good reason to switch to a different con-
struction: in Brennan and Clark (1996) and Van Der Wege (2009), the
modified or otherwise highly specific terms that had been used before
in the discourse would normally be dispreferred in the new context, and
the attributes primed in Goudbeek and Krahmer (2012) are known to be
normally dispreferred, too. The arrays used in critical trials in our exper-
iments, in contrast, were highly similar, providing little reason for alter-
nating between overspecification and minimal specification within condi-
tions. This is especially clear in Experiment 2, where for each individual
participant, objects in all arrays varied in the same attribute. Indeed,
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comparing Figures 4.3, 4.5, 4.8, and 4.10 suggests that consistency was
highest in Experiment 2. In the other experiments, where attribute was
manipulated within participants, the alternation of the three attributes
may have enhanced alternating between including and not including at-
tributes within conditions.
As was stated in the Introduction, we are neutral as to what mech-
anisms underpin the tendency towards consistency in reference produc-
tion in our experiments, and our study was not meant to settle the de-
bate on those mechanisms. Still, it is worth pointing out that we think
it most likely that the consistent behaviour we found was due to prim-
ing. Although it is not impossible that our participants sought to estab-
lish conceptual pacts with their imaginary hearer, experimental studies
suggest that effects of common ground considerations are so subtle that
they can only be detected when the experimental set-up is sufficiently
natural. For example, Brown and Dell (1978) seemed to show that inter-
locutors do not routinely take into account the common ground when
telling stories, by conducting an experiment in which a naive partici-
pant interacted with a confederate. When replicating the experiment with
pairs of two naive participants, however, Lockridge and Brennan (2002)
were able to show that interlocutors did take into account the common
ground after all. Since in our experiments no hearer was present at all,
it is unlikely that the strong tendency towards consistency was due to
the rather subtle effects of considerations of common ground. It is more
plausibe that speakers primed themselves to include attributes previously
included and reuse constructions. Whatever the underlying mechanisms
are, the finding of such a strong tendency towards consistency has clear
implications for the way experimental studies of referential behaviour
should ideally be designed. Our experiments show that decisions about
the design, with respect to the conditions, and the non-critical trials have
a significant effect on the results.
The present study has implications for the modelling of referring ex-
pression production, as is aimed at in the field of Referring Expression
Generation (REG), which is a subfield of computational linguistics. REG
models typically consist of an algorithm which generates a referring ex-
pression which distinguishes the referent from all other objects in a given
context. The output of the algorithms are often evaluated against human-
produced referring expressions. It was Pechmann’s (1989) study, dis-
cussed in Section 4.2.2, which inspired Dale and Reiter (1995) to pro-
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pose their now classic Incremental Algorithm, which selects attributes
incrementally and in a predefined order (a ‘preference order’). Thus,
the algorithm incorporates Pechmann’s main finding, namely, that some
attributes (such as colour) are preferred and therefore selected before oth-
ers (such as size). The Incremental Algorithm is very influential because
it is conceptually and computationally simple, and hence efficient and
easy to implement. However, there are several problems with this and
related, more recent algorithms (Krahmer and van Deemter, 2012; Gatt
et al., 2011).
First, the Incremental Algorithm is under-determined: it does not
contain a procedure for finding a preference order (Krahmer and van
Deemter, 2012). One way to overcome this problem is to collect produc-
tion data which indicate what attribute preferences human speakers show
when they produce referring expressions. Our study not only shows that
colour is preferred over pattern and that pattern is preferred over size,
but also how salience and absoluteness contribute to those preferences.
A second and more important problem is that the Incremental Algorithm
is deterministic: in a given situation, it will always produce the same
referring expression (Gatt et al., 2011). This is at odds with our finding
that there is considerable variation across speakers (see also e.g. Viethen
and Dale, 2010). Moreover, the Incremental Algorithm does not take into
account the referring expressions that have been produced before in the
discourse context. As was discussed in Section 4.2.3, however, more re-
cent learning models that are able to align with their own previously
produced referring expressions have been found to outperform models
that do not take into account previously produced referring expressions
(Viethen et al., 2014). Importantly, our findings indicate that including
one attribute (such as colour) can lead speakers to include another at-
tribute (such as pattern), and that not including one attribute (such as
size) can lead to not including another attribute (such as colour and pat-
tern). Modelling this behaviour requires a selection procedure that is
much more fine-grained than the procedure of the Incremental Algorithm
and related algorithms.
Our study indicates that attributes vary in how likely they are to be
selected when modification is not necessary. Speakers tend to include
colour, which is highly salient as well as absolute. The tendency to in-
clude pattern is less strong. Since pattern is like colour in being absolute,
this may suggest that pattern is less salient than colour, and that salience
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is an important factor in the tendency to produce colour overspecifica-
tion, as proposed by Arts et al. (2011a), Gatt et al. (2013), and Koolen
et al. (2013). Finally, our study shows that overspecification of size is
rare when there is no relevant size contrast in the context, even if size
is highly salient. The fact that the presence of a relevant size contrast
matters strongly suggests that absoluteness is an important factor in the
production of colour overspecification, which has been argued before by
Pechmann (1989) and Belke and Meyer (2002). However, even size over-
specification can be triggered by mentioning the three attributes. In sum,
our study indicates that colour overspecification is more likely to occur
than pattern overspecification because colour is more salient than pat-
tern, and much more likely than size overspecification because colour is
absolute while size is relative.

Chapter 5
Variation within attributes
This chapter has been submitted, in a slightly different form, to Cognitive Science as
‘Salience effects on the overspecification of colour, pattern, and size’.
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Abstract
Experimental research suggests that colour overspecification is more common than over-
specification of other attributes (e.g., Pechmann, 1989; Gatt et al., 2013), supposedly be-
cause colour is a salient attribute (e.g., Koolen et al., 2013). Colours used in experiments,
however, tend to be vivid and hence highly salient (see, e.g., Viethen and Dale, 2011;
Tarenskeen et al., 2015 (Chapter 4 of this thesis), whereas there are also less salient
colours (e.g., pastel colours). This study investigates whether overspecification is af-
fected by variation in salience within attributes. Highly salient colours, patterns, and
sizes were compared with less salient colours, patterns and sizes. We found a positive
effect of salience on overspecification for each attribute. When colour was less salient,
size overspecification was produced equally frequently as colour overspecification, and
pattern overspecification was even more frequent than colour overspecification. Thus,
the salience of attributes is not constant: colour overspecification is triggered by salient
colours, but not by all colours.
5.1 Introduction
When producing definite descriptions to refer to objects, speakers do not
always restrict themselves to including only those attributes that enable
their addressee to identify their referent. Imagine, for example, a situation
in which Dunya wants Eyad to pass her a cushion. If only one cushion
is present, uttering sentence (1a) will normally enable Eyad to identify
the referent. However, assuming that the cushion is red and lying on the
larger one of two sofas, it is not unlikely that Dunya utters one of the
sentences (1b), (1c), or even (1d), even though there is only one cushion.
In this context, the modifiers (in italics) are not necessary for referent
identification: including them results in referential overspecification.
(1) a. Could you give me the cushion?
b. Could you give me the red cushion?
c. Could you give me the cushion that’s on the large sofa?
d. Could you give me the red cushion that’s on the large sofa?
Experimental studies on the production of definite descriptions typically
show that overspecified referring expressions are commonly produced
by adult speakers (e.g., Pechmann, 1989; Arts et al., 2011b; Koolen et al.,
2011). Many studies suggest that some attributes are more likely to be
included than others. In particular, speakers seem to have a preference
for including colour (e.g., Pechmann, 1989; Belke and Meyer, 2002; Vi-
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ethen and Dale, 2011; Gatt et al., 2013). If colour is not necessary for
referent identification, including it thus results in colour overspecification,
as in sentences (1b) and (1d). The finding that colour overspecification is
highly common is very robust (e.g., Arts et al., 2011b; Koolen et al., 2013;
Gatt et al., 2013; Tarenskeen et al., 2015, Chapter 4 of this thesis). It is
often claimed that speakers tend to include colour because it is perceptu-
ally salient (e.g., Koolen et al., 2013). But what exactly does it mean to say
that an attribute is perceptually salient? In this paper, we first clarify the
concept of perceptual salience as it is used in the literature on reference
production, and referential overspecification in particular. We then argue
that the salience of attributes may not be constant: while the colours of
the stimuli in this field of research are often highly salient, like the green
of the left dress in Figure 5.1, there are also colours that are less salient,
like the green of the right dress. That is, rather than claiming that the
attribute ‘colour’ is salient, we could suppose that some values of this at-
tribute (such as grass green and canary yellow) are salient while others
(such as mint green and cream) are less salient. This raises the question if
colour overspecification is affected by the degree to which the referent’s
colour value is salient.
In this paper, we investigate this question by conducting a reference
production experiment in which we compare references to objects in a
highly salient blue and green with references to objects in pastel tones
of the same colours. More generally, we ask whether overspecification is
affected by the degree to which the referent’s values on various attributes
are salient. We therefore not only vary the salience of colour, but also the
salience of pattern and size, comparing highly salient black-and-white
patterns to less salient grey-and-white patterns, and very big and small
pictures to pictures with less salient size contrasts.
In the next section, we discuss the notion of perceptual salience, clari-
fying the way in which it is used in the literature on reference production.
In Section 5.1.2, we introduce our current study in more detail.
5.1.1 Perceptual salience and reference
When producing definite descriptions, speakers have to decide which
attributes of the referent to include. A factor that is often argued to play
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Figure 5.1: A highly salient (left) and a less salient (right) green.
a major role in this process is perceptual salience1, which is the degree
to which something stands out in the visual context (Gatt, 2007; Arts
et al., 2011b; Koolen et al., 2011; Gatt et al., 2013). This notion has been
borrowed from the literature on visual perception, but it is often used
in quite a different way. To the best of our knowledge, however, the
differences have remained implicit. In this section, we discuss the relation
between the original notion and the way it is used in the literature on
reference production.
In the literature on visual perception, the notion of perceptual salience
is understood as a feature of objects (or areas in the visual field). Exper-
iments investigating visual search have shown that one of the reasons
why an object can become salient is that it has a certain attribute, e.g., a
colour, that is unique in the visual context (Treisman and Gelade, 1980;
Itti and Koch, 2000). For instance, a red cushion surrounded by five green
cushions is normally more salient than a red cushion surrounded by two
red and three green cushions. The first object is said to ‘pop out’: it
is identified very quickly, independently of the number of surrounding
objects.
In the literature on reference production, perceptual salience is under-
stood not only as a feature of objects, but also as a feature of properties of
1Perceptual (or visual) salience has been distinguished from discourse (or linguistic)
salience (Kelleher et al., 2005). For example, in a discourse context consisting of the
sentence ‘The girl asked the boy to marry her’, the referent of ‘the girl’ is linguistically
more salient than the referent of ‘the boy’ because ‘the girl’ is subject and precedes ‘the
boy’.
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objects (e.g., Arts et al., 2011a; Gatt et al., 2013; Koolen et al., 2013; West-
erbeek et al., 2015). To the best of our knowledge, this difference between
both usages of this term has not been mentioned before. We presume,
however, that the line of thought is that if a property makes an object
salient, the property itself will be salient as well. Imagine, again, a scene
in which one red cushion is surrounded by five green cushions. As it is
the colour of the red cushion which makes it highly salient in this context,
its redness is likely to be salient to a speaker who intends to refer to the
cushion.
Following this line of reasoning, it can be presumed that the degree to
which an attribute is salient is, at least partly, determined by its discrimi-
natory power, a notion that was introduced by Dale (1989). The discrimi-
natory power of an attribute can be computed by dividing the number of
competitors (the objects in the visual context other than the referent) that
do not share the attribute’s value with the referent by the total number
of competitors. Imagine, for example, that the referent is a red cushion
amidst of five other cushions. If none of the other cushions is red, then
there are five competitors that do not share the referent’s colour value,
and the discriminatory power of colour is 5/5 = 1. If two other cushions
are red and three are not, then the discriminatory power of colour is 3/5
= 0.6, and if all other cushions are red, it is 0/5 = 0. As the literature on
visual search indicates that the salience of the referent will be highest in
the first situation, where it pops out, while it is probably lowest in the
third, we might expect that the referent’s colour will also be most salient
in the first situation, and least salient in the third.
Although the discriminatory power of an attribute might be expected
to be an important factor in deciding whether it should be selected for a
definite description, the experimental evidence for the effect of discrim-
inatory power on reference production is mixed. Some studies have not
found any effect of discriminatory power at all (Gatt et al., 2013; Viethen
et al., 2014), while others show that there are situations in which discrim-
inatory power plays at least some role (Mangold and Pobel, 1988; Belke
and Meyer, 2002; Koolen et al., 2013).
Given the mixed evidence for the effect of discriminatory power on
attribute selection, it is plausible that an attribute’s salience is (also) de-
termined by other factors than discriminatory power. In the literature on
referential overspecification, it has been suggested that some attributes
are intrinsically salient (Arts et al., 2011a; Gatt et al., 2013; Koolen et al.,
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2013). Indeed, reference production experiments suggest that there is
something special about colour: it is included more often in referring
expressions than various other attributes, including size (Chapter 4; see
also, e.g., Arts et al., 2011b; Gatt et al., 2013), pattern (Chapter 4; see also
Gatt et al., 2013), shape (Mangold and Pobel, 1988), and material (Sedivy,
2005). Colour has been shown to be a primary cue in visual perception,
which is computed in the earliest stages of human visual processing (Liv-
ingstone and Hubel, 1988). In line with that, it has been argued that some
attributes, including colour, are perceived earlier than other attributes
(Gatt, 2007, p. 40), and therefore ‘immediately grab [the speakers’] atten-
tion’ (Koolen et al., 2013, p. 408), which is what makes such attributes
intrinsically salient. That is, some attributes may be, in general, more
likely to stand out in the visual context than others.
When it is claimed that colour is intrinsically salient, we take it that
what is meant is, in fact, that colours (i.e., specific colours) are more salient
than, say, specific patterns, shapes, and materials. However, the colours
used for experimental stimuli may often be extremely salient, as they are
mostly bright, saturated, and highly contrastive (Chapter 4; see also, e.g.,
Viethen and Dale, 2011; Koolen et al., 2011; Brown-Schmidt and Konopka,
2011; Arts et al., 2011b). This raises the question, as was put forward al-
ready in Chapter 4, whether colour overspecification is less likely to occur
when objects have colours that are less salient (see, for a similar sugges-
tion, Krahmer and van Deemter, 2012). It is conceivable that the tendency
to produce colour overspecification depends on the salience of the colour
values. For example, fire engine red is probably more salient than the
pale brown colour of a chicken’s egg, and hence, speakers may be more
likely to include colour when referring to a cushion in fire engine red
than to a cushion in the colour of an eggshell. Indeed, studies of colour
perception show that colours vary in salience (Jameson and D’Andrade,
1997; Regier et al., 2009).
The fact that not all colours are equally salient may have important im-
plications for the claim that colour overspecification is common because
colour is an intrinsically salient attribute: it is possible that some colours
are, in general, more salient than, for instance, certain patterns, while
other colours are not. If salience is indeed a major factor in the produc-
tion of definite descriptions, speakers are more likely to include colour
when the referent’s colour is highly salient than when it is less salient.
Extending this line of argument to other attributes, such as pattern and
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size, the tendency to produce overspecification may be dependent on the
degree of salience of the pattern and size values as well: speakers may be
more likely to produce pattern or size overspecification (e.g., ‘the striped
cushion’ or ‘the big cushion’, respectively, when the referent is the only
cushion) when the referent’s pattern or size value is highly salient than
when it is less salient. In other words, apart from making comparisons
across attributes, such as colour versus pattern, this paper also investigates
the role of salience in overspecification by making comparisons within at-
tributes.
5.1.2 The current study: the intrinsic salience of values
In this study, we assess the possibility that the tendency to include un-
necessary attributes is affected by variation in salience within attributes.
We do this by varying the salience of the colour, pattern, and size values
of the target referent (and its competitors). Hypothesis 1 is that the rates
of overspecification of each of the three attributes are higher when their
values are highly salient than when they are less salient.
As pointed out in the previous section, some values of one attribute
may be more salient than values of another attribute, while others are not.
For example, fire engine red may be more salient than a certain pattern
of stripes, while the pale brown of an eggshell may be less salient than
the same pattern. Although colour has been found to be included in re-
ferring expressions more than other attributes (Chapter 4; see also, e.g.,
Arts et al., 2011b; Gatt et al., 2013), this need not always be so: speak-
ers may be more likely to include pattern when the pattern value of the
referent is highly salient than to include colour when the colour value is
not very salient. Hypothesis 2 is, therefore, that while the rate of colour
overspecification might be higher than the rates of pattern and size over-
specification when the attributes’ values are highly salient (Hypothesis
2a), as has been found before, the rate of colour overspecification may not
be higher when colour is low in salience while pattern and size are highly
salient (Hypothesis 2b). That is, when the salience of colour decreases,
the difference between the rate of colour overspecification and the rates of
pattern and size overspecification may disappear, or the pattern of results
might even flip, with the rate of colour overspecification being lower than
the rates of pattern and/or size overspecification.
To investigate the effect of the salience of colour values on colour over-
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specification, we manipulate colour typicality, that is, the degree to which
most people judge specific colour values (e.g., emerald, jade, or lime) to
be good examples of the category they belong to (e.g., green). For ex-
ample, most people will find the green of fresh spinach a more typical
green than army green. There is considerable agreement on colour typ-
icality, not only within but also across languages (Berlin and Kay, 1969;
Webster and Kay, 2007). Judgements on what colours are typical colours,
i.e., colours that are in the ‘focal centre’ of a colour category (Berlin and
Kay, 1969; Rosch, 1975), have been argued to have a neurophysical basis:
due to their high degree of saturation, among other factors, they are more
salient to the human eye than colours further away from the focal centre
(Jameson and D’Andrade, 1997; Regier et al., 2009). In the present study,
we compare a highly typical blue and green (as used for the stimuli in
the experiments described in Chapter 4 to pastel tones of blue and green,
which are desaturated and therefore more distant from their respective
focal centres. Due to their low degree of saturation, the contrast between
pastel blue and green is also lower than the contrast between the more
typical blue and green.2 As the degree of contrast between the target’s
colour and its competitors’ colour may contribute to the salience of the
target’s colour, this might enlarge the difference in salience between the
two colour pairs even more: the colours high in salience may become
more salient by the high colour contrast between them, while that is not
the case for the less salient colours.
Further, to investigate the effect of the salience of pattern values on
pattern overspecification, we manipulate the colour contrast between the
patterns and their background. As patterns in line drawings are, in
fact, coloured shapes (e.g., circles, lines, or flowers) against a differently
coloured background, patterns exist by the grace of colour contrast: the
flowers on a dress are there because they have a different colour than the
rest of the dress. We compare patterns in grey-and-white (low salience)
with patterns in black-and-white (high salience). We use the patterns
from the experiments described in Chapter 4, where the objects were
white with grey stripes or grey spots, and we additionally use patterns
2The ∆E values (determined with the ∆E 2000 formula (Sharma et al., 2005)) of the
two colour pairs were 69 (typical colours) and 23 (pastel colours). ∆E is a measure for the
perceptual difference between two colours. A ∆E value of 1 indicates that the difference
between two colours is just sufficient to be perceived by humans; the maximum ∆E
value of two colours is 100.
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where the objects are white with black stripes or spots. That is, we in-
crease the salience of pattern by maximising the colour contrast between
the shapes and their background. As with colour, increasing the salience
of the patterns leads to increasing the contrast between them, which may
enlarge the difference in salience between the two pairs of pattern values,
too.
Finally, we assess the effect of the salience of size values on size over-
specification. Size is different from colour and pattern in being a relative
attribute: an object is only big or small in comparison to something else,
such as another object of the same type in the visual context (e.g., a bottle
that seems big because there is a second, smaller bottle present). Al-
though colour perception, too, is in fact context-dependent (Evans, 1948,
pp. 175–176; Pitt and Winter, 1974), colour and pattern are usually con-
sidered to be absolute attributes: when an object is clearly blue, or striped,
as in our experiment, it need not be compared with a second object to
know its colour or pattern. We can thus manipulate the salience of the
colour and pattern values themselves, but this is impossible for size. We
therefore manipulate the salience of size by varying the size contrast be-
tween big and small pictures, using a ratio of 3:2, making size less salient,
and a ratio of 3:1, making it highly salient (similar to Experiments 3 and
4 in Chapter 4). That is, our manipulation of colour and pattern salience
is a manipulation of contrast only indirectly, whereas our manipulation
of size salience consists of a manipulation of size contrast.
The effect of size contrast on the selection of size in referring expres-
sions has been investigated before. Van Gompel et al. (2014) found that
the preference for colour over size, when it is necessary to include one of
them but not both, disappeared when size contrast increased. In one of
our previous studies, on the other hand, no effect of size contrast on the
production of size overspecification was found (Chapter 4, Experiment 3).
A likely explanation for the difference between the two findings is that
the size difference between the target and its competitors was relevant in
the first but not in the second study: in van Gompel et al.’s study, the tar-
get was always different in size from another object of the same type, e.g.,
the target was a small candle while the competitors were big candles; in
Chapter 4, as in the present study, none of the competitors ever was of the
same type as the target. As hearers are known to infer from the presence
of a size modifier that the referent must have a different-sized competitor
of the same type, whereas they do not draw an analogous inference from
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the presence of a colour modifier (Sedivy et al., 1999), speakers probably
tend to avoid size overspecification when there is no relevant size con-
trast present in the context, in order to avoid confusion on the part of
the hearer. This may explain why increasing the size contrast resulted
in an increase in including size in Van Gompel et al.’s study, where the
size contrast was relevant and including size did not (necessarily) result
in overspecification, but not to an increase in size overspecification in our
study, where there was no relevant size contrast. We concluded in Chap-
ter 4 that because size is a relative attribute, there is a strong tendency not
to produce size overspecification when there is no relevant size contrast
present in the context, even if size is highly salient.
There may be an additional reason, however, why the increase in size
contrast did not result in an increase in size overspecification in Chapter
4. As shown in the same paper, the tendency to (not) include one at-
tribute may affect the tendency to (not) include another. For example, the
tendency to produce colour overspecification stimulated some speakers
to produce pattern overspecification as well, while the tendency to avoid
size overspecification stimulated other speakers to avoid overspecification
of other attributes, too. In Chapter 4, attributes were varied within partic-
ipants. It is therefore possible that the rate of size overspecification did
not increase in that study due to such within-speaker consistency effects.
In the present study, we vary the attributes between participants, which
enables us to assess the effect of size contrast on size overspecification.
In sum, this study investigates the effect of salience within colour, pat-
tern, and size on overspecification of the respective attributes, by varying
the salience of their values. We do this by comparing typical blue and
green with pastel tones of the same colours, black-and-white patterns
with grey-and-white patterns, and very big and small pictures with pic-
tures in sizes in a lower contrast. Hypothesis 1 is that colour, pattern,
and size overspecification will be produced more frequently when the
respective values of the referent are highly salient than when they are
less salient. The second hypothesis, which is twofold, is that the rate of
colour overspecification may be higher than the rates of pattern and size
overspecification when the values of those attributes are highly salient
(Hypothesis 2a), and that the rate of colour overspecification may not be
higher (or even lower) than the rates of pattern or size overspecification
when the colour values are low in salience while the pattern and size
values are highly salient (Hypothesis 2b).
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5.2 Method
We conducted a reference production experiment in which participants
were presented with an array with six pictures of clothes. One of the
pictures was the target referent, and the five others were competitors. In
each array, the garments varied on exactly one attribute: colour, pattern,
or size. As the target object was unique in all arrays, including colour,
pattern, or size always resulted in overspecification.
5.2.1 Participants
Participants were 217 native speakers of Dutch (18 or 19 participants × 12
conditions; 179 females, 38 males) at Radboud University, Nijmegen, the
Netherlands. Their mean age was 21 (range 16-31 years). They were all
volunteers who received a small fee for their participation. All of them
reported not to be colourblind. An additional number of 16 participants
was tested but their data were not analysed, because they reported to be
colourblind (n = 1), failed to produce definite descriptions (n = 5) or to
follow the instructions (n = 1), or had previously participated in this or
a very similar experiment (n = 2), or because the experimenter made a
mistake in instructing the participants (n = 7).
5.2.2 Materials
The stimulus materials were based on the materials used in the exper-
iments in Chapter 4, for which six line drawings of different types of
clothes were collected on Google Image. The typical names of all objects
consisted of a one-syllabic noun.
We manipulated the pictures in order to create variation across and
within the three attributes. We selected four values for each of the at-
tributes: two values that were highly salient, and two that were less
salient. First, with respect to colour, the HSB-values (HSB stands for Hue,
Saturation, Brightness) of the highly typical colours used in Chapter 4
were 237°, 80%, 100% (blue) and 115°, 62%, 82% (green). An informal
pretest with native speakers of Dutch indicated that both colours were
judged as good examples of their respective colour categories. In order to
vary colour salience, we selected pastel colours, which are less typical due
to their low degree of saturation. The HSB-values of the selected colours
124 Chapter 5. Variation within attributes
were 208°, 20%, 99% (blue) and 114°, 13%, 95% (green). The pretest con-
firmed that the selected colours were consistently named with the Dutch
words for blue and green, respectively.
The patterns were stripes and spots against a white background, and
they were either grey, as in Chapter 4, or black. The size values were big
and small, where the ratio between the heights of big and small pictures
was 3:1 or 3:2. Our manipulation of the size of the pictures did not take
into account the proportions among the objects represented by the pic-
tures (e.g., a dress is normally much larger than a sock). As it did not
seem possible to us to indicate in a realistic way that a sock is small for
a sock by exploiting the proportion between the sock and a dress, while
keeping the ratio between big and small pictures fixed, we chose to ab-
stract away from the actual sizes of the objects represented. We do not
think that our participants will have had problems interpreting the size
of the pictures, because people are very experienced in interpreting pic-
tures and their sizes, which are not always proportional to real life sizes.
Pictures were manipulated with respect to only one attribute at the time:
they were either coloured, or patterned, or manipulated for size. As we
created four variants of each of the six line drawings for each of the three
attributes, we had a total of 4 × 6 × 3 = 72 pictures. We also had filler
pictures, which were as in Chapter 3 (Figure 3.4).
5.2.3 Design
Apart from manipulating Attribute (levels: Colour, Pattern, Size) and
Value Salience (levels: High-Salience, Low-Salience), we also varied Dis-
criminatory Power such that the target’s attribute value was unique versus
non-unique, respectively (levels: Unique, Non-Unique). This was done to
exclude the possibility that we would not find an effect of Value Salience
due to a hidden interaction with Discriminatory Power. The experiment
thus had a 3 × 2 × 2 design. All variables were manipulated between
participants. Participants were randomly assigned to the 12 conditions.
There were 19 participants in the Size/Low-Salience/Non-Unique condi-
tion, and 18 in all other conditions. Examples of arrays in all conditions
are shown in Figures 5.2–5.5.3
3Note that the representation of the stimuli’s colours can only be an approximation
of their representation in the experiment.
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Figure 5.2: A colour (left), pattern (middle), and size (right) array in the High-
Salience/Unique condition.
Figure 5.3: A colour (left), pattern (middle), and size (right) array in the High-
Salience/Non-Unique condition.
In each trial, the participant was presented with an array with pictures.
The arrays in the critical trials all represented six different garments (one
target and five competitors), which were arranged in a 2 (row) × 3 (col-
umn) grid. In each array, the garments varied on exactly one attribute:
colour in the Colour condition, pattern in the Pattern condition, and size
in the Size condition. As the target object was unique in all arrays, includ-
ing a colour, pattern or size modifier always resulted in overspecification,
except for the rare cases where participants did not use a basic-level term
(e.g., ‘the blue picture’ instead of ‘the blue dress’), which were not in-
cluded in the analysis.
In the Colour conditions, the objects in an array were either blue or
green: typical colours (High-Salience) or pastel colours (Low-Salience). In
the Pattern conditions, objects were either striped or spotted: black-and-
white (High-Salience) or grey-and-white (Low-Salience). In the Size con-
ditions, they were either big or small: with a ratio of 3:1 (High-Salience)
or 3:2 (Low-Salience).
In each array, two different values were used. There were two different
ways in which the values were distributed over the pictures in the arrays,
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Figure 5.4: A colour (left), pattern (middle), and size (right) array in the Low-
Salience/Unique condition.
Figure 5.5: A colour (left), pattern (middle), and size (right) array in the Low-
Salience/Non-Unique condition.
in order to vary the discriminatory power of the three attributes. In the
Unique condition, the target’s value was unique in the array: the discrim-
inatory power of the attribute in question was 5/5 = 1. For example, if
the target was a striped dress, then all competitors were spotted. In the
Non-Unique condition, the target shared its value with two competitors:
the discriminatory power of the attribute was 3/5 = 0.6. For example, if
the target was a striped dress, then two competitors were striped as well,
and the remaining three were spotted.4
Fillers were included to obscure the purpose of the experiment. We
know from similar experiments with the same fillers, reported in the pre-
vious chapters, that this intervention is successful: debriefing indicated
that most participants suspected the fillers to be critical trials. We used
three types of filler trials: arrays representing either four common objects,
four pictures of Greebles, or two pictures of human faces (which could be
either of the same or of different genders). We expected modifiers to be
4The following conditions were reported before as Experiment 2 in Chapter 4: the
Colour/High-Salience/Non-Unique condition, the Pattern/Low-Salience/Non-Unique
condition, and the Size/Low-Salience/Non-Unique condition.
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absent in reference to common objects, which did not have any striking
features, present in reference to Greebles, for which simple names were
not appropriate, and present in some but absent in other trials with hu-
man faces (dependently of whether they were of the same or of different
genders).
In each condition, there were 12 different critical pictures (6 objects ×
2 values of the attribute in that condition). In each experimental session,
each picture was presented as the target twice. There were thus 24 critical
trials in each condition. Apart from the critical trials, participants received
4 practice trials and 24 trials of each of the three filler types. They thus
received a total number of 100 trials. We pseudorandomised the order of
the trials, with the restriction that a critical trial was always preceded by
at least two trials in which the target was not of the same type of garment
(for example, when the target was a dress, the target in the previous two
trials was never a dress), in order to prevent participants from adding
modifiers for the sake of contrast with the previous trial. Each participant
saw the trials in a different order. The experiment was programmed with
Presentation software.
5.2.4 Procedure
Participants received written and oral instructions for the task. They were
informed that on each trial they would see an array with six pictures.
Their task was to instruct an imaginary addressee to click on one of the
pictures, by completing the Dutch equivalent of the sentence ‘Click on
. . . ’. Each trial started with a black cross which stayed on the screen
for 1000 ms. The cross indicated the position on the screen where the
target picture would appear. Next, the pictures appeared on the screen.
Participants were told that there was no time pressure, but they were en-
couraged not to think too long before they started talking. They were
instructed to avoid locative information (e.g., ‘the picture in the bottom
left of the screen’), acting as if their addressee might see the pictures in
different positions on the screen than they did themselves. They were
asked to press a key after they were finished talking, in order to continue
with the next trial. The pictures stayed on the screen until the key was
pressed and the next trial started 1000 ms after this response. All par-
ticipants were tested individually in a quiet cubicle. The task took about
twenty minutes.
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5.3 Results
The 217 participants each performed 24 critical trials. In one case, no re-
sponse was given. Thus, the critical trials elicited 5,207 referring expres-
sions. We removed responses in which the referent was not the target
item (n = 38), in which the speaker corrected themselves (n = 54), and in
which a colour, pattern, or size modifier was included without this result-
ing in overspecification (e.g., ‘the blue picture’; n = 21). We thus removed
113 responses from the analysis (2.8%). The remaining 5,094 referring
expressions were annotated as overspecified when a colour modifier was
included in the Colour condition, when a pattern modifier was included
in the Pattern condition, and when a size modifier was included in the
Size condition.
We conducted our experiment in order to test two hypotheses, the sec-
ond of which was twofold. First, we hypothesised that overspecification
of the three attributes is produced more frequently when the values of
the target and the competitors are highly salient than when they are less
salient (Hypothesis 1). Second, we hypothesised that when Value Salience
was high, overspecification would be produced more in the Colour con-
dition than in the Pattern and Size conditions (Hypothesis 2a), whereas
the overspecification rate might not be higher (and maybe even lower)
in the Colour/Low-Salience condition than in the Pattern/High-Salience
and Size/High-Salience conditions (Hypothesis 2b). Figure 5.6 indicates
that both hypotheses were supported by the data.
To statistically test our hypotheses, we first conducted a three-way
ANOVA with Attribute, Value Salience and Discriminatory Power as fac-
tors. In line with Hypothesis 1, we found a highly significant main effect
of Value Salience with more overspecification in the High Salience than in
the Low Salience conditions, F1 (1, 205) = 53.216, p < .001. We also found
a highly significant interaction between Attribute and Value Salience, F1
(2, 205) = 9.308, p < .001, which supports Hypothesis 2. We did not find
a significant main effect of Discriminatory Power, F1 (1, 205) = 0.064, p >
.1, and neither was there any significant interaction with Discriminatory
Power. In all subsequent analysis, Discriminatory Power was therefore
collapsed.
Shapiro-Wilk tests indicated, however, that the data were not normally
distibuted (p < .001 in all conditions), and Levene’s test indicated that
5.3. Results 129
Figure 5.6: Proportions of overspecified referring expressions in the Value Salience
conditions, split for Attribute. The error bars represent standard errors.
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the error variance was not equal across groups (p < .001). Thus, the
assumptions of ANOVA were not met. We therefore ranked the data
in order to use non-parametric statistics. To the best of our knowledge,
there are no commonly accepted non-parametric alternatives for three-
way ANOVA, and conducting multiple statistical tests increases the risk
of making a type I error. To minimise the number of statistical tests,
we only conducted post-hoc tests with non-parametric statistics. In what
follows, we report mean ranks, denoted by MR.
In line with Hypothesis 1, three Mann-Whitney tests indicated that for
all three attributes, the proportion of overspecification was higher in the
High-Salience condition than in the Low-Salience condition. As indicated
in Figure 5.6, it was higher in the Colour/High-Salience (M = .81, SD
= .39, MR = 49.44) than in the Colour/Low-Salience condition (M = .19,
SD = .39, MR = 23.56), U = 1,114.00, z = 5.63, p < .001, it was higher
in the Pattern/High-Salience (M = .37, SD = .48, MR = 43.12) than in
the Pattern/Low-Salience condition (M = .14, SD = .35, MR = 29.88), U
= 885.50, z = 3.06, p = .002, and it was higher in the Size/High-Salience
(M = .17, SD = .37, MR = 43.32) than in the Size/Low-Salience condition,
where overspecification was at floor (MR = 30.50), U = 900.00, z = 3.87, p
< .001.
We conducted two Kruskal-Wallis tests to test Hypothesis 2. The
first test showed a highly significant effect of Attribute within the High-
Salience condition on overspecification, H(2) = 36.16, p < .001. Stepwise
stepdown comparisons indicated, in line with Hypothesis 2a, that the
proportion of overspecification was higher in the Colour/High-Salience
condition (M = .81, SD = .39, MR = 78.08) than in the Pattern/High-
Salience condition (M = .37, SD = .48, MR = 51.04), p < .05, and higher in
the Pattern/High-Salience condition than in the Size/High-Salience con-
dition (M = .17, SD = .37, MR = 36.39), p < .05. The second test compared
the Colour/Low-Salience condition with the Pattern/High-Salience and
Size/High-Salience conditions. The main effect of this test was signif-
icant, too, H(2) = 7.53, p = .023. In line with Hypothesis 2b, stepwise
stepdown comparisons showed that the proportion of overspecification
in the Colour/Low-Salience condition (M = .19, SD = .39, MR = 48.94)
was lower than the proportion in the Pattern/High-Salience condition (M
= .37, SD = .48, MR = 65.36), p < .05, and that is was not significantly
different from the proportion in the Size/High-Salience condition (MR =
.17, SD = .37, MR = 50.81), p > .05.
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In short, all hypotheses were confirmed by the data. In line with Hy-
pothesis 1, the proportion of overspecification was significantly higher
in the High Salience than in the Low Salience conditions for each of the
three attributes. Although overspecification was produced more in the
Colour/High-Salience condition than in the Pattern/High-Salience and
Size/High-Salience conditions, which confirmed Hypothesis 2a, the pro-
portion of overspecification was not significantly higher in the Colour/Low-
Salience than in the Size/High-Salience condition, and even significantly
lower than in the Pattern/High-Salience condition, which confirmed Hy-
pothesis 2b.
5.4 Discussion
While there are many studies of attribute selection in the production of re-
ferring expressions that investigate variation across attributes, the present
study also investigated variation within attributes. We conducted a refer-
ence production experiment in which we investigated how the production
of colour, pattern, and size overspecification is affected by the salience of
the values of the three attributes. In line with Hypothesis 1, we found an
effect of salience within each of the three attributes: speakers produced
more colour overspecification in reference to objects in salient, typical
colours than in less salient pastel colours, more pattern overspecification
in reference to objects with salient black-and-white patterns than with less
salient grey-and-white patterns, and more size overspecification in refer-
ence to objects in contexts with a high size contrast than in contexts where
the size contrast was lower. As expected on the basis of previous studies,
speakers produced more colour than pattern and size overspecification
when the values of the three attributes were highly salient, confirming
Hypothesis 2a. When comparing the rates of overspecification when the
values of colour were low in salience while those of pattern and size were
highly salient, however, we found that, in line with Hypothesis 2b, speak-
ers did not produce more colour than pattern or size overspecification –
the proportion of colour overspecification was even significantly lower
than the proportion of pattern overspecification. We can thus conclude
that the tendency to produce overspecification is affected by the salience
of an attribute’s value.
In the light of the experimental literature on reference production and
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overspecification, it is remarkable that Hypothesis 2b was confirmed by
the data. Many experimental studies have shown that colour is more
likely to be included than other attributes (Chapter 4; see also, e.g., Pech-
mann, 1989; Gatt et al., 2013). The frequent production of colour over-
specification in the experimental literature has been explained in terms
of intrinsic salience: it has been suggested that speakers are more likely to
notice an object’s colour than its other attributes, independently of certain
characteristics of the visual context, such as the discriminatory power of
the referent’s attributes (Arts et al., 2011b; Gatt et al., 2013; Koolen et al.,
2013). The tendency to include salient attributes often results in the selec-
tion of colour, even if colour is not necessary for referent identification,
yielding colour overspecification. However, the claim that colour is an in-
trinsically salient attribute is not without its problems. Intrinsic salience
is a special case of perceptual salience, which is an important notion in
the literature on visual perception (e.g., Itti and Koch, 2000). While in this
field of research, perceptual salience is understood as a feature of objects
(or areas in the visual field), the use of this notion in the literature on ref-
erence production is different in an important way: salience is not only
understood as a feature of objects, but also as a feature of attributes. As
attributes are in fact sets of properties, we have argued that the claim that
colour is a salient attribute should be understood as the assertion that
colour values are salient. Importantly, the colour values of experimental
stimuli tend to be vivid and contrastive (Chapter 4; see also, e.g., Viethen
and Dale, 2011; Koolen et al., 2011; Brown-Schmidt and Konopka, 2011;
Arts et al., 2011b), which presumably makes them highly salient. As we
have argued, however, not all colour values are as salient as those colours.
Speakers may be less likely to produce colour overspecification when re-
ferring to objects in less salient colours than they are when colours are
highly salient. It is thus problematic to claim that speakers commonly
produce colour overspecification because colour is an intrinsically salient
attribute: this claim generalises over colour values while not all colours
are equally salient, and colours may hence not trigger colour overspeci-
fication to the same degree. The present study was conducted to inves-
tigate whether we can extend the conclusions drawn from experiments
with vivid and contrastive colours, which are arguably highly salient, to
conclusions about colours in general.
Our experiment confirms that colour overspecification is triggered by
highly typical colours, which are colours that are in or close to the focal
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centre of their colour categories (Berlin and Kay, 1969), or, in other words,
colours that are considered to be good examples of their colour categories
by most speakers of the language in question. Importantly, the study also
demonstrates, as we proposed, that colour overspecification is triggered
much less by pastel colours, which are further away from the focal cen-
tres of their categories. More broadly, our study shows that the relative
rates of colour overspecification and overspecification of other attributes
(here: pattern and size) can be highly dependent on the salience of the at-
tributes’ values. Our finding that colour overspecification can even be less
likely to occur than pattern overspecification suggests that some values
of colour are less salient than some values of certain other attributes.
Does our study show, then, that we should reject the claim that colour
overspecification is commonly produced because colour is salient? We do
not believe it does. Rather, we point out that this claim is a generalisation
over properties which in fact vary in salience. Although it may be true
that speakers are, in general, more likely to produce colour overspecifi-
cation than overspecification of any other attribute, the claim that they
do is not necessarily supported by production experiments in which the
stimuli have highly typical (or contrastive) colours, because those colours
are not representative for the attribute ‘colour’ as a whole. When inves-
tigating overspecification by comparing attributes, it should be kept in
mind that attributes are actually sets of different properties, which do not
share all their characteristics. Another consideration to keep in mind is
that colour has been compared to a limited number of properties. Many
studies have shown that speakers are more likely to include colour than
size (e.g., Pechmann, 1989; Belke and Meyer, 2002; Gatt et al., 2013), but
only recently has it been discovered that an increase in size contrast can
alter this pattern (van Gompel et al., 2014). The present study shows,
moreover, that a high size contrast can trigger the production of size over-
specification as well, even if no relevant size contrast is present in the vi-
sual context. Both studies indicate, thus, that size is not necessarily less
salient than colour. Additionally, our study shows that pattern can be
more salient than colour. The same may hold for several other attributes,
and for object properties that do not seem to be values of a superordinate
attribute (e.g, ‘dirty’, ‘full’, ‘deformed’, and ‘with a tail’). We therefore
endorse that it is necessary to compare various colour values to a broad
variety of properties, before we can be sure that colour overspecification
is common because colour is salient.
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Our finding that the salience of size positively affects the tendency to
produce size overspecification is in line with results obtained by van Gom-
pel et al. (2014), who found that the preference for colour over size dis-
appeared when the salience of size increased. However, it is not in line
with the results obtained in our previous study (Chapter 4), where we
found no effect of increasing the salience of size on size overspecification.
As discussed in the Introduction, there was a relevant size contrast in the
arrays used in the first but not in the second study. When no relevant size
contrast is present, speakers may tend to avoid size overspecification so
as not to confuse their hearers, who might infer from the presence of a
size modifier that there is actually a relevant size contrast present in the
context (Sedivy et al., 1999). We thus concluded in our previous study
that increasing the salience of size does not lead to an increase in size
overspecification when there is no relevant size contrast, because size is
a relative attribute. In the present study, however, we did find an (admit-
tedly modest) effect of the salience of size, even though the size contrast
was again irrelevant in the experimental arrays. What can we learn from
this difference in findings? First, it is important to note that the effect
of size contrast that we observed in the present study is by no means in
conflict with our previous conclusion that the infrequent production of
size overspecification is due to the fact that size is a relative attribute. The
present study indicates, again, that when the size contrast in the visual
context is irrelevant, size overspecification is less likely to occur than the
overspecification of absolute attributes, even if size is highly salient. Still,
it needs to be explained why an effect of size contrast on size overspec-
ification was found in our present but not in our previous study. One
possible explanation is that the present study had a between-participants
design while the previous one had a within-participants design. As was
pointed out in the Introduction, we showed in Chapter 4 that the tendency
to (not) include one attribute can affect the tendency to (not) include an-
other one, as speakers show a tendency towards consistency in the types
of utterances they produce. In our previous study, we thus may have
found no effect of size contrast because some participants were prevented
from producing size overspecification due to the presence of colour and
pattern variation in some of the trials, which might have triggered their
awareness that there was no need to include modifiers. In the present
study, this cannot have happened because it had a between-participants
design. An alternative explanation is that the present study had more
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statistical power than our previous one: due to collapsing Discriminatory
Power in the present study, the number of participants in each remaining
condition was twice the number of participants in our previous study.
In short, we suggest that, on the one hand, the degree to which size is
salient affects the tendency to include size, even if this results in over-
specification, while on the other hand, the effect of salience is weaker for
size than for colour and pattern because speakers tend to be reluctant
to produce size overspecification, since redundantly including a relative
attribute may lead to confusion on the part of the hearer.
Apart from the salience of the colour, pattern, and size values of the
objects, we varied the discriminatory power of the three attributes. We
did not find an effect of this manipulation: speakers did not produce
more overspecification when the referent’s colour, pattern, or size was
unique (i.e., when the attribute’s discriminatory power was 1) than when
it was shared with two competitors (i.e., when the attribute’s discrimi-
natory power was 0.6). In the Introduction, we argued that a property
which makes an object salient might become salient itself as well. The
experimental literature on visual perception has shown that objects tend
to ‘pop out’ when, e.g., their colour is unique in the context, that is, when
the discriminatory power of colour is 1. As discriminatory power can
make objects salient, it would be expected that it plays a role in making
attributes salient as well. It is therefore somewhat surprising that we did
not find any effect of discriminatory power in our experiment, even if
this finding is in line with some earlier findings (Gatt et al., 2013; Viethen
et al., 2014). As mentioned in the Introduction, however, some studies
have found an effect of discriminatory power on the production of defi-
nite descriptions. This raises the question if a stronger manipulation (e.g.,
a discriminatory power of 1 versus 0.2) or a higher number of competi-
tors (e.g., 0 out of 23 competitors versus 22 out of 23 competitors sharing
the referent’s value) might have an effect on reference production. More
research is needed to discover what role discriminatory power plays in
the production of definite descriptions.
Another question that our study raises is what role colour contrast
plays in the tendency to produce colour overspecification. When varying
the salience of the values within the experimental arrays, we also, in-
evitably, varied the contrast between those values. The effect of salience
on colour overspecification could therefore be explained not only in terms
of colour typicality, but also in terms of colour contrast: it may be affected
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by the degree to which the target’s colour contrasts with the competitors’
colours. It is an interesting question whether the salience of the referent’s
colour is determined by colour typicality, colour contrast, or both. For
example, what happens if the colours of the referent and its surrounding
objects have a low typicality, but are nevertheless high in contrast (such as
pastel blue and army green)? We are currently investigating this question.
To conclude, the present study provides evidence that the tendency
to produce overspecification of colour, pattern, and size varies with the
salience of the values of those three attributes. Further, although colour
overspecification is more likely to occur than pattern overspecification
when the colour values are salient, this is not necessarily the case when
the salience of colour decreases: colour overspecification can become
equally likely to occur as pattern overspecification, and sometimes even
less likely. Our study indicates that using exclusively typical and con-
trastive colours gives rise to claims about colour overspecification and
colour salience that may be too general. Rather than asserting that colour
is a salient attribute, we claim that certain colour values are highly salient
and are likely to trigger colour overspecification, while others are less
salient and therefore less likely to lead to colour overspecification. More
general, we argue that when investigating overspecification, the focus
should not be on attributes alone, but also on their values.
Chapter 6
Typicality, categorisation, and
contrast
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6.1 Introduction
As we have seen in the previous chapters, the experimental literature
on reference production suggests that colour is a ‘preferred’ attribute:
speakers tend to include it more often in definite descriptions than other
attributes, which results in colour overspecification if colour is not nec-
essary for the hearer to identify the referent (e.g., Pechmann, 1989; Arts
et al., 2011b; Gatt et al., 2013). In Tarenskeen et al. (submitted, Chapter
5 of this thesis), however, we showed that the tendency to include colour
is not necessarily stronger than the tendency to include other attributes.
Rather, this depends on the attributes’ values (e.g., ‘light blue’ is a value
of the attribute ‘colour’). Whereas colour overspecification was produced
frequently in that experiment when speakers referred to objects in vivid
colours, which are highly salient, the less salient pastel colours triggered
the unnecessary inclusion of colour not half as often. Colour overspecifi-
cation was produced more often than pattern overspecification, but only
when colours were highly salient. Indeed, when colours and patterns
were lowly salient, the rates of overspecification of the two attributes did
not differ from each other significantly, and the rate of colour overspec-
ification was even lower than the rate of pattern overspecification when
colour was lowly salient and pattern highly salient. In sum, we found that
there is substantial variation in the salience of particular colours, which
affects the tendency to produce colour overspecification. Since the highly
salient colours in the experiment were higher in both typicality and con-
trast than the lowly salient colours, the study does not tell whether the
observed effects were the result of typicality, contrast, or both. In the
present chapter, we investigate this question.
Intuitively, the colours in the left array in Figure 6.1 are ‘better exam-
ples’ of blue and green than the colours in the left array. That is, the
colours of the first colour pair are higher in typicality than the colours of
the second pair – or, in the terminology of research on colour language:
the colours in the left array are closer to the ‘focal centres’ of their respec-
tive basic colour categories (Berlin and Kay, 1969) than those in the right
array.1 The colours in the left array were used in Chapter 5 as highly
1The participants in our experiment were speakers of Dutch. However, as the basic
colour categories distinguished in Dutch are roughly equivalent to those distinguished
in English (Majid et al., 2015), we refer to the Dutch categories by using the equivalent
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salient colours, while the colours in the right array were used as lowly
salient colours. Since there is evidence that focal colours (the best exam-
ples of a basic colour category) are more salient to the human eye than
colours further away from the focal centre (Jameson and D’Andrade, 1997;
Regier et al., 2009), it can be assumed that the typical blue and green were
more salient to the participants in our experiment than the pastel colours.
Also, colour terms may be more accessible for speakers when the refer-
ent’s colour is close to the focal centre: several studies have shown that
more typical members of a category are recognised faster as a member of
a category (e.g., Rips et al., 1973; Rosch and Mervis, 1975).
Figure 6.1: Arrays in the Colour-High (left) and Colour-Low conditions in Chapter 5.
As discussed in Chapter 5, however, it may not only be the high colour
typicality that makes the two colours in the left array highly salient. Cal-
culating the perceptual difference between the colours within each of the
two pairs reveals that the colour contrast between the two typical colours
is higher than the contrast between the two pastel colours. For this calcu-
lation, we used the Delta-E (∆E) 2000 formula (Sharma et al., 2005), which
is a measure for how different two colours are to the human eye. A ∆E
value of 1 indicates the ‘just noticeable difference’, where two colours
are exactly sufficiently different for humans to be able to perceive this
difference, and a value of 100 indicates that two colours are maximally
different from each other. Indeed, the ∆E value of the highly typical blue
and green is 69, while it is 23 for the two pastel colours. The contrast
between the two typical colours is thus clearly higher than the contrast
between the two pastel colours.
In sum, as discussed in Chapter 5, at least two factors may have con-
tributed to the variation in colour salience in that chapter: the degree of
English terms throughout this chapter for the sake of readability.
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typicality of the colours in the arrays, and the amount of contrast between
the two colours within the arrays. The purpose of the present study is to
tease these two factors apart. As in the previous study, we conduct a ref-
erence production experiment in which we compare the rates of colour
overspecification in reference to objects in colours that are either high
or low in salience. Again, the highly salient colours are high in both
typicality and contrast, while the lowly salient colours are low in both
respects. The colours in the present experiment are close to but slightly
different from those in Chapter 5. However, we now add colours which
are (roughly) equally low in typicality as the lowly salient colours, but
equally high in contrast as the highly salient colours. If we find that the
rate of overspecification is lower for objects in those new colours than
for objects in the colours that are high in both typicality and contrast, this
indicates that colour typicality is a factor in the production of overspecifica-
tion, since the only difference between the two colour pairs is a difference
in typicality. If we find, on the other hand, that the rate of overspeci-
fication is higher for objects in the new colours than for objects that are
low in both typicality and contrast, this indicates that colour contrast is a
factor: the only difference between those two colour pairs is supposed to
be a difference in contrast. Note that the two findings are not mutually
exclusive: if the rate of overspecification in reference to objects in the new
colours is lower than in reference to objects in the highly salient colours
and higher than in reference to those in the lowly salient colours, it shows
that both factors play a role.
6.2 Method
We conducted a reference production experiment in which participants
were presented with arrays with six coloured pictures of clothes. One of
the pictures was the target referent, and the other five were competitors.
The task was to instruct an imaginary hearer to click on the target object.
As six different garments were presented in each array, including colour
always resulted in colour overspecification.
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6.2.1 Participants
Participants were 74 native speakers of Dutch (59 females, 15 males) at
Radboud University, Nijmegen, the Netherlands. Their mean age was
22 (range 18-29 years). They were all volunteers who received a small
fee for their participation. All of them reported not to be colourblind. An
additional three participants were tested but their data were not analysed,
because their age exceeded the predetermined age restriction of 35 years
(n = 1), because they had participated earlier in the same experiment (n =
1), or because of equipment failure (n = 1).
6.2.2 Materials
The stimulus materials were very similar to those used in Chapter 5. For
the critical trials, six line drawings of clothes were collected on Google
Image. The typical Dutch label of each garment consisted of a one-syllabic
noun. Six colour variants were created for each picture: highly typical
blue and green, less typical light blue and green, and less typical dark
blue and green. We also had filler pictures, which were as in Chapter 3
(Figure 3.4).
We used colour judgement data collected by Majid et al. (2011, 2015)
to select shades of blue and green which are highly typical for the two re-
spective categories according to speakers of Dutch. In their study, Dutch
participants were presented with so-called Munsell chips: plain plastic
chips coloured according to the Munsell colour system, which are com-
monly used as materials in studies of colour language. Participants were
instructed to indicate the best example of each Dutch basic colour cat-
egory (the Dutch equivalents of black, white, red, green, blue, yellow,
purple, orange, pink, brown, and grey). The chips chosen by most partic-
ipants as the best examples of blue and green are then taken to be in the
focal centres of the two categories. In order to be able to calculate the dif-
ference between colours, we converted the Munsell values of both chips
into CIEL*a*b* coordinates, by using the mapping table on the World
Color Survey Data Archives (Cook et al., 2009). Focal green (CIEL*a*b*
coordinates: 62, -56, 49) was selected as highly typical green. Focal blue
(CIEL*a*b coordinates: 41, 7, -49), when represented on a colour cali-
brated computer screen, did not correspond to our intuitions on the most
typical blue, however. Therefore, in an informal pretest, non-colourblind
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speakers of Dutch were presented with this colour and five other shades
of blue. One of those other colours was judged by all participants to be
the best example of blue. We selected this colour (CIEL*a*b* coordinates:
42, 46, -82) as highly typical blue.
The CIEL*a*b* coordinates of the four remaining colours were 78, -8,
-20 (light blue); 96, -13, 15 (light green); 30, -38, -30 (dark blue); and 38,
-25, 91 (dark green). They were selected according to four criteria. Our
first criterion was that all colours had to fall clearly into one category. For
instance, speakers of Dutch should agree that light green was an instance
of green, and not an instance of a different colour category. To illustrate:
turquoise would not meet this criterion, since it is an instance of blue
according to some speakers, but an instance of green according to others.
We used an informal pretest with non-colourblind speakers of Dutch to
ensure that this was the case. Second, we aimed at keeping constant the
contrast within the pairs of highly contrastive colours (i.e., typical blue
versus typical green, light blue versus dark green, and light green versus
dark blue). Thus, the ∆E value of blue and green had to be the same
for each of those colour pairs. The upper part of Table 6.1 indicates that
all differences were roughly the same: the ∆E values of all three pairs
were 62 or 63. Third, the contrast within the pair of colours low in both
typicality and contrast (i.e., light blue and light green) had to be clearly
lower than the contrast within the highly contrastive colour pairs. The
middle row in Table 6.1 indicates that the ∆E value of light blue and light
green was 29, which is indeed clearly lower than 62. Finally, we aimed at
keeping constant the low typicality of the four respective colours. To the
best of our knowledge, however, there is no commonly accepted measure
for colour typicality. Therefore, our criterion was that each colour low in
typicality should be equally far from the highly typical colour from the
same category. The bottom rows in Table 6.1 give the ∆E values of all
four pairs: they range from 30 to 34. Although they were thus very close,
our other criteria made it impossible to select the colours in such a way
that the differences within all pairs were exactly the same.
6.2.3 Design
In each trial, the participant was presented with an array with two, three,
four, or six pictures. The arrays in the critical trials all represented six dif-
ferent garments (one target and five competitors), which were arranged
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Condition Colour 1 Colour 2 ∆E
High-High typical blue typical green 63
(high contrast, high typicality)
High-Low-lightblue light blue dark green 62
(high contrast, low typicality)
High-Low-lightgreen light green dark blue 63
(high contrast, low typicality)
Low-Low light blue light green 29
(low contrast, low typicality)
light blue typical blue 34
light green typical green 30
dark blue typical blue 34
dark green typical green 31
Table 6.1: Colours used in the experiment. The name and characteristics of each
condition is indicated in the leftmost column. All relevant ∆E values are presented in
the rightmost column. A higher ∆E value indicates that two colours are more easily
distinguishable.
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in a 2 (row) × 3 (column) grid. The colour of the target object was al-
ways different from the colour of at least some competitors: when it was
blue, some were green, and when it was green, some were blue. As the
target object was unique in all arrays, including a colour modifier always
resulted in overspecification, except for the rare cases where participants
did not use a basic-level term (e.g., ‘the blue picture’ instead of ‘the blue
dress’), which were not included in the analysis. For the sake of varia-
tion, the target’s colour was unique in the array in half of the trials (e.g.,
the target was blue and all competitors were green), but shared with two
competitors in the other half (e.g., the target and two competitors were
blue and the other three competitors were green).
The experiment had three main conditions, which were tested between
participants. In the High-High condition, pictures were either highly typ-
ical blue or highly typical green. The contrast between the colours in
the arrays was thus high and the colours were high in typicality. In the
Low-Low condition, pictures were either light blue or light green: both
contrast and typicality were thus low. These two conditions were simi-
lar to the Colour/High-Salience and the Colour/Low-Salience conditions
in Chapter 5, respectively, although the colours were slightly different.2
In the High-Low condition, the colour contrast within the critical arrays
was high, as in the High-High condition, but the colour typicality of all
colours was low, as in the Low-Low condition.
In the High-High and the Low-Low conditions, each participant saw
only one colour pair throughout the experiment: one shade of blue and
one shade of green. In the High-Low condition, there were two colour
pairs: light blue versus dark green, and light green versus dark blue. To
keep the number of colour pairs constant within participants, this con-
dition was split into two conditions: the High-Low-lightblue condition
(light blue and dark green) and the High-Low-lightgreen condition (light
green and dark blue). Examples of arrays in each condition are shown
in Figure 6.2.3 Participants were randomly assigned to the four resulting
2The ∆E values of the differences between the colours in our previous and the present
experiment were 4 (highly salient versus highly typical blue), 10 (highly salient versus
typical green), 9 (pastel versus light blue), and 3 (pastel versus light green). Note, how-
ever, that these values are only approximations of the differences between the colours,
because we did not use a calibrated screen in our previous experiment.
3Note that the representation of the stimuli’s colours can only be an approximation
of their representation in the experiment.
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conditions. There were 20 participants in the High-Low-lightgreen con-
dition, and 18 in all other conditions. An overview of the colours in each
condition is presented in Table 6.1.
Figure 6.2: Arrays in the High-High (top left), Low-Low (top right), High-Low-
lightblue (bottom left), and High-Low-lightgreen (bottom right) conditions.
We included filler trials in order to obscure the purpose of the exper-
iment. There were three types of filler trials: arrays with four common
objects, arrays with four pictures of Greebles, and arrays with two pic-
tures of human faces.
There were 12 different critical pictures in each condition (6 pictures
× 2 values of the attribute in that condition). Each picture was presented
twice in each experimental session. Thus, there were 24 critical trials
in each condition. Participants also received 24 trials of each of the three
filler types, and 4 additional trials for practice. Altogether, they received a
total number of 100 trials. The order of the trials was pseudorandomised,
with the restriction that a critical trial was always preceded by at least two
trials in which the target was not of the same type of garment (for exam-
ple, when the target was a dress, the target in the previous two trials was
never a dress), in order to prevent participants from adding modifiers for
the sake of contrast with the previous trials. Each participant saw the tri-
als in a different order. The stimuli were presented on a colour calibrated
computer monitor. The experiment was programmed with Presentation
software.
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6.2.4 Procedure
Participants received both written and oral instructions about the task,
which was to instruct an imaginary addressee to click on one of the pic-
tures in the array, by completing the Dutch equivalent of the sentence
‘Click on . . . ’. The position of the target on the screen was indicated by a
cross on that position, which preceded the presentation of the array and
stayed on the screen for 1000 ms. Participants were instructed to avoid in-
formation about the target’s position in the array (e.g., ‘the picture in the
bottom left’) by asking them to imagine that their addressee might see the
pictures in a different order. They were told that there was no time pres-
sure, but they were encouraged not to think too long before they started
speaking. They were instructed to press a key after they were finished
speaking, and the pictures remained on the screen until they did. The
next trial started 1000 ms after the key was pressed. All participants were
tested individually in a quiet cubicle. It took them about 20 minutes to
complete the task.
6.3 Results
The 74 participants each performed 24 critical trials. Thus, the critical tri-
als elicited 1,776 referring expressions. We removed responses in which
the referent was not the target item (n = 10), in which speakers corrected
themselves (n = 22), and in which a colour modifier was included without
this resulting in overspecification (e.g., when the utterance was ‘the blue
picture’; n = 8). We thus removed 40 responses from the analyses (2.3%).
The remaining 1,736 referring expressions were annotated as colour over-
specification if a colour modifier was included.
6.3.1 Colour typicality versus colour contrast
Speakers are more likely to produce colour overspecification when refer-
ring to objects in highly salient colours than when referring to objects
in pastel colours, which are less salient. The present experiment investi-
gates what factors play a role in this difference. If typicality plays a role,
the prediction is that the proportion of colour overspecification is lower
in the High-Low conditions than in the High-High condition. If contrast
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is a factor, on the other hand, the prediction is that the proportion of
colour overspecification is higher in the High-Low conditions than in the
Low-Low condition.
In the initial analysis, the two High-Low conditions were taken to-
gether as one condition. The mean proportion of colour overspecification
was lower in the resulting High-Low condition (M = .37, SD = .48) than
in the High-High condition (M = .70, SD = .46). It was also numeri-
cally lower than in the Low-Low condition (M = .46, SD = .50). Since
Shapiro-Wilk tests indicated that the data were not normally distributed
(p < .001 for all conditions), we ranked the data and analysed them us-
ing non-parametric statistics. We report mean ranks, denoted by MR. A
Kruskal-Wallis test indicated that at least one of the three conditions was
different from another condition, H(2) = 8.70, p = .013. Stepwise step-
down comparisons revealed a significant difference between the High-
High condition (MR = 49.97) on the one hand and the High-Low (MR =
32.49) and Low-Low (MR = 35.61) conditions on the other hand, p < .05,
while the difference between the High-Low and Low-Low conditions was
only marginally significant, p = .051. The results seem to support the first
prediction, suggesting that colour typicality plays a role in colour over-
specification. However, the second prediction is not supported: the rate
of colour overspecification in the High-Low condition is not higher than
in the Low-Low condition – numerically, it is even lower.
As Figure 6.3 shows, however, the participants in the two High-Low
conditions responded differently: while the proportion of overspecifica-
tion in the High-Low-lightgreen condition (M = .22, SD = .41) was numer-
ically lower than the proportion in the Low-Low condition, the proportion
in the High-Low-lightblue condition (M = .54, SD = .50) was numeri-
cally higher. Two Mann-Whitney tests indicated that the proportion in the
High-Low-lightblue condition (MR = 13.36) was not significantly differ-
ent from the High-High condition (MR = 20.64), U = 123.50, z = -1.28, p
> .05, or from the Low-Low condition (MR = 19.92 versus MR = 17.08),
U = 136.50, z = -1.28, p > .05. Thus, the significant difference between the
High-High and the High-Low conditions was entirely due to the low rate
of colour overspecification in the High-Low-lightgreen condition. Look-
ing into the data suggested, interestingly, that our selected light green did
not (clearly) fall into the category ‘green’ according to some participants.
In Section 6.3.2, we go into this matter more deeply.
As the High-Low-lightblue condition was not significantly different
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Figure 6.3: Proportions of overspecified referring expressions in each condition. For
the sake of clarity, the colours of the bars are approximations of the colours of the stimuli
in the condition they represent. The error bars represent standard errors.
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from either the High-High or the Low-Low condition, no support was
found for either of the two predictions. However, an additional analy-
sis was carried out. As indicated before, the colours in the High-High
condition were very similar to the colours in the Colour/High-Salience
condition used in Chapter 5, and the same holds for the colours in the
Low-Low condition and the Colour/Low-Salience condition. We there-
fore compared the High-Low-lightblue condition from the present study
to the Colour/High-Salience and Colour/Low-Salience conditions from
our previous study. A Kruskal-Wallis test indicated a highly significant
main effect, H(2) = 32.55, p < .001. Stepwise stepdown comparisons in-
dicated that the proportion of overspecification was, in line with our first
prediction, significantly lower in the High-Low-lightblue condition (MR
= 45.28) than in the Colour/High-Salience condition (MR = 62.00), p <
.05, but, in line with our second prediction, significantly higher than in
the Colour/Low-Salience condition (MR = 29.11), p < .05. The results
thus suggest that both colour typicality and colour contrast might play a
role in the production of colour overspecification.
6.3.2 Categorisation
The rate of colour overspecification was unexpectedly low in the High-
Low-lightgreen condition. In order to investigate why this was the case,
we looked into the colour terms used by the participants. It turned out
that in the High-Low-lightgreen condition, light green targets were not
always referred to as ‘(light) green’ (even though an informal pretest had
indicated that each of the six colours was classified as expected). The
only three participants who included colour at least once when referring
to light green targets, always used colour terms other than ‘(light)green’:
one used ‘white’ (11 trials), one used ‘yellow’ (3 trials), and one used
‘yellowish’ (1 trial) and ‘yellow-green’ (1 trial). None of the other colours
were referred to by any other term than ‘(light) blue’ or ‘(light) green’. In
sum, the light green colour we selected did not seem to be clearly green to
all participants, which may have urged some of them to avoid including
colour altogether.
We conducted a posttest to assess the degree to which all our selected
colours fell into one category. We presented 75 participants (all of whom
reported not to be colourblind) with two pictures from the experiment,
one at the time, on a calibrated screen. They always received two pictures
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of the same type of garment, in the two colours used within one of the
four conditions in the main experiment. They were asked to indicate, for
each of the eleven Dutch basic colour terms, how likely they were to use
it if they were to name the colour of the picture, on a 7-point scale. (We
included all basic colour terms so as not to bias the participants towards
any of the colour categories.) Typical blue and green were rated by 18
participants each, dark blue by 22, dark green by 20, light blue by 35, and
light green by 37 participants.4
The results indicate that for each colour, more than 95% of the partici-
pants assessed it ‘highly likely’ that they would name the colour by using
the target colour term (‘blue’ for the three shades of blue, and ‘green’ for
the three shades of green), except for light green, where this rating was
given by only 73% of the participants. Moreover, Table 6.2 shows that
although the median ratings of the target colour terms were 7 (‘highly
likely’) for each of the six colours, all of the colours low in typicality (but
neither of the colours high in typicality) received at least one median rat-
ing higher than 1 (‘not at all likely’) for a different colour term than the
target colour term: light blue and dark green received one such median
rating, dark blue two, and light green three. Thus, the posttest confirms
that the colours low in typicality that were selected for the experiment
may not clearly fall into one category according to all speakers of Dutch,
and that this holds for light green in particular.
6.4 Discussion
In this study, we aimed to answer the question whether colour overspeci-
fication is affected by the typicality of the referent’s colour, by the colour
contrast between the referent and objects in the visual context, or by both.
We conducted a reference production experiment in which we compared
references to objects in colours high in both contrast and typicality (High-
High condition) and colours low in both respects (Low-Low condition)
with references to objects in colours high in contrast, but low in typical-
ity: light blue and dark green (High-Low-lightblue condition) and light
green and dark blue (High-Low-lightgreen condition).
4The light colours were rated by a higher number of participants than the other
colours because they were represented in both the Low-Low and the High-Low condi-
tions.
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typical dark light typical dark light
blue blue blue green green green
‘blue’ 7 7 7 1 1 1
‘green’ 1 1 1 7 7 7
‘white’ 1 1 1 1 1 3
‘black’ 1 3.5 1 1 1 1
‘grey’ 1 2 2 1 1 2
‘brown’ 1 1 1 1 3 1
‘yellow’ 1 1 1 1 1 3
‘orange’ 1 1 1 1 1 1
‘red’ 1 1 1 1 1 1
‘pink’ 1 1 1 1 1 1
‘purple’ 1 1 1 1 1 1
Table 6.2: Median estimations of the likelihood of using a colour term (rows) to de-
scribe a colour (columns). Ratings higher than 1 are represented in bold face.
As the fourth condition turned out to be complicated, we focused
on the High-Low-lightblue condition first. The proportion of overspec-
ification in this condition was not significantly different from either the
proportion in the High-High or in the Low-Low condition. As the colours
in the High-High and the Low-Low conditions were similar to those in
the Colour-High and the Colour-Low conditions, respectively, in Chap-
ter 5, we also compared the High-Low-lightblue condition to those two
conditions. We found, first, that the proportion of overspecification was
significantly lower in the High-Low-lightblue condition than in the Colour-
High condition. The contrast between blue and green was very similar in
the two conditions: the ∆E values were 62 in the High-Low-lightblue
condition and approximately 69 in the Colour-High condition. It is there-
fore very likely that we found an effect of colour typicality, which was
clearly different between the two conditions: highly typical colours are
more salient than lowly salient colours, and speakers may thus be more
likely to produce colour overspecification when the referent’s colour is
high in typicality, as in the Colour-High condition, than when it is low in
typicality, as in the High-Low-lightblue condition.
Second, we found that the proportion of overspecification was signifi-
cantly higher in the High-Low-lightblue condition than in the Colour-Low
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condition. This suggests that colour contrast may play a role as well in
colour overspecification: while the colours in both conditions were low
in typicality, the contrast between blue and green was clearly higher in
the High-Low-lightblue than in the Colour-Low condition, where the ∆E
value was 23.
It is important to realise that in the additional analysis, conditions
were compared that are probably not entirely comparable. First, and most
importantly, the present experiment was conducted using a calibrated
screen, while the experiment in our previous work was not. Therefore,
we do not know exactly what colours were shown to the participants in
our previous study, or how similar those colours were to the colours in
the present study. Second, the degree of colour typicality was opera-
tionalised as the perceptual difference between a colour and the highly
typical colour from the same colour category. This measure is problem-
atic because in colour models that take into account human colour per-
ception, such as CIEL*a*b* and Munsell, colour categories differ in shape
and size. Look, for instance, at the Munsell chart in Figure 6.4. In this
chart, E16 is the best example of ‘green’ and C10 is the best example of
‘yellow’ according to speakers of Dutch (Majid et al., 2011). Now, while
the second colour below the best example of ‘green’ (G16) may be judged
as fairly typical, the second colour below the best example of ‘yellow’
(E10) may not be judged as yellow at all, thus being very low in typ-
icality. This shows that the degree of typicality of a colour is relative
to the size and shape of its colour category, which raises the possibility
that the colours in the High-Low-lightblue and the Low-Low conditions
were not perceived as equally typical. Hence, the difference between the
two conditions might be due to a difference in typicality rather than to
a difference in contrast. We are therefore prone to emphasise that more
research is needed to give a decisive answer to the question how colour
contrast contributes to the tendency to produce colour overspecification.
The proportion of overspecification was the lowest in the High-Low-
lightgreen condition. To find out why this was so, we looked into the
data and conducted a posttest. The results suggest that the light green
that we selected for the experiment did not clearly fall into the category
‘green’: although the majority of the participants in the posttest estimated
it ‘very likely’ that they would describe this colour as ‘green’, the propor-
tion of participants who gave this rating to the target colour was lower
for all other colours selected for the experiment. Indeed, some partic-
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Figure 6.4: The World Color Survey Munsell chart (Cook et al., 2009). Note that the
colours only roughly approach the colours of Munsell chips.
ipants in the High-Low-lightgreen condition referred to light green by
using a different term than ‘(light) green’: terms for white, yellow, or
even terms reflecting doubt, such as ‘yellowish’ and ‘yellow-green’. It
makes sense for speakers not to refer to the referent’s colour if it is at the
boundary between colour categories, or close to a boundary: including
such a colour could be confusing for the hearer, who may not agree with
the speaker about the colour category the colour falls into. Also, colour
terms may be less accessible for speakers when the referent’s colour does
not clearly fall into one category; as indicated in the Introduction, more
typical members of a category have been shown to be recognised faster as
a member of a category (e.g., Rips et al., 1973; Rosch and Mervis, 1975).
The fact that alternative colour terms for light green were only used in
the High-Low-lightgreen but not in the Low-Low condition, even though
the same colour was used in both conditions, suggests that the selected
shade of light green was perceived differently in a context with dark blue
objects than in a context with light blue objects. This is in line with the
literature on colour perception, which shows that the perception of colour
is highly context-dependent (Evans, 1948, pp. 175–176; Pitt and Winter,
1974; Bloomer, 1976, pp. 109–116).5
Our results suggest that speakers are less likely to refer to the refer-
ent’s colour if this colour is not categorised uniquely. It can be argued
that potential disagreement in colour categorisation is one extreme the
5See http://brainden.com/color-illusions.htm for some examples of colour illusions,
which illustrate the context-dependence of colour perception.
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colour typicality scale, where the best examples of colour categories are
the other extreme. This is in line with the results of the posttest. Highly
typical blue and green were the only two colours which elicited the lowest
possible median ratings for all colour terms other than ‘blue’ or ‘green’,
respectively. The other four colours elicited a higher median rating for at
least one other colour term, and light green elicited most: light blue and
dark green elicited one higher median rating, dark blue two, and light
green three. This accords with the fact that in the reference production
experiment, light green was the only colour which was referred to some-
times by different colour terms than expected beforehand. It seems, then,
that colour overspecification is more likely to occur when the referent’s
colour is not highly typical but nevertheless categorised uniquely than
when it is harder to categorise, but that it is even more likely to occur
when the referent’s colour is (close to) the best example of its category.
The trends in our reference production experiment support this proposal.
In sum, the present study strongly suggests that colour salience, and
hence the production of colour overspecification, is affected by the typ-
icality of the referent’s colour: if it is so low in typicality that it is not
entirely clear what colour category it falls into, speakers are not likely to
produce colour overspecification, while colour overspecification is very
likely to occur when the referent’s colour is close to the focal centre of
the colour category. Furthermore, our results suggest that colours that
are further from the focal centre but still uniquely categorised do trig-
ger colour overspecification, but not to the same extent as highly typical
colours do. Additionally, we found preliminary evidence that the ten-
dency to produce colour overspecification is positively affected by colour
contrast. We conclude that colour typicality, and possibly also colour
contrast, contribute to the salience of the referent’s colour, and as a result
affect the tendency to produce colour overspecification.
Chapter 7
Conclusions
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The topic of this thesis was referential overspecification, with a focus on
colour overspecification. At first sight, it may seem odd that speakers
should unnecessarily include certain information, which makes overspec-
ification an intriguiging phenomenon. One aim of the thesis was to gain
more insight into the question how the production of overspecification is
best accounted for. To this end, I presented a survey of the experimental
literature on overspecification (Chapter 1) and a closely related theoretical
chapter in which I presented a proposal for an account of overspecifica-
tion (Chapter 2). This proposal was merely a theoretical sketch, as more
knowledge of the patterns in reference production is needed to work out a
more detailed account. A series of experimental studies, which were dis-
cussed in the following four chapters, aimed at extending our knowledge
of those patterns, with a focus on a central notion in research of overspec-
ification: salience. The focus of the experimental series narrowed down
from variation across objects, via variation across and within attributes,
to factors in colour salience. In this final chapter, I present a summary
of what has been discussed in the past chapters, closing with the main
lessons that can be drawn from the thesis as a whole.
As pointed out before, when speakers produce overspecification, they
provide their hearer with information that is not strictly speaking nec-
essary. In Chapter 1, I showed that theorists in psycholinguistics and
computational linguistics intially assumed that adult speakers therefore
do not normally produce overspecification (e.g., Olson, 1970; Dale, 1989).
Experimental research revealed, however, that in fact they do (Mangold
and Pobel, 1988; Pechmann, 1989). A very influential idea in the literature
on overspecification is that some attributes are preferred over others, and
that speakers select attributes incrementally, based on those preferences,
rather than investigating carefully how many objects in the context are
excluded by each attribute (e.g., Pechmann, 1989; Dale and Reiter, 1995).
Indeed, Chapter 5 suggested that the latter selection criterion, which is
called discriminatory power, is not an important factor in the produc-
tion of overspecification, which is in line with results obtained by Gatt
et al. (2013), which show that discriminatory power can be overruled by
attribute preferences. Attribute preferences are probably determined by
many factors, but the literature suggests that visual salience seems to
be among the most important ones. The finding that colour overspec-
ification is commonly produced is often explained in terms of salience
(e.g., Arts et al., 2011b; Koolen et al., 2013). However, the tendency to
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produce colour overspecification is also modulated by contextual factors,
such as the colours of the objects in the context (Koolen et al., 2013), as-
sociations between colours and types of objects (Sedivy, 2003; Westerbeek
et al., 2015), relevance of the competitor, and complexity of the context
(Koolen et al., 2015). In the present thesis, various additional factors were
found to have an effect: the degree to which colour is important for the
referent, the visual complexity of the referent (Chapter 3), the discourse
context (Chapter 4), and the salience of the referent’s colour in the context
(Chapter 5), which seems to be determined by colour typicality, colour
categorisability, and colour contrast in the context (Chapter 6).
Chapter 1 closed with a discussion of explanations for the produc-
tion of overspecification that have been proposed in the literature. They
were divided into two families, one of which explains overspecification in
terms of production efficiency (e.g., Pechmann, 1989; Dale and Viethen,
2010), while the other explains it rather in terms of communicative ben-
efits (e.g., Arts et al., 2011b). The question of why speakers produce
overspecification was addressed in more detail in Chapter 2, in which the
framework of Gricean pragmatics was adopted (Grice, 1975). Following
Geurts and Rubio-Ferna´ndez (2015), I assumed that Gricean pragmatics
is concerned with the questions of what speakers do and why they do
it (the W-level), rather than with the question of how they do it (the H-
level). Central to the Gricean theory is the Cooperative Principle, which
states that speakers contribute to the conversation as is required by the
purpose of the conversation. The well-known Gricean maxims, including
the second maxim of Quantity (‘do not make your contribution more in-
formative than is required, for the current purposes of the exchange’), are
specifications of this principle. I argued that overspecification need not
be a violation of the Cooperative Principle or even the second maxim of
Quantity, since the unnecessary modifiers that speakers tend to include
are often useful for hearers. After all, if overspecification is beneficial
for hearers, it is more cooperative to produce it than to produce mini-
mal specification. I then showed that there is only scarce evidence for
the suggestion that seemingly cooperative behaviour is in fact the result
of egocentric processes, while there is a large body of evidence show-
ing that interlocutors routinely take into account what is in the common
ground, which enables them to behave cooperatively. Finally, I presented
a sketch for an account for overspecification. I proposed that on the W-
level, where we are concerned with the question of why overspecification
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is produced, overspecification can be accounted for in terms of coopera-
tiveness. Including salient attributes, for example, is a cooperative strat-
egy, because salient attributes are likely to be useful in referent identifica-
tion (see also Arts et al., 2011a). On the H-level, concerning the question
of how overspecification is produced, overspecification can be accounted
for in terms of the heuristics underpinning this cooperative strategy. I
argued that, due to the limited cognitive resources of speakers, general
heuristics have been developed, which may sometimes result in subopti-
mal referring expressions. For instance, including colour is, in general, a
good idea because colour is often salient, but it is not particularly helpful
for the hearer in a monochrome context. Still, heuristics that implement
the intention to be cooperative probably result in cooperative behaviour
more often than not.
The series of experimental studies started with a study which focused
on the effect of variation across objects on colour overspecification. Chap-
ter 3 showed, first, that there is a correlation between the production of
colour overspecification and the degree to which colour is judged to be
important for the referent (e.g., most people find that colour is more im-
portant for a dress than for a stapler). Second, a strong tendency was
found to produce colour overspecification in reference to simple geomet-
rical figures. Both findings were argued to be due to colour salience:
colour is probably more salient when it is highly important to an object
than when it is not so important, and the colour salience of simple geo-
metrical figures is probably high because they do not have any attributes
that matter, other than their shape and colour. At first sight, this finding
is at odds with an account of overspecification in terms of cooperative-
ness: colour is not more helpful for hearers when the referent is a dress
or a circle than when it is a stapler. As pointed out in Chapter 2, however,
including salient attributes when referring to an object is a communica-
tively beneficial strategy. After all, what is salient to the speaker will, in
general, also be salient to the hearer, and salient attributes are therefore
likely to help the hearer to efficiently identify the referent. Thus, although
colour is not more helpful when the referent’s colour importance is high
than when it is low, the observed patterns are in fact due to a general
speakers’ tendency to include salient attributes, which can be accounted
for in terms of communicative benefits.
Narrowing the focus from variation across objects to variation across
attributes, Chapter 4 presented a series of experimental studies in which
159
the rates of overspecification of colour, pattern, and size were compared.
A baseline study (Experiment 1) with a within-participants design in-
dicated that colour and pattern overspecification were produced more
frequently than size overspecification, presumably because colour and
pattern are salient and absolute attributes while size is relative and less
salient in this experiment (see also Belke and Meyer, 2002). In a series of
follow-up studies, factors contributing to the observed tendencies were
assessed: salience and absoluteness, but also the tendency towards con-
sistency which may reflect conceptual pacts and alignment (e.g., Brennan
and Clark, 1996; Pickering and Garrod, 2004).
When making size more salient by increasing size contrast (Experi-
ment 3), the pattern of results was similar to the pattern found in the
baseline study: again, colour and pattern overspecification were pro-
duced more than size overspecification, and the rate of size overspeci-
fication did not increase significantly. This finding suggests that speakers
tend not to produce overspecification of relative attributes. Such a ten-
dency makes sense, as size overspecification is potentially confusing for
hearers: they may wrongly infer from the presence of a size modifier
that the referent is the bigger or smaller one of two objects of the same
type (Sedivy et al., 1999). Changing the experimental design, however,
did alter the pattern (Experiment 2): when using a between-participants
design, the rate of pattern overspecification decreased, now being closer
to the rate of size overspecification than to the rate of colour overspecifi-
cation. The experiment thus showed that the tendency to produce colour
overspecification is in fact stronger than the tendency to produce pattern
overspecification. As colour and pattern are both absolute attributes, this
suggests that colour is more salient than pattern. It also indicated that the
within-participants design of the other experiments had triggered partic-
ipants, who preferably respond in a consistent way, to treat colour and
pattern similarly, while a between-participants design excluded this pos-
sibility. Finally, the tendency towards consistency was shown to be so
strong that even size overspecification was frequently produced when
size was mentioned in previous utterances (Experiment 4). In sum, it was
shown in Chapter 4 that both salience and absoluteness contribute to the
tendency to include colour, even if this results in overspecification, but
that overspecification of other attributes can occur frequently as well.
The study presented in Chapter 5 narrowed the focus still further.
Again, the rates of colour, pattern, and size overspecification were as-
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sessed, but now variation within rather than across attributes was inves-
tigated. The starting point of this experiment was the observation that
the colours of experimental stimuli in research of reference production
tend to be extremely salient, being highly saturated and contrastive (as
in Chapters 3 and 4; see also, e.g., Viethen and Dale, 2011, and Koolen
et al., 2011). As high rates of colour overspecification are often accounted
for in terms of salience, it was hypothesised that colour overspecification
would be produced less frequently in reference to objects in less salient
pastel colours. Similarly, the effect of salience of pattern and size on over-
specification of those attributes was investigated. Indeed, an effect was
found for each of the three attributes, the effect on colour overspecifica-
tion being especially strong. Although the rate of colour overspecification
was higher than the rate of pattern overspecification when the referents’
colours and patterns were high in salience, the difference entirely disap-
peared when they were low in salience. To conclude, Chapter 5 showed
that colour overspecification is not necessarily produced more than over-
specification of other attributes.
The focus of Chapter 6 finally narrowed to factors contributing to the
salience of colours that triggers colour overspecification. Two factors were
investigated: colour typicality and colour contrast. First, speakers might
be more prone to produce colour overspecification when the referent’s
colour is high in typicality, that is, if it is a good example of its colour
category (e.g., the green of fresh spinach) than if it is low in typicality
(e.g., army green; see Berlin and Kay, 1969; Rosch, 1975). Second, colour
overspecification might be triggered by the amount of colour contrast
between the referent and its competitors: this contrast is higher when
colours are very different from each other (e.g., army green and pastel
blue) than if they are similar (e.g., pastel green and pastel blue). Although
our analysis did not indicate an effect of either colour typicality or colour
contrast, an additional analysis, in which the results were compared to
similar conditions from Chapter 5, suggested that colour overspecification
is more likely to occur when the referent’s colour is high than when it is
low in typicality. A complicating factor in the experiment was that one
of the colours of the stimuli was potentially confusing: the selected light
green was categorised as white or yellow by some of the participants.
This was probably the reason why the rate of colour overspecification
was very low in the condition in question, since including colour when
the referent’s colour is hard to categorise is potentially confusing for the
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hearer. It can be argued that colours that are hard to categorise are on
one extreme of the colour typicality scale, however, which was supported
by a colour term judgement task. This is thus additional evidence that
the tendency to produce colour overspecification is affected by colour
typicality. Finally, the results suggested that colour contrast may have an
effect on colour overspecification, too.
To conclude, I have argued for an account of overspecification in terms
of cooperativeness. I have shown that distinguishing between the theo-
retical W-level, which is concerned with what and why, and the H-level,
which is concerned with how, is helpful in explaining the production of
overspecification, as it takes into account both production and compre-
hension efficiency. It enables us to account for patterns in overspecifica-
tion that do not appear to reflect cooperativeness, without forcing us to
assume that speakers tend to be egocentric. The presented experimen-
tal studies are in line with this proposal: they show that speakers tend
to include salient attributes, even if this leads to overspecification. They
confirm that colour overspecification is common, while at the same time
refining the suggestion that colour is exceptional per se. Rather, we have
seen that some colours of some objects are highly salient, due to colour
importance, object complexity, colour typicality, and possibly also colour
contrast. Further investigation of the factors involved in patterns of refer-
ence production is a highly recommended topic for future research.
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Als mensen met elkaar praten, gebruiken ze verwijzende (of referentie¨le)
uitdrukkingen. Dit zijn woorden of woordgroepen die verwijzen naar
iets in de werkelijkheid, zoals ‘het hoogste gebouw van de Radboud Uni-
versiteit’, ‘de vrouw die vandaag feest viert’ en ‘het proefschrift’. Al
deze voorbeelden zijn definiete descripties: ze bestaan uit een definiet
lidwoord (‘de’ of ‘het’ in het Nederlands) en een beschrijving van de re-
ferent, in de vorm van een zelfstandig naamwoord (‘vrouw’), eventueel
aangevuld met extra informatie (‘die vandaag feest viert’).
Aanvankelijk werd aangenomen dat sprekers alleen extra informatie
toevoegen als de hoorder deze informatie nodig heeft om te begrijpen
wie of wat de referent is. Uit experimenteel onderzoek blijkt echter dat
sprekers regelmatig informatie toevoegen die strikt genomen niet nodig
is. Ze hebben het bijvoorbeeld over ‘de vrouw die vandaag feest viert’
terwijl er maar e´e´n vrouw aanwezig is, en ‘de vrouw’ de hoorder dus
voldoende informatie zou geven om te weten over wie het gaat. Het
toevoegen van onnodige informatie aan een definiete descriptie wordt
referentie¨le overspecificatie genoemd. Het doel van dit proefschrift is om
de productie van overspecificatie beter te begrijpen.
De belangrijkste vraag van het eerste deel van het proefschrift is hoe
we kunnen verklaren dat overspecificatie regelmatig voorkomt. In Hoofd-
stuk 1 geef ik een overzicht van experimenteel onderzoek naar de produc-
tie van overspecificatie. Eerst beschrijf ik de patronen die zijn gevonden in
het gedrag van sprekers, die een indruk geven van welke eigenschappen
onder welke omstandigheden vaak (schijnbaar) onnodig genoemd wor-
den. Het blijkt dat sprekers voor sommige eigenschappen een sterkere
voorkeur hebben dan voor andere, terwijl de mate waarin een eigenschap
de referent onderscheidt van andere objecten relatief onbelangrijk is (dit
wordt ook bevestigd door het experiment gepresenteerd in Hoofdstuk 4).
Er lijkt met name een sterke voorkeur te bestaan voor het noemen van
kleur. Het algemene idee in de literatuur is dat dit komt doordat kleur in
het oog springt: het is vaak e´e´n van de meest opvallende eigenschappen
van een object. De tendens om kleur te noemen is zo sterk dat sprekers
dit soms zelfs doen als alle objecten in de context dezelfde kleur heb-
ben als de referent: sprekers hebben het bijvoorbeeld over ‘de rode jurk’
terwijl alle andere kleren ook rood zijn. Anderzijds wordt de kleur van
bijvoorbeeld bananen zelden genoemd, tenzij de banaan in kwestie een
atypische kleur heeft (‘de blauwe banaan’).
Na het overzicht van patronen in overspecificatie bespreek ik de ver-
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klaringen die in de literatuur genoemd worden voor de productie van
overspecificatie. Grofweg zijn er twee soorten verklaringen. Overspe-
cificatie kan worden verklaard in termen van productie-efficie¨ntie: de
spreker gebruikt bij het produceren van verwijzende uitdrukkingen stra-
tegiee¨n die haar de moeite besparen die nodig zou zijn om te bepalen
welke eigenschappen nodig zijn voor de hoorder. Mogelijk gebruiken
sprekers eenvoudige heuristieken (bijvoorbeeld: ‘noem de meest opval-
lende eigenschappen van de referent’). Volgens een alternatieve verkla-
ring produceren sprekers echter overspecificatie omdat dit communica-
tieve voordelen heeft: een hoorder kan de referent bijvoorbeeld vaak veel
sneller ontdekken als hij weet welke kleur deze heeft, en als de hoorder
informatie uit de zin mist kan extra informatie hem in staat stellen alsnog
te achterhalen wie of wat de referent is.
In Hoofdstuk 2 doe ik een theoretisch voorstel waarbij ik inzichten uit
beide verklaringen combineer. Ik ga er hierbij vanuit dat menselijke com-
municatie op ten minste twee niveaus verklaard kan worden. Op het W-
niveau is de centrale vraag: wat doen mensen en waarom doen ze het? Op
het H-niveau is dit: hoe doen mensen wat ze doen? Ik stel voor om over-
specificatie op het W-niveau te benaderen vanuit een Griceaans kader.
Volgens deze theorie zijn sprekers en hoorders in principe coo¨peratief en
verwachten zij dit ook van elkaar. Aangezien experimenteel onderzoek
over het algemeen laat zien dat overspecificatie een positief effect heeft op
het begrijpen van verwijzende uitdrukkingen, stel ik dat het produceren
van overspecificatie vaak coo¨peratiever is dan het geven van de precieze
hoeveelheid benodigde informatie over de referent. Mijn antwoord op
de vraag waarom sprekers vaak overspecificatie produceren is dus: omdat
overspecificatie communicatieve voordelen heeft. Op het H-niveau zien
we echter dat de beperkingen van de menselijke cognitie een efficie¨nte
manier vereisen om eigenschappen te selecteren. Het lijkt erop dat spre-
kers daarom heuristieken gebruiken die in het algemeen tot coo¨peratief
gedrag leiden (bijvoorbeeld ‘noem de meest opvallende eigenschappen
van de referent’), maar die zo algemeen zijn dat de uitkomst soms niet
optimaal is (bijvoorbeeld doordat er een eigenschap genoemd wordt waar
de hoorder niets aan heeft bij het identificeren van de referent). Door de
inzichten van verschillende niveaus te combineren is het niet nodig om
de onwaarschijnlijke aanname te maken dat sprekers in feite egocentrisch
zijn en niet overwegen welke informatie nuttig is voor hun hoorder.
Het doel van het tweede deel van het proefschrift is om meer patronen
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in de productie van overspecificatie in kaart te brengen. Ik presenteer een
serie van experimenten waarin proefpersonen denkbeeldige personen de
opdracht gaven om op een plaatje op het scherm te klikken. Er stonden
steeds meerdere plaatjes op het scherm, maar de referent was altijd uniek:
als het een jas was, stond er geen andere jas op het scherm. Het was dus
nooit nodig om extra eigenschappen van het object toe te voegen (zoals
de kleur, het patroon of de grootte). Zo was het mogelijk om te onderzoe-
ken onder welke omstandigheden sprekers overspecificatie produceren.
Kleuroverspecificatie staat in alle experimenten centraal, maar in de loop
van het proefschrift versmalt de focus van variatie tussen objecten, via
variatie tussen en binnen eigenschappen, tot factoren die bepalend zijn
voor hoe opvallend kleuren zijn.
Hoofdstuk 3 laat zien dat de neiging om kleuroverspecificatie te pro-
duceren afhankelijk is van het soort object waarnaar de spreker verwijst.
Als kleur belangrijk is voor het object (zoals voor een jurk) is deze neiging
sterker dan als kleur niet belangrijk is voor het object (zoals voor een niet-
machine). Bij visueel simpele plaatjes, zoals vierkanten en cirkels, is deze
neiging ook sterker. Een verklaring hiervoor is dat sprekers de neiging
hebben opvallende eigenschappen van de referent te noemen, en dat de
kleur van een object opvalt als kleur belangrijk is voor dit object, of als
een object weinig andere eigenschappen dan kleur heeft. Hiermee is het
gevonden patroon een illustratie van het in Hoofdstuk 2 gepresenteerde
voorstel voor het verklaren van overspecificatie. Op het eerste gezicht
lijkt coo¨perativiteit in dit patroon geen rol te spelen: een hoorder heeft bij
het identificeren van de referent niet meer voordeel van kleur bij een jurk
dan bij een nietmachine. Bij nader inzien blijkt dat de strategie die aan
dit patroon ten grondslag ligt wel degelijk is ontstaan om tot coo¨peratief
gedrag te leiden.
De focus in Hoofdstuk 4 versmalt van variatie tussen objecten naar
variatie tussen eigenschappen: kleur wordt vergeleken met patroon en
grootte. Het blijkt dat patroonoverspecificatie minder voorkomt dan kleur-
overspecificatie, maar meer dan grootte-overspecificatie. Een mogelijke
verklaring voor het eerste is dat de kleuren in deze experimenten opval-
lender waren dan de patronen. Het tweede komt waarschijnlijk doordat
patroon, net als kleur, een absolute eigenschap is terwijl grootte relatief
is: een object is alleen groot of klein ten opzichte van een ander ob-
ject. Daardoor kan het onnodig noemen van grootte verwarrend zijn
voor de hoorder, terwijl die kans bij patroon en kleur minder groot is.
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Dit wordt bevestigd door een vervolgexperiment: zelfs bij een verhoogd
grootte-contrast, waardoor grootte erg opvallend wordt, komt grootte-
overspecificatie maar weinig voor. Andere vervolgexperimenten laten een
sterke tendens tot consistentie zien: de neiging om kleuroverspecificatie
te produceren zet proefpersonen bijvoorbeeld vaak aan om ook patroon-
overspecificatie te produceren. In sommige gevallen leidt de tendens tot
consistentie zelfs tot een toename in grootte-overspecificatie.
Hoofdstuk 4 suggereert, in samenspraak met de literatuur, dat kleur-
overspecificatie veel voorkomt omdat kleur erg opvallend is. Hoofdstuk
5, waar wordt ingezoomd op variatie binnen eigenschappen, laat echter
zien dat de mate van kleuroverspecificatie afhankelijk is van de speci-
fieke kleuren van de referent en de andere objecten in de context. Kleur-
overspecificatie komt veel voor bij opvallende, felle kleuren, maar veel
minder bij pasteltinten, die minder opvallend zijn dan felle kleuren. Ook
bij patroon en grootte heeft de mate waarin deze eigenschappen opvallen
invloed op de mate van overspecificatie. Bovendien komt kleuroverspe-
cificatie niet meer voor dan patroonoverspecificatie als de kleuren niet zo
opvallend zijn. Kleur wordt dus niet automatisch sneller genoemd dan
andere eigenschappen.
Ten slotte wordt er in Hoofdstuk 6 onderzocht wat pasteltinten min-
der opvallend maakt dan felle kleuren, waardoor kleuroverspecificatie
bij pasteltinten minder voorkomt. Het verschil zou veroorzaakt kunnen
worden doordat het contrast tussen pastelblauw en -groen lager is dan
het contrast tussen felblauw en -groen. Het is ook mogelijk dat de felle
kleuren zelf meer opvallen, omdat ze betere voorbeelden zijn van ‘blauw’
en ‘groen’ dan pasteltinten: ze hebben een hogere typicaliteit. De kleur
van gras is bijvoorbeeld volgens de meeste mensen een ‘beter’ groen dan
legergroen. Het experiment suggereert dat vooral typicaliteit een belang-
rijke factor is. Ook belangrijk is of een kleur goed gecategoriseerd kan
worden: kleuroverspecificatie lijkt minder voor te komen als er moge-
lijk onenigheid is of een kleur bijvoorbeeld onder de categorie ‘groen’ of
‘geel’ valt. Aangezien een dergelijke kleur in feite een zeer lage typicali-
teit heeft, ondersteunt dit resultaat het idee dat typicaliteit een belangrijke
rol speelt in hoe opvallend de kleur van een referent is.
Samenvattend kunnen we zeggen dat felle kleuren, waarschijnlijk van-
wege hun hoge typicaliteit, vaak zeer opvallend zijn en daardoor regel-
matig tot kleuroverspecificatie leiden. Ook andere eigenschappen kunnen
zo opvallend zijn dat de kans op overspecificatie groot is. De tendens om
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opvallende eigenschappen van de referent te noemen is zeer sterk omdat
dit de kans vergroot dat de hoorder de referent efficie¨nt en correct iden-
tificeert, wat een voorwaarde is voor succesvolle communicatie. Zelfs
aan ogenschijnlijk minder coo¨peratief gedrag ligt in feite een strategie ten
grondslag die in het algemeen tot coo¨peratief gedrag leidt. De belang-
rijkste reden dat overspecificatie veel voorkomt is dus dat sprekers de
neiging hebben met name die eigenschappen van de referent te noemen
die bruikbaar zijn voor de hoorder – zelfs al zijn ze niet per se nodig.
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